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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
This thesis consists of five essays in the field of political economy. The first part of the thesis 
includes three essays covering various aspects of the political economy of globalization and 
economic reforms, which are linked in several ways. The second part of the thesis includes two 
essays on the political economy of development in India. The aim of this introductory section is 
to give a brief and non-technical overview of the essays, as well as to explain the links between 
them. The discussion of the contribution of the research to the existing literature will be carried 
out separately in each essay. 
 
Globalization and economic reforms are two important concepts in the international 
political economy field. Explaining the social effects of both has been at the center of the 
international political economy literature for an extensive period of time. Much has been written 
about the effects of globalization on social outcomes (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008, 
Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003) and there are at least two distinct trains of thought in 
academia and the public discourse. One view is that the structural changes towards more liberal 
economic policy can positively transform the economy and polity, increasing economic growth 
and welfare, as well as bringing much required modernization (Bhagwati 2004, Wolf 2004, 
Friedman 1999). On the other hand, more pessimistic voices, which include mainstream 
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economists such as Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, and Marxist critical theorists, believe that 
globalization can simultaneously promote a ‘race to the bottom’ in social standards that degrades 
communitarian bases of social stability and welfare (Rodrik 1997, Stiglitz and Charlton 2006). In 
fact, the global financial crisis of 2008, where people took to the streets in both developing and 
developed countries, has made the issue of whether or not globalization and economic reforms 
create socially undesirable consequences, ever more crucial. 
The first part of the thesis sheds new light on various aspects of the social effects of 
globalization and economic reforms, reviewing findings in the literature to date and extending 
existing theories. A major contribution of the thesis is the rigorous and thorough empirical 
evaluation of the human rights effects of economic reforms, and to what extent globalization has 
induced a race to the bottom in labour standards, while also contributing new empirical findings 
to extend the research surrounding the side effects of participating in IMF programs. 
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 1, we focus on the impact of economic 
reforms and economic freedom on human rights. It is argued that economic policy reforms will 
benefit most people in terms of better access to goods, lower inflation, and better economic 
opportunities (Murphy et al. 1991). However, critics of market reforms see the majority as losers 
from such reforms, expecting resistance that would lead to political repression (Przeworski 
1991). Using the change in the Index of Economic Freedom as a measure of market liberalization 
reforms, employing data from a panel of 117 countries for the 1981–2006 period, the results 
show a strong positive association between reforms towards more free markets and governments’ 
respect for human rights, controlling for a host of relevant factors, including the possibility of 
endogeneity. These results lend support to those who argue that freer markets generate better 
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economic conditions and higher levels of social harmony. In fact, halfhearted measures at 
implementing reforms could be dangerous to human rights. 
After exploring the impact of economic reforms on human rights, we continue by linking 
economic liberalization policies prescribed by international organizations such as the IMF to the 
outbreak of civil war in chapter 2. As the global economic downturn has heightened concerns 
over intervention by international financial institutions, as well as political stability, a 
prominently published work by Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer (2010) purports to show that signing 
on to an IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) increased the risk of civil war during the  
1970–1999 period. They claim that the IMF’s SAPs push economic liberalization to the point 
where some people are so negatively affected as to foment civil war. We advance this debate by 
critically examining their theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly questioning their 
crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF programs on the economic environment in terms of 
the actual winners and losers from economic liberalization, and who might be in a position to 
rebel. Separating the effects of crises from IMF interventions is crucial since crises also generate 
losers in their own right. With only minor adjustments to their study, we find the exact opposite 
of what they conclude. We show that their measure of signing on to an IMF program remains 
consistently insignificant in explaining the outbreak of civil war, using the threshold of 25 battle 
deaths when defining the onset of a civil war. These results suggest that their operationalization 
of the IMF variable, as well as the utilization of large-scale civil wars (1000 deaths and above), 
captures the effect of ongoing war rather than the effects of liberalization. After extending the 
time period under study from 1970–1999 to 1970–2008, as well as making some minor changes 
to operationalization, again we find that IMF involvement is at worst a poor predictor of conflict, 
and at best, an alleviator of the risk.  
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The next chapter turns to a topic which is currently the focus of both politicians and the 
labour unions in general. We analyze whether inter-country competition for investment has 
adverse effects on labour standards. Among the many concerns over globalization is that as 
nations compete for international firms, they will relax labour standards as a method of lowering 
costs and attracting investment. Using spatial econometric estimation on panel data for 148 
developing countries over 18 years, we find that the labour standards in one country are indeed 
positively correlated with labour standards elsewhere (i.e., a reduction in the labour standards of 
other countries reduces the labour standards of the country in question). This interdependence is 
more evident in labour practices (i.e., enforcement) than in labour laws. Furthermore, 
competition is most fierce in those countries which already have low standards. Since there has 
been a decline in the labour practices and laws across all three groups, this is possible evidence 
of a race to the bottom as nations compete for investment. 
 
The second part of the thesis focuses on essays on the political economy of development 
in India. India is often hailed as one of the success stories of globalization (Basu 2008). Indeed, 
after the inception of market economic reforms in 1991, economic growth has been both 
sustained and impressively robust in terms of national economic indicators (Basu 2008). 
However, despite rapid economic growth during the post-1990 period, the benefits of economic 
growth are unevenly distributed, and some areas and groups of people have seen their living 
standards decline (Banerjee 2010). One could argue that this is somewhat surprising given the 
rapid surge in economic growth in recent years (Bardhan 2010). In connection with this, two 
critical issues have attracted a lot of attention, both within and outside India. First is the issue of 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
5 
 
corruption which is seen as a hindrance to prosperity and development, and the second is the 
emergence of India as one of the major donors of development aid.  
  In chapter 4, we focus particularly on the influence of the timing of elections on 
controlling corruption. Firstly, we develop a conceptual framework that extends theories of 
political budget cycles to corruption, where an incumbent government considers controlling 
corruption based purely on political considerations. More specifically, we investigate whether 
the timing of elections affects the responsiveness of the incumbent government to control 
corruption. Secondly, we empirically test the predictions of the conceptual framework using 30 
Indian states during the 1988–2009 period. Consistent with the conceptual framework developed, 
i.e., an incumbent politician might exert greater effort in an election year to control corruption, 
the findings show that scheduled elections (and not unscheduled elections) are associated with an 
increase in the number of corruption cases registered. In addition, we find that corruption cases 
registered tend to increase as a scheduled election year draws closer. Furthermore, the effects are 
found to be stronger in ‘swing states’ (where the margin of victory of the incumbent in the 
previous election was 5% or less), and in state scheduled election years which coincide with 
national elections. On the other hand, there is no effect of scheduled elections on corruption 
cases being investigated by anti-corruption agencies. 
The following chapter examines a puzzling question about India. Here, we analyze what 
determines Indian development aid. It is indeed puzzling to note that India, which has a large 
domestic population suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is 
emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of learning why poor countries provide 
foreign aid, this is the first work to econometrically analyze India’s aid allocation decisions. We 
utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments to 128 developing countries by the Ministry of 
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External Affairs and the Export-Import Bank of India, obtained in US dollars from AidData for 
the 2008-2009 period. We then compare India’s bilateral aid allocation with that of other donors 
to examine if India is any different regarding the motivation behind its allocation decisions. The 
findings show that India’s aid allocation decisions are largely driven by commercial and political 
self-interest. While recipient need does not seem to be a key determinant, neighboring countries 
receive considerable attention. 
The final section of this work briefly summarizes the main findings. 
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2. Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Do Pro-Market Economic Reforms Drive Human Rights 
Violations?1 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is little consensus on whether or not economic policy reforms towards freer markets lead 
to violations of human rights (see Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009, de Soysa and Eriksen 2009).2 
This issue resurfaces in many of the debates related to growing globalization and the spread of 
neo-liberal policies and values (Martell 2010; Stilwell 2006). Several prominent observers hail 
the victory of free-market capitalism over its rivals as progress that promotes prosperity, social 
peace and democracy (Friedman 1962, Hayek 1944, Bhagwati 2004, Fukuyama 1991). Thus, 
countries at higher levels of economic freedom and change at higher rates are expected to have 
less social dissatisfaction and less state repression of dissent (Sen 1999). Skeptics of market 
                                                            
1 Coauthored with Indra de Soysa, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU henceforth). 
2 We use the terms political repression and violations of human rights interchangeably because they essentially 
mean the same thing. In fact, the two most widely-used empirical indicators, the CIRI human rights database and the 
Political Terror Scale, are essentially based on information obtained from agencies such as the US State Department 
and Amnesty International reports. Thus, conceptions of political terror and the degree of respect for human rights 
are analytically and empirically very similar.  
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reform, comprised of scholars of critical political economy, neo-Marxist scholars, a large portion 
of the NGO community, the anti-globalization movement, as well as some orthodox economists, 
voice concern over capitalistic policy choices for social justice and stability (Root 2008, Stiglitz 
2002). They claim that free-market reforms are mostly undertaken by ruling elites for narrower 
aims, in which the rich reap all the gains and displace the pain of austerity and budget cuts on the 
poor and politically powerless. Therefore, the question of whether economic reform policies 
towards more free markets cause social dissent and disarray, measured as the level and degree of 
state violations of human rights, is an empirical one which we address by examining the 
association of the levels and rates of change towards more free-market policies and respect for 
human rights of individual citizens by their own states. 
We employ a widely-used measure of economic policies that capture broad-based reform 
towards free markets, rather than only assessing whether or not there was intervention by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs hereafter), which has generally been the norm for 
addressing this question (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2009). The problem with such an 
approach is the rather strong assumption that governments actually do implement market-
oriented reforms suggested by the IMF, which some suggest is not the case (Boockmann and 
Dreher 2003). Our approach is a direct test of the mechanism that purportedly explains why 
interventions by IFIs increase human rights violations, which is that free-market economic 
policies that these institutions push lead to state repression of human rights. Our measure of 
“economic opening” therefore captures both endogenous economic changes, with and without 
interventions from outside and regardless of the severity of political and economic crisis that 
generally require the IMF to be involved. Many countries, notably China and India, undertook 
far reaching economic reforms without much external intervention. 
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This study contributes to the existing literature in at least two very important ways. 
Firstly, most studies simply address the issue of liberalization and human rights by looking at the 
level of economic openness, which is typically measured as openness to trade and foreign 
investment (FDI) (see Hafner-Burton 2005). We make use of a comprehensive measure of the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index as a proxy for the extent of market-economic policy 
reforms. Secondly, we explicitly address a number of causality issues because of possible 
endogeneity between the respect for human rights and free market reforms by estimating 
dynamic models, employing the GMM estimation method, and addressing the issue of direction 
of causality using Granger Causality test. We employ panel data for 117 countries (95 Least 
Developing Countries and 22 OECD countries) over the period from 1981–2006 (26 years). The 
rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the various theoretical discussions 
around how market economic reforms and its progress can affect human rights within countries. 
Section 2.3 introduces the two dimensions of market reforms, human rights and their 
measurement. Section 2.4 discusses the method of estimation and data. We report empirical 
results in Section 2.5, and then conclude. 
 
2.2 Why might reforms matter for Human rights? 
Economic reforms are usually wide-ranging changes to the existing regulatory, institutional and 
structural make up of an economy, and are aimed at increasing economic efficiency by 
promoting the privatization of markets, free competition and the strengthening of property rights. 
Reforms generate winners and losers, and the causes of reforms and their consequences are 
functions of the “political economy” within these societies and not entirely due to economic 
factors alone, or any particular direction of the reforms being undertaken (Alesina and Drazen 
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1991, Rodrik 1997). It is empirically and theoretically recognized that economic policy reforms 
may require strong political authority since losers from reform are likely to resist them, whether 
they are directed towards more free markets or away from them (Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi 
2006, Haggard and Kaufman 1992). On the other hand, political rulers who generally control de 
facto political power are likelier to repress rather than reform if reforms towards more free 
markets, particularly granting stronger property rights, might undermine access to power and 
privilege in the future (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). Others show that reforms were 
undertaken in many cases because there was general consensus about the necessity for reform 
because of the widespread recognition that the previous policies had failed (Armijo and Faucher 
2002). Indeed, many suggest that the recent spread of neoliberal policies has occurred because of 
emulation (Simmons, Dobbins and Garrett 2004). Clearly, the view on whether market reforms 
necessitate human rights violations or causes it is mixed, and it is not immediately obvious how 
the degree of human rights in a country relates to economic policies. As studies of human rights 
violations show, the rights of people are violated by governments when they are faced with 
serious social dissent (Poe 2004). Consequently, repression is one tool from a “menu of choices” 
available to policy makers for dealing with serious threats to socio-political stability. The degree 
of human rights violations in a country is therefore a relatively good proxy for capturing the level 
of social dissent serious enough to threaten the incumbents in power, and in many ways, an 
indirect measure of the degree and extent of societal grievances.3 
The causal link between the economic reforms and human rights are offered by two 
competing theoretical traditions in political economy. First, the direct effects of economic 
                                                            
3 Of course, we also acknowledge that mass violations of human rights may occur without the threat of serious 
dissent, but this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. 
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liberalism on human rights can be traced back to Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations,” which 
argued that people who are free from economic regulations and restraints will naturally solve 
collective dilemmas such as peace and security as if by use of a “hidden hand” (Smith 1776). 
Free markets encourage voluntary exchange and the allocation of goods according to supply and 
demand, whereas success and failure in the market is based on effort and talents rather than by 
privilege. These processes obtain harmony because the power to determine social outcomes 
largely rests with individuals and communities rather than states—in other words, respect for 
property rights leads to the dilution of state power and the empowerment of citizens, who are 
free to choose or exit with their assets (Stilwell 2006).  
Freer markets, rather than privilege, help disperse economic resources, allowing those 
with economic power to offset the influence of those with political power (Iversen 2008). 
Political competition and market competition are complements because they both prevent 
monopoly (Hayek 1944, 1994, Friedman 1962). In Friedman’s (1962: 10) words, “the kind of 
economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, 
also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in 
this way enables the one to offset the other.” Moreover, markets are viewed as superior at 
allocating scarce resources relative to states, and the incentives operating in markets act 
powerfully to raise individual productivity and wealth (Bjørnskov and Foss 2008). Liberals argue 
that economic and political pathologies related to rent-seeking can have severe negative 
consequences for society, whereas competitive capitalism should bring wealth, justice and social 
harmony (de Soysa and Fjelde 2010, Mousseau and Mousseau 2008). As a result, countries 
engaged in economic policy reform are likely to be on the right path to greater affluence, more 
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democracy and conditions generally preferred by ordinary people (Murphy et al. 1991, Berggren 
2003, Gans-Morse and Nichter 2008). 
Liberals also argue for indirect effects through positive outcomes of reforms on social 
and human capital development (Goldsmith 1997, Dawson 1998, Norton 2003, Gerring and 
Thacker 2008). Likewise, there is much evidence to suggest that internal conflicts in their 
various forms occur as a result of underdevelopment and lower economic growth (Collier et al. 
2003, Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Amartya Sen (1996) contends that it is the friendlier economic 
policies, and not repressive political systems per se, that provide economic growth and 
development. Countries that make use of the opportunities provided by economic policy reforms 
will gain economically and solve problems related to underdevelopment and the lack of 
industrialization, which are factors that promote respect for human rights and the empowerment 
of people. However, if opening up to free markets requires repression, then economic growth 
might be still-born because instability and political repression could scuttle growth. Although 
there is quite a bit of evidence that shows a positive relationship between economic policy 
reforms towards more free markets and economic growth4, several scholars, including some 
prominent economists, voice concern about the redistributional effects of economic policy 
reforms. They argue that reforms imposed by elites impose costs on the poor that can lead to 
“race to the bottom” effects which would increase social tensions, undermine democracy and 
entrap states in cycles of poverty and repression (Przeworski 1991, Rodrik 1994, Armijo, 
Biersteker and Lowenthal 1994, Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Nevertheless, others argue that 
                                                            
4 Prominent studies such as: Easterly and Levine (1997), Ayal and Karras (1998), Gwartney et al. (1999), de Haan 
and Sturm (2000), Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002), Scully (2002), Dawson (2003), de Haan et al. (2006), 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006), Justesen (2008) have all examined the impact of economic freedom and 
economic growth. All the studies, including the meta-data study by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006), find 
strong positive effects between economic freedom and economic growth with different samples, countries and 
periods. See Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for the other side of the debate. 
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bad policies are purposely followed by political elites because bad policies are good politics that 
help the elites maintain their powers and privileges, which can lead to self-sustaining poverty 
traps (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). 
There is no doubt that reforms create winners and losers, and who actually dissents and 
for what reasons—whether socially beneficial or harmful—is generally unclear, but one might 
assume that repression is highest where the losers are many and the winners are small. Rodrik 
(1994) argues that the consequences of neoliberal policies often involve a redistribution of 
income among different groups. If the efficiency gains from neoliberal policies are not 
substantial and income is not redistributed properly, this may lead to widespread agitation for 
resisting the required policy changes. Others see economic liberalization causing problems due 
to the short-term hardships borne by some (Gans-Morse and Nichter 2008). Those directly hurt 
by austerity measures may take their anger to the streets, often resulting in strikes and riots that 
states respond to with repressive measures. Many scholars argue that these destabilizing effects 
pose a threat to democratic institutions, thereby ultimately leading to human rights repression 
(Przeworski 1991). Clearly, the net effect of economic policy reforms on human rights violations 
is theoretically and empirically ambiguous. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
Ceteris paribus, countries moving towards freer economic policies will experience higher 
violations of human rights. 
 
2.3 Measuring human rights and market-economic policy reforms 
We use the Cingranelli and Richards (2006) Human Rights Data (CIRI) measuring the degree of 
government respect for Physical Integrity Rights (PIR hereafter). These data contain annual 
coverage from 1981 to 2008 for 195 countries. The sources of information used for coding the 
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index are from both the US State Department's annual country reports on human rights practices 
and from Amnesty International’s annual reports.5 The “integrity of physical rights” deals with 
the abuses that physically harm people such as torture, disappearances, imprisonment for 
political beliefs and political murder. The PIR index contains information about the pattern and 
sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights in addition to the level of severity. 
Here, the pattern is defined as “the association of different levels of government respect for 
several physical integrity rights with a single, overall scale score” (Cingranelli and Richards 
1999). Sequence is defined as “the order in which governments have a propensity to violate 
particular physical integrity rights” (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). Naturally, some forms of 
violations, such as political murder and torture, are more serious than others, such as 
imprisonment. The PIR index is based on the human rights practices of governments and any of 
its agents such as police or paramilitary forces. The index is an additive index constructed from 
observations on torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearances. It 
ranges from zero, meaning no government respect for these four human rights to eight, or full 
government respect for physical integrity rights. 
Our main independent variable is market reforms. Previous studies addressing the issue 
of market economic policy reforms have used proxies, such as a dummy variable capturing the 
date on which the country liberalized its economy, or a composite index made from several 
dummy variables on capital account and current account restrictions (Asiedu and Lien 2004). 
Others have used trade openness and the level of FDI in an economy. These single indicators 
only capture very specific aspects of economic policy reforms. Major upheavals to the social and 
                                                            
5 For more on the construction of the dataset and coding rules, see the CIRI Human Rights Data project at: 
http://ciri.binghampton.edu/documentation.asp 
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economic order of a country possibly occur because of broader changes that include the 
privatization of business and regulatory laws covering labour and wages, the state of property 
rights enforcement, real and potential trade openness and the extent of government involvement 
in the economy. 
Following Dreher, Lamla, Lein and Somogyi (2009), we consider the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI hereafter) constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2008) as a 
proxy for policy reforms. These data are available in five-year intervals for the period from 1970 
– 2000, and on a yearly basis thereafter. The EFI is a comprehensive measure comprised of five 
sub-indices capturing: expenditure and tax reforms; property rights and legal reforms; trade 
reforms; reforms related to access to sound money; labour, business and credit reforms. These 
five sub-indices are roughly comprised of 35 components of objective indicators. Each variable 
in the respective sub-indices was transformed to an index on a scale from 0 to 10. When higher 
values of the original variable indicated a higher degree of freedom, the formula [(Vi – Vmin) / 
Vmax – Vmin)]  10 was used for the transformation. Conversely, when higher values indicated 
less freedom, the formula was [(Vmax – Vi) / Vmax – Vmin)]  10. The sub-component indices were 
then averaged to determine each component. The component indices within each area are 
averaged to derive the indices for each of the five sub-indices. In turn, the five sub-indices are 
averaged to derive the summary index for each country. The final index is then ranked on a scale 
of 0 (not free) to 10 (totally free). Another way of interpreting this would be that the value of 0 
denotes the absence of state regulations, or a state failure to provide these public goods, while 10 
denotes the highest level in a highly competitive market economy. Hence, a higher index implies 
a higher degree of market conformity. Finally, the missing years between the reported quintiles 
for this variable are interpolated. Since the score on EFI changes slowly between the five-year 
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periods, the interpolated values should not be problematic. The detailed description on EFI is 
captured in exhibit 1 in appendix. However, unlike Dreher et al. (2009) and Bjørnskov and Foss 
(2008), we also make use of Δ reforms (henceforth) denoting the year-to-year growth in the 
overall index of market-economic conformity (i.e. EFI), which in fact captures the degree to 
which reforms occurred. A positive value of Δ reforms indicates a movement towards more free 
market policies, whereas a negative value would be a move towards more autarky. In other 
words, the Δ reforms capture the new policy decisions taken by the state and not necessarily the 
accumulation of reforms over the years, which we also control for in our models because 
countries at very low levels are more likely to have higher rates of change and vice versa. 
 
2.4 Data and method 
We analyze a time-series cross-section dataset (TSCS) containing 117 countries covering the 
years from 1981–2006 (see table 1.6 in appendix). The available number of countries and the 
coverage over time are entirely dependent on the availability of the EFI measure and CIRI data 
on human rights. Since the EFI is not available for all countries for all years, our dataset is 
unbalanced. The model to be estimated is specified as: 
)1(43121 tititititit ZHPIRPIR     
Where, PIRit is the Physical Integrity Rights index for country i at year t. Hit captures the 
hypothesis variable(s), namely Δ reforms and EFI, and Zit includes the vector of control 
variables. υt are time dummies and ωit is the error term for country i at time t. Following others, 
we also include lagged dependent variables (PIRit-1). There are two reasons for the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable. First, it fixes problems associated with autocorrelation and model 
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dynamic effects of the X variables on Y (Poe and Tate 1994, Beck and Katz 1995, Wilson and 
Butler 2007). Second, it is theoretically plausible that bureaucratic decisions associated with the 
organs of state repression use past decisions to decide whether to repress or not in present 
circumstances, so this behavior can be quite sticky (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999, Neumayer 2005). 
Hence, we also estimate all our models with a lagged dependent variable.  
The vector of control variables (Zit) includes other potential determinants of human rights 
which we obtain from the extant literature on the subject. We follow the pioneering studies of 
Poe and Tate (1994), Poe, Tate and Keith (1999) and other comprehensive evaluations of these 
early studies on the determinants of repression (Landman 2005). Accordingly, the models control 
the effects of development by including per capita income (logged) in US$ constant prices and 
the economic growth rates obtained from the Economic Research Service (ERS) International 
Macroeconomic 2008 dataset, Washington DC.6 Since economic reforms are more likely to be 
peaceful when countries are richer and enjoying higher growth rates, we control for this. 
Following others (Landman 2005), we include the log of total population (ERS 2008). Large 
countries will generally have more dissent and are harder to govern. As a matter of fact, country 
size is one of the most robust predictors of civil war and political repression (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006, Landman 2005). To measure the nature of the political regime in power, we 
include a measure of regime type using the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). 
Democracies are less likely to use repression as a policy tool. We subtract the autocracy score 
from the democracy score, as is standard when using the Polity data. The democracy score 
ranges from +10 (full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy).  
                                                            
6 We use the ERS dataset to maximize the number of observations in our dataset. The results do not change 
dramatically when using the per capita GDP data sourced from the World Development Indicator 2010 (World Bank 
2010). 
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Additionally, we account for the degree of ethnic fractionalization sourced from Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) since some claim that ethnic difference can lead to social frictions that 
generally discourage good economic policies (Easterly 2006).7 Naturally, an ongoing civil war is 
likely to affect the degree of state repression. We include a variable measuring civil war that 
takes the value 1 if there is armed conflict between an organized group and a state in which at 
least 25 deaths have occurred in a single year and 0 otherwise (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We also 
include the count of the number of years of civil peace so as to distinguish between immediate 
post-war situations and others (Gleditsch et al. 2002). In addition to these variables, we include 
oil export dependency, which is independently related to repression due to the so-called 
“resource curse” (Ross 2001, de Soysa and Binningsbo 2009). Oil wealth is a dummy taking the 
value 1 if oil exports exceed one-third of export revenue, and 0 if not. Finally, the legal heritage 
of countries is likely to matter. We include dummy variables, which take the value 1 separately if 
the country’s legal heritage originates from one of the following: British, Socialist, French, 
German and Scandinavian, and 0 otherwise (La Porta et al. 1998). For more details on the data, 
see the data sources in table 1.7 in appendix. The descriptive statistics are presented in table 1.8 
in appendix. The baseline models are estimated using ordered probit with time dummies, in 
addition to the pooled OLS method (POLS henceforth). The pooled data are susceptible to 
having highly correlated data between and across panels that could lead to highly optimistic 
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). We use the Newey-West method which allows us to 
compute an AR1 process for autocorrelation and obtain Huber-White corrected robust standard 
errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey and West 1987). With both these methods 
(Ordered probit and Newey-West POLS), we do not include any country fixed effects because 
                                                            
7 For dissenting views on ethnic fractionalization and economic outcomes, see Collier (2001) and de Soysa (2011). 
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some of the variables (ethnic fractionalization and legal heritage, etc.) are “time invariant.” The 
usage of two-way fixed effects will not only be collinear with time-invariant or largely time-
invariant regressors, but will also generate biased estimates (Beck 2001). However, we drop the 
time-invariant variables from our models and perform two-way OLS fixed effects because 
accounting for unit (country) heterogeneity is an additional robustness check since TSCS results 
can be sensitive to specification (Wilson and Butler 2007). We estimate the Huber-White 
corrected robust standard errors, which is a method robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation (Wiggins 1999).  
 
2.4.1 Endogeneity concerns 
It is quite possible that our key explanatory variables – Δ reforms and EFI – are endogenous to 
having less human rights violations. That is, it might be governments committed to respecting 
human rights that reform in the first place. For example, the expectation of political or regime 
instability arising out of dissent and uprising could deter new policy initiatives to be introduced 
by the government that, among other things, eases restrictions on economic freedom. 
Improvement in human rights performance of the states may also spur increases in economic 
policy reforms initiated by the government. Not taking this endogeneity into account would 
induce bias in our estimate of the effect of policy reforms and EFI on human rights. This issue is 
not trivial because those who argue that repression is required for free-market reforms make 
causal claims about reforms leading to repression. Nevertheless, to determine the direction of 
causality we use a dynamic model of Granger Causality (Granger 1969). Accordingly, the 
variable x is said to “Granger cause” a variable y if the past values of the x help explain y, once 
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the past influence of y has been accounted for (Engle and Granger 1987). We follow Dreher and 
Siemers (2009) to account for Granger Causality in a panel setting as: 
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Where, the parameters are denoted as: ψi,t and ξi,t for country i during the year t, the maximum 
lag length is represented by ρ. While δi is unobserved individual effects, ζt is unobserved time 
effects. it denotes the error term. Under the null hypothesis, the variable x is assumed to not 
Granger cause y, while the alternative hypotheses allow for x to Granger cause y after controlling 
for past influence of the variable y. Joint F-Statistic is used to gauge the joint significance of PIR 
on Δ reforms and EFI. 
After rejecting the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, we control for this by replicating 
the baseline models using the system-GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We are not aware of an IV 
estimator for an ordinal score dependent variable when the error term is serially correlated and 
heteroscedastic. We therefore follow Miguel et al. (2004) and Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) 
in estimating linear ordered probability models, which provide consistent estimates. The 
dynamic panel GMM estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain 
moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent data, which is considered 
appropriate in the presence of endogenous regressors. The results are based on the two-step 
estimator implemented by Roodman (2006) in Stata 11. The two-step GMM estimator weights 
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the instruments asymptotically by efficiently using the first-step estimates. Because our sample is 
large enough, we do not face the problem of under estimated standard errors (Arellano and Bond 
1991). We apply the Sargan-Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used (amounting to a 
test for the exogeneity of the covariates) and the Arellano-Bond test of second order 
autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to be consistent. 
We treat the lagged dependent variable and our measures of Δ reforms and EFI as endogenous 
and all other variables as strictly exogenous. Thus, EFI and Δ reforms are lagged by two years.8 
As before, we include time dummies in all the GMM regressions. In order to minimize the 
number of instruments in the regressions, we collapse the matrix of instruments as suggested by 
Roodman (2006).  
 
2.5 Results 
We begin with the Granger Causality tests (tables 1.1 and 1.2). The null hypothesis in set 1 can 
be easily rejected at lag lengths from one to three (see table 1.1). However, at lag two, the joint 
F-statistics, though significant at the 5% level, is down to the 10% level at three lags. The results 
do remain constant at the 10% level when we introduce one more lag structure into set 1. The 
joint F-statistic is strongly significant at the 1% level in column 1 of set 1 in table 1.1. In set 2, 
we clearly find that there is reverse causality flowing from PIR to EFI at all three lag structures, 
with joint significance at the 1% level (see table 1.1). The null hypothesis that human rights have 
no effect on economic freedom can therefore be rejected for lag length one to three. In table 1.2, 
we find that at lag one and three there is a significant positive impact of changes in the economic 
                                                            
8 As a further robustness check, we used different versions of lagged values for EFI and Δ reforms. We lagged both 
variables by one and three years for both the global sample and the sample of LDCs, and the results remained 
unchanged. 
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freedom index (Δ reforms) on human rights. However, the null hypothesis that human rights 
have no effect on economic reforms cannot be rejected for lag length one and two, but only at lag 
length three. Consequently, the purely statistical test addressing causality suggests that positive 
changes in economic reforms “cause” human rights to improve but reveals little effect from the 
other way around. In fact, the result from higher human rights to higher economic freedom is 
weakly negative. 
Next, we move to dynamic models that allow us to control for other relevant intervening 
factors. In table 1.3, column 1, we find that Δ reforms (annual change in the economic freedom 
scores) have a statistically significant positive impact on PIR, net of all the controls. The positive 
effect suggests that movement towards more free markets reduces the level of violations of 
physical integrity rights. These results are robust to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. 
The positive and statistically significant effect of free market economic reforms is robust to 
entering region dummies (see column 1 in table 1.3). These results are upheld when including 
regional dummies in column 2. When we drop the time-invariant variables in column 3 by 
including country and time effects, the relationship between Δ reforms and PIR is still positive. 
Notice that the level of economic freedom (accumulated reforms) shows a robustly positive 
association with rights across the columns, thereby signifying that even when change towards 
more free markets are accounted for, the level of free market policies has a strong positive effect 
on rights, net of several important control variables, such as income per capita and the level of 
democracy. Thus, even if countries may have short-term pain from reforms in some cases, they 
may be worth undertaking in order to reach higher levels of economic freedom for obtaining 
social peace (de Soysa and Fjelde 2010, Mousseau and Mousseau 2008). Overall, the results are 
in line with the basic argument put forth by Amartya Sen (1999) and Hayek (1974) on the 
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importance of economic freedom for social progress, although our results also show no 
contradiction between moving towards more free markets and the deterioration of human rights. 
The results of OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors and two-way OLS fixed 
effects are presented in columns 4–6 in table 1.3. As seen there, the results remain the same as 
those reported for ordered probit regressions. The effect of free market reforms is positive on the 
government respect for human rights. A standard deviation increase in reforms would raise 
respect for human rights by roughly 39% of a standard deviation of the PIR index (columns 4 
and 5). The impact from a maximum change of 180% on reforms could increase the PIR by 
160% of a standard deviation, or 3.84 points, which is close to half the scale and certainly no 
small matter. The accumulated level of economic freedom also has a non-negligible effect, in 
which a standard deviation increase in the level of economic freedom would increase respect for 
human rights by roughly 19% of a standard deviation, and by almost 63% of a standard deviation 
of the PIR at the maximum value of economic freedom, net of all the other variables in the 
model. The somewhat lower impact of the level is not surprising since changes from lower to 
higher levels of economic freedom should yield a much higher impact than what might be 
expected when countries are already at high levels. In any case, because of the close association 
of wealth and democracy with economic freedom levels, the indirect effects are likely to be 
large. These results remain robust to the inclusion of regional dummies and two-way fixed 
effects estimations, in which the time-invariant variables drop out (columns 5 and 6 in table 1.3).  
Table 1.4 demonstrates that the effect of reforms and EFI also matters when we only test 
a sample of 87 developing countries. In all columns, irrespective of the estimation techniques, 
both Δ reforms and EFI are significantly different from zero at the 1% level (see table 1.4). In the 
developing countries only sample we find very similar substantive effects, which are in fact 
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slightly increased in magnitude. These results remain robust to the inclusion of two-way OLS 
fixed effects regressions (see column 6 in table 1.4). Given that the results in both tables are net 
of the indirect effects through per capita income and the level of democracy, the total substantive 
impact of free market economic reforms on human rights seems quite substantial. 
Interestingly, with the ordered probit, the Newey-West OLS and two-way fixed effects 
regressions, the control variables are consistent with those reported by others. There is a positive 
relationship between economic development (per capita GDP) and human rights. Increases in the 
level of income raises the cost of dangerous dissent and reduces the power of states to use 
repression as a viable policy tool. Although the results on the rate of economic growth are 
positive, they remain largely insignificant. Like others, we find that large countries have higher 
violations of rights. This effect is consistent across the methods displayed in all models in both 
samples. Contrary to many arguments about the effects of high ethnic fragmentation on social 
friction, we find significant positive effects of ethnic fractionalization on human rights in all the 
methods, which produces results that are consistent with those who argue that high 
fractionalization makes countries safer (de Soysa 2009, 2011, Landman and Larizza 2009). 
Conflicts cause higher violations of human rights, as others also report (Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, 
Tate and Keith 1999, Dreher, Gassebner and Siemers 2010).  
Likewise, the greater the years of civil peace, the lower the incidence of human rights 
abuse. With respect to legal heritage relative to Scandinavian legal origin, we find that other 
legal systems display negative signs. Oil exporters show higher levels of human rights abuses 
than non-oil exporters. This result is consistent with the findings of Ross (2004) and de Soysa 
and Binningsbø (2009), who argue that oil exporters have high levels of social dissent and are 
likely to maintain autocratic regimes. As expected, democracy proved very important for human 
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rights. In all the models irrespective of estimation technique, democracy is positively associated 
with less human rights violations. Interestingly, our main results on Δ reforms and EFI 
demonstrated a net positive effect on basic human rights despite the inclusion of several 
statistically significant controls. 
Next, we examine our models, controlling for possible endogeneity between human 
rights, Δ reforms and EFI. As discussed earlier, we make use of the System-GMM method to 
control for reverse causality (table 1.5). The Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test do not reject 
the GMM specifications at conventional levels of significance across the columns. The Hansen J-
statistic clearly shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments cannot be 
rejected at the conventional level of significance. In table 1.5, EFI is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level in all the columns (including developing countries). A noteworthy point is 
that after controlling for potential feedback from PIR, the value of the coefficient of EFI in 
column 1 of table 1.5 has more than doubled – from 0.15 to 0.40.  
Changes in economic freedom, however, are now robustly significant on human rights 
only in the case of the LDCs sample and when regional dummies are not in the estimations for 
the global sample. This suggests that for the full sample, the result on reforms causing better 
human rights is not as robust, but given the stringency of the tests there are still statistically 
significant effects, particularly in the LDCs sample. For this reason, there is good evidence 
showing that reform efforts, even after controlling for endogeneity, improve human rights 
conditions among those countries already at lower levels of human rights. Both variables, for 
example, remain significant when we repeat the exercise in column 5 and 6 in table 1.5 by 
dropping the time-invariant variables. At no time, however, is there any evidence to suggest that 
that reforms lower human rights conditions as skeptics have argued. Our results demonstrate that 
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on average countries attain higher levels of economic freedom without the need for repressive 
measures, and the bulk of the evidence suggests that reforming more comprehensively might in 
fact improve existing levels of government respect for human rights, not social breakdown. 
 
2.5.1 Further checks on robustness 
We examine the robustness of our main findings in the following ways. First, the EFI measure is 
linearly interpolated by us for the years in-between the quintiles. We now run the original data 
only on the reported quintiles so as to remove any biases stemming from the interpolation. 
Hence, our total number of observations drops to 1130. Our results, for both global and 
developing countries, show that the level of economic freedom (EFI) is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. However, the Δ reforms measure is now statistically 
insignificant across the board (including GMM). This change is likely due to the five-year data 
setup. Second, following Dreher and Boockmann (2010), we run all our previous estimations 
with the Political Terror Scale (PTS hereafter), which is an alternative measure of human rights 
violations coded differently but using similar empirical material, namely Amnesty and the US 
State Department reports (Gibney and Dalton 1996). The PTS is coded by the US State 
Department and Amnesty International on a scale of 0 – 5, with the highest value representing 
worse human rights conditions. Nonetheless, for easy interpretation we reverse the coding with a 
higher value implying full respect for human rights. The results show that EFI decreases political 
terror, although the results with respect to Δ reforms are not as robust. These results are 
essentially the same for both the full sample and the sample consisting of 87 developing 
countries only. It should be noted again, however, that the results on Δ reforms are never close to 
being negative, which the skeptical arguments expect to see empirically. 
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Third, instead of the percentage change of EFI, we take the first difference as our reforms 
variable. The results do not show any major change from those reported earlier. Alternatively, 
we also experimented with a dummy variable which obtains a value of 1 if the EFI score for an 
ith country in the year t scores 6 or above and 0 otherwise. We find that our EFI dummy is 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance. Fourth, we check for 
sensitivity by including a host of different control variables. We drop all our controls to estimate 
the impact of EFI and ∆ reforms on human rights. We still find that both variables remain 
significant at conventional levels of significance. Even if we drop only those variables which 
remain statistically insignificant, we still find robust evidence for positive effects of reforms on 
human rights. Fifth, we consider five-year averages for 1981–1985; 1986–1990; 1991–1995; 
1996–2000; 2001–2006 periods and replicate our baseline estimates as reported in table 1.1. EFI 
and change in EFI remain positive and significant for explaining better human rights in estimates 
using ordered probit, pooled OLS and fixed effects.9 
Next, we examine the sensitivity of our main variables (i.e. EFI and Δ reforms) on 
various permutations and combination of controls by employing Extreme Bounds Analyses10 
(EBA hereafter) proposed by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). The EBA enables us 
to examine whether the proposed variables are robust as determinants of human rights, 
independently of which of the additional variables are in the set of control variables. Due to 
limitations of space we do not discuss the technicalities of EBA here, but instead refer the reader 
to Leamer (1983) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). We follow a less stringent EBA test proposed by 
                                                            
9 We also replicate the baseline estimations by splitting our sample into regions. America (North and South), Europe 
(including transition countries), East Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa 
and South Asia. We find very similar results within all the regions except for South Asia. This is not surprising 
given the N of 5 for South Asia region.  
10 It is noteworthy that Hafner-Burton (2005) finds only patchy support using trade and FDI as measures of 
globalization on the level of human rights within countries. 
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Dreher et al. (2009). We find that EFI and Δ reforms are both significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level in 90% of regressions when testing the global sample and 92% of regressions for 
the developing countries sample only, with CDF(0) being almost equal to one in both samples. In 
addition, most of the control variables are strongly related to PIR, as in our baseline regressions. 
The EBA results provide strong additional support for the robustness of the relationship between 
EFI level and the rate of change of EFI on the levels of human rights. The results of all of the 
robustness checks (including that of EBA) are not reported because of space considerations, but 
they are replicable using our data and do files. Given the weight of this evidence, we can safely 
reject the hypothesis that free market economic reforms increase the incidence of human rights 
violations. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, is fond of saying, “economic development 
requires discipline,” which is a sentiment echoed by many rulers who try to cling to power with 
the promise of bringing development (Sen 1999). Many think Lee has a point because it is 
commonly understood that people will resist free-market economic reforms even if they will 
benefit from such reforms in the long run. According to many, turning to the market is like 
“swallowing the bitter pill” (Weyland 1998). The question of whether free-market reforms cause 
declines in human rights is an issue that is extensively debated in the literature and among policy 
circles, particularly in the debates on globalization and the effects of IMF interventions. The 
skeptics of market-oriented economic policy reforms contend that reforms reflect the interests of 
the haves and that they come at the expense of the many. Under such conditions, a market 
opening can lead to mass dissent and the violations of human rights. Liberals, on the other hand, 
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see economic reforms as the antidote to crises that can lead to social breakdown and that various 
aspects of a market opening can be healthy for economics and politics. Despite much anecdotal 
evidence pointing both ways, there has been little systematic empirical research that addresses 
this issue and takes the question of the direction of causality seriously because even if levels of 
open market policies are good for societies, changing towards them might cause problems that 
may destroy the foundations of future progress. 
Our findings are easily summarized. Using the best available data and empirical methods, 
we find positive effects of market-economic policy reforms on government respect for human 
rights. We control for potential feedback effects, running from human rights to increased market-
economic policy reforms using the GMM method of estimation. Even after controlling for 
endogeneity, market-economic policy reforms seem to predict better human rights, a result that is 
robust to changes in specification and testing method, as well as in a sample of 87 developing 
(non-OECD) countries only. These results support liberal optimism about market economic 
reforms and vindicate those who find positive effects of free markets on economic development 
and other measures of social welfare, including the public good of peace and decent governance. 
Furthermore, if IMF interventions lead to human rights violations as some find, then the 
mechanism leading to such an outcome might clearly not be a market opening as they assume. 
Perhaps interventions allow bad governments to defer opening as some have claimed 
(Boockmann and Dreher 2003), which may raise levels of dissent due to the continuation of 
cronyism. Despite our tests controlling for endogeneity, it might still be true that there is 
widespread consensus that reforms are necessary when they are in fact undertaken so that social 
dissent is lower before reforms occur (Armijo and Faucher 2002). Regardless, our results show 
that the level of economic freedom and movement towards greater economic freedom both 
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reduce violations of human rights. Future studies might look more carefully at the differential 
effects of change towards freer markets and changes away from them, and more clearly identify 
the winners and losers of free/market economic reforms and the conditions under which high 
dissent is defused or exacerbated, taking into consideration the exact nature of market opening 
policies. 
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Table 1.1: Granger Causality tests on Economic Freedom Index and Human rights 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Variables PIR PIR PIR Variables EFI EFI EFI 
Physical Integrity Rights (t-1) 0.487*** 0.395*** 0.352*** Economic Freedom Index (t-1) 0.948*** 1.263*** 1.181*** 
(0.0196) (0.0224) (0.0234) (0.00753) (0.0375) (0.0399) 
Physical Integrity Rights (t-2) 0.153*** 0.108*** Economic Freedom Index (t-2) -0.333*** -0.0959 
(0.0223) (0.0247) (0.0356) (0.0630) 
Physical Integrity Rights (t-3) 0.120*** Economic Freedom Index (t-3) -0.171*** 
(0.0224) (0.0390) 
Economic Freedom Index (t-1) 0.233*** 0.261* 0.159 Physical Integrity Rights (t-1) 0.0105*** 0.00709*** 0.00579** 
(0.0465) (0.156) (0.159) (0.00219) (0.00242) (0.00242) 
Economic Freedom Index (t-2) -0.0838 0.0900 Physical Integrity Rights (t-2) 0.00207 0.00126 
(0.153) (0.242) (0.00255) (0.00272) 
Economic Freedom Index (t-3) -0.133 Physical Integrity Rights (t-3) 0.000996 
(0.157) (0.00228) 
Joint F-Statistics 25.03*** 7.36*** 2.51* Joint F-Statistics 22.91*** 7.57*** 3.26*** 
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Table 1.2: Granger Causality tests on Market-Economic Policy Reforms and Human rights 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Variables PIR PIR PIR Variables Reforms Reforms Reforms 
Physical Integrity Rights (t-1) 0.507*** 0.400*** 0.356*** Economic Reforms (t-1) 0.380*** 0.311*** 0.285*** 
(0.0194) (0.0224) (0.0233) (0.0397) (0.0436) (0.0442) 
Physical Integrity Rights (t-2) 0.166*** 0.111*** Economic Reforms (t-2) 0.116*** 0.0572 
(0.0224) (0.0247) (0.0426) (0.0504) 
Physical Integrity Rights (t-3) 0.122*** Economic Reforms (t-3) 0.0946** 
(0.0224) (0.0482) 
Economic Reforms (t-1) 1.632* 0.571 0.433 Physical Integrity Rights (t-1) 0.000351 0.000444 0.000340 
(0.854) (0.885) (0.860) (0.000386) (0.000484) (0.000495) 
Economic Reforms (t-2) 1.178 -0.0946 Physical Integrity Rights (t-2) -0.000686 -0.000376 
(0.859) (0.880) (0.000504) (0.000559) 
Economic Reforms (t-3) 2.467*** Physical Integrity Rights (t-3) -0.00102** 
(0.850) (0.000464) 
Joint F-Statistics 3.65*** 1.65 3.34** Joint F-Statistics 0.83 0.95 2.41* 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.3: Effects of EFI and Market-Economic Reforms on Human Rights, 1981–2006 
(Global sample) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables PIR PIR PIR PIR PIR PIR 
  
Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
Fixed 
Effects 
Constant 1.731*** 2.121*** 3.615 
(0.265) (0.340) (4.445) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.546*** 0.517*** 0.378*** 0.620*** 0.590*** 0.408*** 
(0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0201) (0.0163) (0.0175) (0.0303) 
Economic Freedom Index 0.144*** 0.160*** 0.171*** 0.146*** 0.167*** 0.183*** 
(0.0311) (0.0319) (0.0452) (0.0312) (0.0321) (0.0573) 
Economic Reforms 1.803*** 1.879*** 1.840*** 2.062*** 1.975*** 1.878** 
(0.682) (0.681) (0.714) (0.742) (0.743) (0.847) 
Per capita GDP (log) 0.128*** 0.0595** 0.0445 0.126*** 0.0634** -0.0278 
(0.0249) (0.0298) (0.150) (0.0247) (0.0307) (0.220) 
Per capita GDP growth rate 0.00090 0.0018 0.0011 0.00136 0.0016 0.0016 
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0084) 
Population (log) -0.0995*** -0.123*** 0.284 -0.114*** -0.123*** -0.104 
(0.0138) (0.0157) (0.287) (0.0149) (0.0170) (0.401) 
Democracy 0.0227*** 0.0300*** 0.0498*** 0.0203*** 0.0279*** 0.0394*** 
(0.00403) (0.00486) (0.00739) (0.00411) (0.00512) (0.0113) 
Oil Exports/GDP dummy -0.160** -0.0847 -0.142 -0.230*** -0.189*** -0.0865 
(0.0683) (0.0694) (0.155) (0.0704) (0.0724) (0.218) 
Conflicts -0.755*** -0.860*** -1.009*** -0.988*** -1.066*** -1.176*** 
(0.0740) (0.0753) (0.0944) (0.0806) (0.0827) (0.161) 
Civil Peace Years 0.00324** 0.000730 0.00226 0.00295** 0.00131 0.00576 
(0.00144) (0.00152) (0.00283) (0.00147) (0.00156) (0.00377) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.341*** 0.172 0.339*** 0.185* 
(0.102) (0.118) (0.101) (0.111) 
British Legal Heritage -0.792*** -0.549*** -0.289*** -0.143** 
(0.141) (0.144) (0.0662) (0.0660) 
Socialist Legal Heritage -0.358** -0.114 0.158* 0.225* 
(0.155) (0.184) (0.0946) (0.136) 
French Legal Heritage -0.707*** -0.429*** -0.223*** -0.0621 
(0.140) (0.144) (0.0647) (0.0632) 
German Legal Heritage -0.596*** -0.476*** -0.0787 -0.0217 
(0.176) (0.178) (0.111) (0.108) 
OECD region dummy 0.775*** 0.461*** 
(0.133) (0.131) 
MENA region dummy 0.305** 0.267** 
(0.122) (0.130) 
Europe region dummy 0.317** 0.301* 
(0.156) (0.165) 
South East Asia region dummy 0.254* 0.128 
(0.134) (0.136) 
South Asia region dummy 0.0563 -0.103 
(0.158) (0.164) 
Sub-Saharan Africa region dummy 0.266** 0.185 
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(0.126) (0.131) 
Latin America and Caribbean dummy -0.0868 -0.144 
(0.106) (0.110) 
Pseudo R2 0.327 0.3351 0.3717 
Log Pseudo likelihood -3911.7 -3864.4 -3651.9 
R-Squared 0.7503 
F-Statistics 330.6*** 390.5*** 30.44*** 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Total Observations 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4: Effects of EFI and Market-Economic Reforms on Human Rights, 1981–2006 
(Developing countries sample) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables PIR PIR PIR PIR PIR PIR 
  
Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
Fixed 
Effects 
Constant 1.978*** 2.102*** -0.332 
(0.339) (0.385) (5.409) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.516*** 0.505*** 0.379*** 0.606*** 0.591*** 0.418*** 
(0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0189) (0.0326) 
Economic Freedom Index 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.152*** 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.189*** 
(0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0468) (0.0343) (0.0357) (0.0613) 
Economic Reforms 2.056*** 2.099*** 1.977*** 2.396*** 2.347*** 2.097** 
(0.699) (0.705) (0.746) (0.793) (0.805) (0.920) 
Per capita GDP (log) 0.0860*** 0.0842*** 0.00829 0.0926*** 0.0833** -0.0194 
(0.0277) (0.0310) (0.161) (0.0294) (0.0333) (0.242) 
Per capita GDP growth rate 0.00205 0.00157 0.000683 0.00252 0.00194 0.00128 
(0.00674) (0.00671) (0.00672) (0.00842) (0.00833) (0.00881) 
Population (log) -0.104*** -0.104*** 0.311 -0.123*** -0.120*** 0.306 
(0.0156) (0.0165) (0.345) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.519) 
Democracy 0.0154*** 0.0256*** 0.0400*** 0.0160*** 0.0265*** 0.0358*** 
(0.00408) (0.00532) (0.00784) (0.00434) (0.00584) (0.0120) 
Oil Exports/GDP dummy -0.126* -0.140* -0.0539 -0.193** -0.213*** -0.00369 
(0.0696) (0.0722) (0.163) (0.0771) (0.0803) (0.211) 
Conflicts -0.864*** -0.882*** -1.032*** -1.078*** -1.090*** -1.223*** 
(0.0766) (0.0781) (0.0969) (0.0885) (0.0899) (0.171) 
Civil Peace Years 0.000325 0.000959 0.00121 0.00163 0.00234 0.00369 
(0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00332) (0.00189) (0.00191) (0.00445) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.334*** 0.195 0.364*** 0.233* 
(0.109) (0.131) (0.121) (0.138) 
British Legal Heritage -0.0695 -0.142** -0.0813 -0.147** 
(0.0538) (0.0622) (0.0589) (0.0694) 
Socialist Legal Heritage 0.381*** 0.168 0.397*** 0.162 
(0.0922) (0.130) (0.104) (0.148) 
French Legal Heritage 
German Legal Heritage 
OECD region dummy 
MENA region dummy 0.265* 0.216 
(0.138) (0.155) 
Europe region dummy 0.305* 0.281 
(0.161) (0.179) 
South East Asia region dummy 0.290** 0.179 
(0.147) (0.158) 
South Asia region dummy 0.0378 -0.0763 
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(0.167) (0.182) 
Sub-Saharan Africa region dummy 0.231* 0.140 
(0.135) (0.148) 
Latin America and Caribbean dummy -0.0836 -0.169 
(0.115) (0.127) 
  
Pseudo R2 0.2735 0.2761 0.3089 
Log Pseudo likelihood -3206.7 -3194.9 -3050.2 
R-Squared 0.379 
F-Statistics 173.3*** 160.7*** 29.92*** 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Countries 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Total Observations 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5: Effects of EFI and Market-Economic Reforms on Human Rights, 1981–2006 
(GMM) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables PIR PIR PIR PIR PIR PIR 
 
Full 
sample LDCs 
Full 
sample LDCs 
Full 
sample LDCs 
  SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM 
Constant 1.915 2.021 1.322 1.903 1.896* 2.079 
(1.246) (1.648) (1.665) (5.293) (1.066) (1.540) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.237*** 0.221*** 0.209*** 0.202*** 0.256*** 0.239*** 
(0.0339) (0.0455) (0.0367) (0.0454) (0.0368) (0.0467) 
Economic Freedom Index 0.358*** 0.386*** 0.398*** 0.405*** 0.280*** 0.344*** 
(0.0845) (0.0991) (0.0899) (0.120) (0.0867) (0.106) 
Economic Reforms 3.427 6.531** 2.531 5.302 3.970* 6.669** 
(2.094) (2.703) (2.191) (3.662) (2.082) (2.674) 
Per capita GDP (log) 0.204*** 0.164 0.138 0.208 0.186*** 0.122 
(0.0664) (0.102) (0.110) (0.136) (0.0619) (0.0971) 
Per capita GDP growth rate -0.00373 -0.00066 -0.00458 -0.00278 -0.00200 -0.00101 
(0.0095) (0.0122) (0.00982) (0.0124) (0.0099) (0.0123) 
Population (log) -0.259*** -0.311*** -0.263*** -0.273*** -0.218*** -0.229** 
(0.0763) (0.0966) (0.0817) (0.0996) (0.0841) (0.106) 
Democracy 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.0523*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.0325** 
(0.0109) (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0179) (0.0110) (0.0129) 
Oil Exports/GDP dummy -0.241 -0.291 -0.230 -0.257 -0.235 -0.312 
(0.193) (0.231) (0.216) (0.258) (0.193) (0.238) 
Conflicts -1.383*** -1.368*** -1.322*** -1.314*** -1.405*** -1.389*** 
(0.147) (0.202) (0.152) (0.206) (0.150) (0.211) 
Civil Peace Years 0.0128*** 0.0146** 0.0098** 0.0160** 0.0135*** 0.0140** 
(0.00400) (0.00610) (0.00402) (0.00633) (0.00410) (0.00625) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.518 0.708** 0.183 0.163 
(0.318) (0.350) (0.263) (0.314) 
British Legal Heritage -0.555** -0.0954 -0.219 -0.0863 
(0.247) (0.188) (0.212) (0.269) 
Socialist Legal Heritage 0.307 0.803** 0.626 0.953 
(0.351) (0.393) (0.464) (0.683) 
French Legal Heritage -0.405 -0.174 
(0.268) (0.235) 
German Legal Heritage -0.476 -0.184 
(0.420) (0.420) 
OECD region dummy 1.318* 
(0.709) 
MENA region dummy 1.034 -0.508 
(0.711) (4.311) 
Europe region dummy 0.851 -0.427 
(0.672) (4.198) 
South East Asia region dummy 0.654 -0.375 
(0.691) (4.204) 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
47 
 
South Asia region dummy 1.080 -0.108 
(0.716) (4.335) 
Sub-Saharan Africa region dummy 0.422 -0.600 
(0.784) (4.290) 
Latin America and Caribbean dummy 0.374 -0.920 
(0.641) (4.303) 
  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1): p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2): p-value 0.452 0.719 0.634 0.827 0.359 0.607 
Hansen test: p-value 0.259 0.859 0.393 0.908 0.263 0.753 
Number of instruments 113 111 120 117 108 108 
Wald chi2 2414.9*** 1441*** 3829.9*** 1278.2*** 2127.9*** 1403.1*** 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Countries 115 87 115 87 115 87 
Total Observations 2620 1978 2620 1978 2620 1978 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.8 Appendix 
 
Exhibit 1: Components of the Fraser Economic Freedom Index (EFI)  
A rea  1 : S ize  o f G o v ern m en t: E x p en d itu res, T a xes, a n d  E n terp rises
A G en era l g o v e rnm en t co nsu m p tio n sp en d ing  a s a  p e rcen tage  o f to tal  co nsu m p tio n
B T ransfers an d  su b sid ie s as a  p ercen tag e o f G D P
C G o ve rn m en t enterp rise s an d  in v estm ent 
D T o p  m arg in al tax  ra te
i T o p  m arg in al  in co m e  tax  rate
ii T o p  m arg in al  in co m e  and  p ayro ll  tax ra te s 
A rea  2 : L eg a l S tru c tu re a n d  S ecu r ity  o f P ro p erty  R ig h ts
A Ju d ic ia l in d ep en d ence  (G C R )
B Im p artia l co u rts  (G C R )
C P ro tec tio n  o f p ro p e rty r ig h ts  (G C R )
D M ilitary interference  in  ru le  o f law  an d  th e  p o litic a l p ro cess (C R G )
E In teg rity o f th e  leg al system  (C R G )
F L ega l en fo rcem ent o f co ntrac ts  (D B )
G  R eg u la to ry re str ic tio ns o n  th e sale  o f rea l p ro p e rty (D B )
A rea  3 : A ccess to  S o u n d  M o n ey
A M o n ey  G ro w th
B S tan d ard  d eviatio n  o f in fla tio n
C In flatio n : M o st re cen t yea r
D F reed o m  to  o w n  fo re ig n  curren cy b an k  acco u n ts
A rea  4 : F reed o m  to  T ra d e  In tern a tio n a lly
A T axes o n intern a tio n a l trad e
i. R even u es fro m  trad e  tax es (%  o f trad e  secto r)
ii M ean  ta riff ra te
ii i S tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  o f ta riff  rates
B R eg u la to ry T rad e  B a rrie rs
i N o n -ta riff  trad e b a rrie rs  (G C R )
ii C o m p lian ce co st o f im p o rtin g an d  ex p o rtin g (D B )
C S ize o f the  trad e  secto r rela tive  to  ex p ec ted
D B lack-m ark et ex chan g e ra te s
E In te rn atio n al cap ital  m a rke t co n tro ls
i F o re ig n  o w n ersh ip /in v estm en t re str ic tio ns (G C R )
ii C ap ita l co n tro ls
A rea  5 : R eg u la tio n  o f C red it , L a b o r , a n d  B u sin ess
A C red it m a rk et reg u la tio n s
i. O w n ership  o f b an ks
ii F o re ig n  b an k co m p e tit io n
ii i P riv ate  sec to r c red it
iv Intere st ra te  co ntro ls/n ega tiv e  rea l intere st ra te s
B L ab o r m ark e t regu la tio ns
i M in im um  w age  (D B )
ii H irin g an d  fir in g  reg u la tio n s (G C R )
ii i C entra lized  co llec tiv e  b a rga in in g  (G C R )
iv M and ated  co st o f  h ir in g (D B )
v  M and ated  co st o f  w o rk er d ism issa l (D B )
v i C o n sc rip tio n
C B u sin ess R egu la tio ns
i P rice  co n tro ls
ii A d m in istra tiv e  req uirem en ts (G C R )
ii i B ureau c racy co sts  (G C R )
iv  S ta rtin g  a  b u sin e ss (D B )
v E x tra p ay m en ts/b rib es (G C R )
v i  L icen sin g re str ic tio ns (D B )
v ii C o st o f tax  co m p lian ce  (D B )  
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2008), www.freetheworld.com 
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Table 1.6: List of countries under Study 
 
Albania Denmark Kuwait Senegal 
Algeria Dominican Republic Latvia Singapore 
Argentina Ecuador Madagascar Sirrea Leone 
Australia Egypt Malaysia Slovakia 
Austria El Salvador Mali Slovania 
Bahamas Estonia Malwai South Africa 
Bahrain Fiji Mauritius Spain 
Bangaldesh Finland Mexico Sri Lanka 
Barbados France Morocco Sweden 
Belgium Gabon Myanmar Switzerland 
Benin Germany Namibia Syria 
Bolivia Ghana Nepal Tanzania 
Botswana Greece Netherlands Thailand 
Brazil Guatemala New Zealand Togo 
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Nicragua Trinidad & Tobago 
Burundi Guyana Niger Tunisia 
Cameroon Haiti Nigeria Turkey 
Canada Honduras Norway Uganda 
Central African Republic Hungary Oman United Arab Emirates 
Chad India Pakistan United Kingdom 
Chile Indonesia Panama United States of America 
China Iran Papua New Guinea Urkraine 
Colombia Ireland Paraguay Uruguay 
Congo Democratic Republic Isreal Peru Venezuela 
Congo Republic Italy Philippines Zambia 
Costa Rica Jamaica Poland Zimbabwe 
Cote d'Ivoire Japan Portugal  
Croatia Jordon Romania  
Cyprus Kenya Russian Federation  
Czech Republic Korea Republic  Rwanda  
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Table 1.7: Data sources and definitions 
  
Variables 
 
Data description 
 
Data Sources 
 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI) 
 
 
 
 
EFI is made up of five sub-indices capturing: 
expenditure and tax reforms; property rights and 
legal reforms; trade reforms; reforms related to 
access to sound money; labour, business and credit 
reforms. These five sub-indices are made up of 35 
components of objective indicators. The final index 
is ranked on the scale of 0 (not free) to 10 (totally 
free) 
Fraser Institute 
 
 
 
 
Economic Policy reforms 
Reforms denote year-to-year growth in the overall 
EFI. Own construction 
PIR index 
 
 
The index range from 0, no government respect for 
human rights to 8, full government respect for 
human rights on torture, extrajudicial killing, 
political imprisonment, and disappearances. 
CIRI dataset  
 
 
Log (Per capita GDP) and growth 
rate 
Per capita GDP (logged) in US$ 2000 constant prices 
and rate of growth of per capita GDP. 
Economic Research Service (ERS), 
Washington DC 
Log (Population) Count of total population (logged) ERS dataset, Washington DC 
Political regime (Polity IV) 
 
Polity IV index captures the nature of political 
regime ranging from +10 (full democracy) to –10 
(full autocracy). 
 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002) 
Conflicts dummy 
Dummy coding 1 if there is a civil conflict and 0 
otherwise. UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) 
Number of peace years 
Count of Number of civil peace years since the end 
of a conflict. UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) 
Ethnic Fractionalization Index of Ethnic Fractionalization raging from 0 - 1 Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Legal heritages 
Dummies for British, Socialist, French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origins. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Oil Exports dependency 
Dummy taking the value 1 if oil exports exceed 
1/3rd of export revenue, and 0 if not. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) augmented 
with fuel export data from the World 
Bank (2008). 
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Table 1.8: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Observations 
PIR 4.902 5 8 0 2.368 2839 
EFI 6.393 7 10 0 3.01 2839 
Δ Economic Reforms 0.05 0.05 1.806 -5.391 0.447 2839 
Democracy 2.834 6 10 -10 7.126 2839 
log (Per capita GDP) 7.629 7.563 10.72 4.368 1.628 2839 
GDP growth rate 3.201 3.6 4.25 -5.03 5.103 2839 
Oil exports dummy 0.156 0 1 0 0.363 2839 
log (Population) 9.393 9.229 14.076 5.849 1.505 2839 
Conflicts dummy 0.192 0 1 0 0.394 2839 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.404 0.356 0.925 0.004 0.291 2839 
Socialist legal heritage 0.064 0 1 0 0.245 2839 
British legal heritage 0.339 0 1 0 0.473 2839 
Instrument variable 0.004 0.061 0.651 -3.78 0.368 2839 
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3. Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Bad Medicine? Intervention by the International 
Monetary Fund and the Risk of Civil War, 1970-200811 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF hereafter) is likened to “swallowing 
the bitter pill” because IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP henceforth), designed to 
produce macro-economic stability, require deeply unpopular austerity measures coupled with 
a package of broadly neoliberal reforms often referred to as “the Washington consensus” 
(Dreher and Rupprecht 2007, Easterly 2005, Stiglitz 2002, Vreeland 2003, Woods 2006).12  
The current economic crises have brought people into the streets in protest, leading to 
violence even in some Western capitals, which makes the issue of whether or not the IMF 
dispenses ‘bad medicine’ ever more prescient. Indeed, Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer (HHB 
henceforth) in an article published by International Organization argue that liberalization 
through IMF SAPs is like “sowing the seeds of war” because economic liberalization 
generates ‘losers’ who organize violence. HHB’s arguments are in many ways exemplary of 
                                                             
11 Coauthored with Trude M. Midtgaard and Indra de Soysa, (NTNU). 
12 See New York Times (NYT) 30thApril, 2010 The Bitter Pills in the Plan to Rescue Greece. New York Times, 
B1. The ’Washington consensus’ is a term coined for a specific policy package of liberalization, which pushes 
the opening up of markets, privatization, the removal of price supports, the balancing of budgets etc. Williamson, 
John (1994) The Political Economy of Policy Reform, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
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other critical arguments about the involvement of the IMF as a cause of adverse social 
consequences, such as civil violence and the violation of human rights. To put it simply, HBB 
claim that liberalization generates losers, who will have low opportunity costs for organizing 
armed violence against a state. They do not specify the nature of opportunity costs associated 
with no reforms. Without knowing theoretically who these losers from liberalization are, and 
how exactly they foment violence, it is hard to imagine that there would be no losers willing 
to fight if economic crisis continued without reforms. From their empirical analysis, it is 
difficult to separate the effects of the immediate crisis from the liberalizing effects of SAPs, if 
indeed they actually occur when countries sign an agreement.  
Studies such as HHB’s should be commended for focusing on this important issue and 
improving on existing studies on IMF programs and armed conflict, a topic that deserves far 
more attention than has been the case hitherto13. They take particular care in solving issues 
related to biases stemming from endogeneity and selection. Using their dataset and 
operationalization (making minor changes in addition), however, we find results at odds with 
their conclusions. For example, their positive and significant effect on the risk of civil war 
becomes statistically insignificant with a one year lag and becomes negative and statistically 
highly significant if lagged by three years, which is the time that most stand by agreements 
typically end and, presumably, when liberalization should have fully set in.14 Thus, assuming 
that signing on to an agreement signifies that a country stays in the program for three years 
and is ‘liberalized’ by the IMF, the risk of civil war onset is significantly negative. More 
interestingly, switching their dependent variable, which measures large-scale civil war (1000 
battle death threshold), to onsets of conflicts determined at 25 deaths and above consistently 
                                                             
13 Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) present comparable results in a study using a similar design. This study 
covers the years 1981-1999, with the same variable for IMF participation and no time lags. On the other hand, 
Rowlands and Joseph (2003) find a negative and significant relationship between IMF programs and civil 
conflict. This study is also based on a limited sample covering the years between 1985 and 1995, and the authors 
find it is not robust to alternative specification. Previous studies are therefore both limited and ambiguous. 
14 For details on IMF lending programs, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm. 
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yields negative effects that are statistically highly significant, whether the main variable is 
contemporaneous or lagged three years. These results hold up when we extend the data by 11 
years (until 2008). Once we employ several different operationalizations, however, we find 
for the most part that the IMF does not matter either way. The rest of this article will examine 
the theoretical and empirical issues addressed by HHB, present our objections, our alternative 
empirical strategy and data, our results, and conclude.  
 
3.2 Blaming Doctors for Death? 
The IMF’s role has developed increasingly from a lender of last resort to a development bank 
akin to the World Bank. The IMF’s lending activities in poor countries have mushroomed in 
the last three decades (IMF factsheet, 2012)15. In 2009, the G20 summit committed to tripling 
the IMF’s funding from about 250 to 750 billion US$ as a part of the official crisis 
management strategy, thereby increasing their leverage substantially (IMF, 2009). The IMF 
lends money to countries in trouble on concessional and non-concessional terms well below 
market rates. In fact, many countries that do sign agreements with the IMF are simply not 
creditworthy and would be at the mercy of international capital markets with high risk 
premiums. To ensure that the borrowing country is able to meet payments the IMF gives 
technical advice and primarily tries to stabilize the macroeconomic environment (Woods, 
2006). If the content of IMF programs causes civil wars, however, the international 
community is complicit in causing underdevelopment since civil war would set the borrowing 
country back further. However, if the problems associated with the IMF are simply that SAPs 
are unsuitable, then the advice, as HHB suggest, is simply to tweek SAPs so that the losers are 
compensated and would therefore be content enough not to organize violence.  
                                                             
15 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm 
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If, however, the problem of conflict lies in the deeper causes of the structural crises 
themselves, then a different set of policy priorities must take effect, with reforms pushed far 
enough so that long-term gain might still be worth the short-term pain. Giving in to the 
demands of those able to organize costly conflict because they might not like the immediate 
changes that would increase the gains for all is surely not advisable. There should be no moral 
dilemmas associated with policies that hurt corrupt generals who steal the public purse, or rich 
elites who are likely to be behind crises in the first place. HHB argue that liberalization 
through IMF programs produces winners and losers and lowers the opportunity costs for the 
losers to participate in civil war, while at the same time reducing the government’s ability to 
compensate them. There are several reasons to be skeptical about these conclusions on 
theoretical and empirical grounds.  
First, it is not at all clear from the main explanatory variable used by HHB (i.e. signing 
on to a SAP) that liberalization occurs when countries borrow from the IMF because of the 
problem of moral hazard. Governments that get bailout loans can renege on the 
implementation of reforms, prolong decisions regarding difficult political choices or getting 
economic fundamentals right, leading to stalled reforms and further crises (Bird et al. 2004, 
Collier and Gunning 1999). Indeed, many find that countries receiving IMF loans do not 
necessarily liberalize after receiving the money (Boockmann and Dreher 2003). Thus, the 
assumption that SAPs lead to liberalization that causes mass dissent and generates losers is 
rather unfounded and not clearly demonstrated by HHB. There are several recent papers that 
show that more liberalized economies avoid civil and ethnic war and generally have less 
political repression (de Soysa 2011, de Soysa and Fjelde 2010, Mousseau and Mousseau 
2008, Steinberg and Saideman 2008). Nor are states liberalizing at greater rates exposed to 
higher political dissent and political repression (de Soysa and Vadlamannati 2012). If it is not 
liberalization that matters, then it might be that the IMF, who is the ‘doctor’, is being blamed 
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for death, particularly in instances where patients refuse the medicine. Studies looking at the 
compliance rate of IMF SAPs by countries borrowing from the IMF suggest that, on average, 
over half of the patients do not take their medicine (Vreeland 2006). HHB anticipate this 
criticism and suggest that the IMF may cause losers regardless, but as we suggested earlier, 
governments in crisis are already generating large numbers of losers. On the other hand, what 
would happen in a country in crisis that has no access to cheap IMF loans? 
Secondly, who loses out from SAPs and whose opportunity costs for engaging in 
costly conflict are affected is not clear at all, which has a direct bearing on the assumption 
about liberalization’s effect. Indeed, several political leaders who implemented SAPs, such as 
Gerry Rawlings in Ghana and the United National Party in Sri Lanka, have gone on to win 
popular elections immediately afterwards. In other words, those who dissent against SAPs 
cannot be readily identified as representative of popular opinion about the implementation of 
reform and getting economic fundamentals right. Indeed, most people are hurt by economic 
crisis because of high prices, inflation, resource shortages, and general economic insecurity—
HHB remain silent on how some groups may overcome collective action problems in 
organizing violence relative to others. Stylized-theory in terms of winners and losers in the 
developing world, such as the Heckhscher-Ohlin-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner type models, 
suggest that workers and farmers in poor countries will gain from the opening up and 
liberalization of markets, whereas capital and domestic rent-seeking forces could lose. Thus, 
workers and consumers in poor countries could gain when goods become cheaper and access 
to better quality goods increases. Export-oriented businesses are likely to gain relative to 
inward-oriented ones. Scrutiny by the IMF is also likely to hurt those rent-seeking coalitions 
that spend heavily on the military, for example. Privatization and increased competition is 
also likely to give people access to better quality goods and services at better prices. It is 
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highly unclear from the theory, however, as to who foments civil war. Generals in the military 
might organize violence because they lose rents (Collier and Hoeffler 2005).  
Ordinary people will experience a very high level of collective action problems for 
organizing violence. Theoretically, HHB simply suggest that people will lose jobs and 
government budgets will be cut due to SAPs. This could have been directly modeled quite 
easily, but they fail to do this. Identifying who actually rebels and the exact reasons for their 
actions is no easy task, so we do not fault HHB for this, but inferring from a positive effect of 
signing on to a SAP with increased risk of civil war as the effects of liberalization is 
completely unwarranted unless one thinks that narrowly-based rent seekers who have access 
to the appropriate infrastructure to cause violence actually organize costly violence as a public 
good that brings redress to others. Highly distorted economic fundamentals might also often 
be the reason why civil war breaks out, particularly at a time when a bad government tries to 
reform itself. Distorted economies also generate losers. Contrarily, if conflict is driven by the 
underlying issues that have also caused the crisis, then ignoring the IMF and choosing not to 
liberalize is not a solution to peace. There is also a danger that governments will use the 
argument of stability to increase military spending to try and increase security, if reforms 
require strong states capable of insuring stability.  
We also question HHB’s empirical analyses on the following two issues primarily: 
first, if economic liberalization through IMF programs increases the likelihood of civil war by 
reducing the opportunity costs of losers, we would expect the effect to unfold over some time. 
A standard IMF program lasts between one to three years, and loans are disbursed in tranches 
based on how satisfied the IMF is with the reforms undertaken, or when the borrowers reach 
particular reform and policy benchmarks set by the IMF (Kahn and Sharma 2006). If 
liberalization or the content of SAPs are bad for people, then we should observe rising 
grievances and lowered opportunity costs over time. The Liberian case, as presented by HHB, 
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illustrates this point well because the standby arrangements, which the authors suggest 
influenced the onset of war, were signed by Liberia between 1980 and 1984, while the actual 
war did not break out until 1998. If their reasoning is right, then this is because Liberia 
implemented SAPs according to IMF wishes over those years. Indeed, the evidence from the 
case they discuss suggests otherwise. Liberia was denied all further credit from the IMF and 
World Bank in 1985 because the government refused to accept the conditionality after signing 
(Claessen and Salin 1991). The Bank and Fund left the country the same year (Claessen and 
Salin 1991: 136). Did Liberia, then, suffer civil war because the country was liberalizing 
because of the IMF? With this question in mind, we test the proposition that signing only 
matters for conflict after a period of time has lapsed between signing and proper 
implementation of reforms. By doing this, we can assess the argument that the content of 
SAP, rather than the nature of the crisis, matters.  
Second, the HHB study is limited to full-scale civil wars covering only armed conflicts 
with a threshold of 1000 battle related deaths, with at least 100 killed on each side every year. 
This threshold excludes all but a few of the most brutal conflicts and comprises no more than 
74 conflicts. It would be difficult to argue that that the effect of IMF programs is limited to 
the most brutal intrastate conflicts. Indeed, the various definitions of a full-scale civil war 
usually include an internal conflict between a state and an organized armed group with a 
political agenda, with at least 1000 battle related deaths. However, the onset of a particular 
civil war is often hard to pinpoint, and different scholars use different coding rules to define 
when a conflict started. The measures vary on how many deaths are needed for a conflict to 
be counted as active, how multiple civil wars in one country are treated, and whether the 
starting point of the conflict is the year the number of deaths surpasses the 1000 death 
threshold, or the year the first killings took place  (see e.g. Sambanis (2004) for a thorough 
review).  
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In this way, a country could have experienced several years of devastating conflict 
before it is recorded as a full-scale civil war. Using the 1000 death threshold therefore 
excludes many relevant conflicts, and has some additional unfortunate consequences. For 
instance, Chad has suffered several rebellions, insurgencies and struggles for power among 
various factions, warlords and rebel groups since 1965. Yet, it is not recorded as an onset of 
civil war until 1994 by the coding rules of Fearon and Laitin (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 
Hartzell et al. 2010). This is the same year the central government signed up to a program 
with the IMF with the intention of rebuilding the economy that had been ravaged by roughly 
three decades of war. It does not make much sense to use a program signed up to in 1994 to 
predict the onset of a conflict that had been ongoing and caused more than 40000 deaths at the 
time of signing an IMF agreement (See also Buhaug 2010). By utilizing the PRIO/Uppsala 
Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Harbom and Wallensteen 2009), which 
uses the much lower threshold of 25 battle related deaths in a single year, the onset of civil 
war in Chad is coded for 1976, 18 years before it is recorded as a civil war by the coding rules 
of Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
This difference in coding rules is also important because civil war destroys 
infrastructure and the economy in general, which has a direct impact on independent variables 
such as GDP per capita, economic growth, and external trade. At the same time, the IMF 
formally included post conflict assistance in the IMF emergency assistance arrangement in 
1995, but had been providing technical advice and programs for reconstruction of war-
ravaged economies before that through other facilities, as well as in countries where conflict 
is still active (Gupta 2005). Mozambique, for instance, signed its first economic rehabilitation 
program with the IMF in 1987 during the civil war. This was as a part of the transformation 
from a socialist planning economy to a market economy (Michailof et al. 2002). In this case 
too, HHB recorded the conflict 10 years after relatively large-scale organized violence had 
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started, and five years before it officially ended. For all of these reasons, it is important to 
identify the onset of the conflict as early as possible since the onset of conflicts and economic 
crises are likely to be related. To analyze the relationship between IMF programs and civil 
war, after replicating HHB results, we use the 25 deaths threshold, which allows greater 
variance and is rapidly becoming the standard in the field. 
 
3.3 Data and method 
Initially, we use the data collected by HHB, which is based largely on Fearon and Laitin’s 
(2003) replication dataset (see table 2.5 in appendix for summary statistics). HHB conduct 
bivariate probit analysis in order to mitigate problems associated with endogeneity and 
omitted variables bias. This is because the conditions causing conflict and the conditions that 
determine why IMF agreements are signed might not be independent of each other. They 
employ the strategy which accounts for selection effects, or the non-randomness of the 
chances of being selected into an IMF program, which is a vast improvement on existing 
studies on the IMF and civil war. Thus, we make no alterations to either their data or method, 
which makes our analysis directly comparable with theirs. After performing a strict 
replication of HHB, we then lag their main independent variable to ascertain the effects 
stemming from the period after signing and then introduce our own variations of IMF signing 
using a variable indicating whether a country has been in an IMF program for more than five 
months during a specific year. We do this so that a reasonable amount of time is given for 
liberalization to take place, which can then be recorded (Dreher 2006).  
Our second innovation is to switch the dependent variable from large-scale civil war to 
insurgencies that already develop after 25 battle deaths in a single year, as well as at least two 
years of ‘no fighting’ having taken place. A new onset of war is only coded once these 
conditions are fulfilled (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). After the 
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initial replication, we push matters further by extending the period of study from 1999 to 
2008. First we run HHB’s model specification on the extended data, to make sure the models 
are compatible. We find the same results in all specifications as in the initial analysis.16 Then 
we employ variables in the first and second-stage equations that fit more with the standard 
literature on why the IMF lends, as well as capturing several important correlates of civil war. 
Our argument is that our extended analysis is more refined in terms of the variables 
employed. For example, in order to measure regime type HHB use Polity data that are highly 
sensitive to ongoing violence (Cheibub et al. 2010). They also square the polity measure to 
model the quadratic effect of democracy on civil war, which is not generally recommended 
given problems with massive measurement bias associated with such measures (Treier and 
Jackman 2008) and employing squared term and interpreting it in a non-linear model is not 
straight forward (Ai and Norton 2003). We simply use a measure of democracy presented as a 
dummy that is less likely to be influenced by violence as the Polity index is (Cheibub et al. 
2010). Another innovation is to add conflict in the neighborhood because of the geostrategic 
reasons attached to Western intervention in bad neighborhoods (Balla and Reinhardt 2008). 
For example, historically, Pakistan has received many IMF bailouts due to its strategic 
importance to the US. Furthermore, we employ a variable measuring the number of years 
since previous civil war as recommended by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) that has become 
the standard for controlling for time-dependency in civil war models since. 
Our extended dataset contains annual observations on all countries for which data are 
available from 1970 to 2008. In the civil war equation (second stage), we include the standard 
controls: population size logged, GDP per capita logged, trade to GDP, regime type, conflict 
history, oil exporting country, and mountainous terrain, for comparability. In order to control 
for spatial dependence and the fact that the IMF might be influenced by geopolitical factors, 
                                                             
16 The results from these analyses are presented in table 2.6 in the appendix. 
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we include a variable capturing whether or not a neighbor is in conflict. In the IMF equation 
(first stage), we include economic indicators that are known to influence the decision to apply 
for IMF assistance (Barro and Lee 2005, Bird and Rowlands 2006, Dreher 2004).  
The IMF provides loans to countries in crises, and one crucial issue is whether the 
outcome of conflict is the result of IMF programs or the conditions of the crisis itself. We 
include measures of both a low economic standing and more sudden economic crises. 
Countries with a low economic standing sign up to programs with the IMF more often than 
countries that are better off because they are less creditworthy on open capital markets. 
Following others, we use the availability of foreign reserves, measured as the total amount of 
reserves as the number of months of exports of a country, which also doubles as a measure for 
the extent of a country’s vulnerability to external shocks (Barro and Lee 2005). Healthy 
economic growth reduces the need for IMF assistance, thus we include the economic growth 
rate. Trade as a percentage of GDP (Trade-to-GDP ratio) is used for the degree of openness 
because closed economies are known to approach the IMF more often (Bird and Rowlands 
2006). Following others, we also include three dummies indicating whether a country has 
experienced a currency crisis, a debt crisis or a systemic banking crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 
2008). Additionally, previous participation in IMF programs also increases participation in 
new programs (Bird et al. 2004, Vreeland 2003). Thus, following others, we include the 
number of years a country has been under an IMF program in the equation (Abouharb and 
Cingranelli 2007). 
In order to control for endogeneity, we need an instrument that influences IMF lending 
but has no independent effect on civil war. Several studies have found that voting patterns in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is related to support from the IMF (Dreher et 
al. 2009). Indeed, US support is likely to be a key determinant of why a country receives IMF 
assistance because of the abnormal voting power wielded by the US (Stone, 2004). As we 
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consider voting patterns in the UN to be unrelated to the likelihood of civil war, we employ 
Kegley and Hook’s measure of voting in line with the US in the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) as an instrument in the analysis (Kegley and Hook 1991). The Kegley and 
Hook (1991) measure codes votes in agreement with the US as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, 
and excludes the abstentions17. The resulting numbers are then divided by the total number of 
votes in UNGA each year (Dreher et al. 2009). 
 
3.4 Results 
Table 2.1 reports our main results. In column 1, we are able to replicate the positive and 
statistically significant effect reported by HHB for their variable measuring signing up to an 
IMF agreement. The coefficient we obtain of 1.89 is extremely close to that reported by HHB 
(1.91). In fact, the difference is because of 1 missing observation which occurred due to 
merging our data with theirs. In column 2, we lag their IMF variable by one year, which 
makes the result statistically insignificant. Quite surprisingly, lagging the IMF variable by 
three years (column 3) leads to the reversal of the sign to negative, a result that is statistically 
highly significant. In other words, three years after signing up to an IMF agreement, a country 
exhibits a much lower chance of an onset of civil war, ceteris paribus. It is hard to believe that 
the contemporaneous term of signing up to an IMF program causes war if it is the 
liberalization process itself that produces the conditions of civil war. It seems far more 
reasonable to think that the conditions of the crisis, rather than liberalization, are what 
matters. Given that these tests were based on the 1000 battle deaths threshold, which should 
take much greater organization and time to take effect, the argument that liberalization 
                                                             
17 As a further robustness check, we replace Kegley and Hook’s (1991) measure of UNGA voting with Thacker 
(2006), who codes votes in agreement with the US as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions as 0.5. The 
results are the same if we use Thacker’s data Thacker, Strom. (2006) The High Politics of Imf Lending. In 
Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the Imf and the World Bank, edited by Gustav Ranis, James R. 
Vreeland and Stephen Kosack, pp. 111–142, London: Routledge. 
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matters is rather suspect. Indeed, when we enter a term measuring whether a country has been 
in a program for at least five months of that year, the significant effect of signing up to an 
IMF program vanishes (column 4). 
In columns 5, 6, and 7 of table 2.2, we switch the 1000 battle death threshold to 25 and 
above using the PRIO-Uppsala armed conflicts data. As seen here, both the contemporaneous 
term and the three year lagged term are both negative and statistically significant. In other 
words, there is a much lower chance of an onset of civil war causing more than 25 battle 
deaths in a single year when countries sign up to an IMF program, as defined and tested by 
HHB both contemporaneously and with reasonable time lags. As in the case of using the 1000 
battle death threshold, again, gauging whether a country was in a program for at least five 
months during a given year did not have a statistically significant effect when testing for the 
onset of smaller wars. Additionally, we tried to see whether we could improve the 
specification of the models and the proxies used. For example, we switched the Polity 
democracy measures used by HHB with different operationalization of democracy, including 
a measure of democracy developed by Cheibub et al (2010). We also dropped some variables 
in the model and added others. At no time did we find a positive and statistically significant 
effect of signing up to an IMF program on the risk of an onset of civil war. If HHB have the 
right specification of a model of civil war, then IMF involvement is better associated with 
peace rather than civil war. 
Next, we examine our updated data, including various forms of crises that elicit IMF 
interventions and support from the US, proxied by UNGA voting in the first stage. As seen in 
table 2.3, none of the IMF variables significantly predict the onset of a civil war after 
estimating why some countries are chosen for IMF programs. Notice that our UNGA variable 
is robustly related to why countries get chosen for IMF programs, as are the variables 
measuring crisis. Most importantly, our extended data and models show highly similar results 
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to others, particularly Fearon and Laitin´s (2003) findings where per capita income, 
population size and oil exports are properly signed and statistically significant (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006, Ward et al. 2010). We think our results are generally more comparable to 
other studies in the field than HHB´s findings. Given that IMF interventions are more likely 
where crises are present, it is probable that less people suffer because of intervention that may 
alleviate some pain, given that crises themselves would lead to hardship and austerity by 
default.   
 
3.4.1 Further Checks on Robustness 
We examine the robustness of our main findings using the extended dataset in several ways. 
First, we use alternative measure of civil war, wherein we use civil war incidence variable 
coded 1 for each year if a country experiences conflict and 0 otherwise. Although it is 
equivalent to Fearon and Laitin civil war measure, in this version it records every year if the 
death toll surpasses 1000 deaths. Replicating the HHB models with their explanatory 
variables and replicating the extended dataset models with this alternative measure of civil 
war yields consistent results, i.e. no association between IMF program participation and 
outbreak of civil war.  
Second, we control for country fixed effects along with the time fixed effects (which 
are already controlled for) using two-stage least squares method (2SLS-IV hereafter), thus 
estimating linear probability models. We estimate the 2SLS-IV models on our extended 
dataset in which we regress outbreak of civil war measure on IMF program participation and 
other explanatory variables. In doing so, we use UNGA voting index as our instrumental 
variable. Note that we estimate 2SLS-IV models by including time dummies only in one set 
of models and including time and country dummies in another set of models. The validity of 
the selected instruments depends on, firstly, instrument relevance, i.e., the instrument must be 
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correlated with the explanatory variable in question. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) suggest 
examining the F-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression. The 
selected instruments would be relevant when the first stage regression model’s F-statistics 
meets the thumb rule threshold of being above 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). Secondly, the 
instrument variable should not vary systematically with the disturbance term in the second 
stage equation, i.e.   0itit IV meaning, the instruments cannot have independent effects on 
the dependent variable. The Hansen J-test, developed by Hansen (1982) is employed to check 
whether the selected instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. The joint F-statistic in our 
models is always above 10 with statistical significance of 1% level18 and the Hansen J-test of 
over identifying restrictions accepts the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. After 
controlling for endogeneity associated with IMF program participation, and for country fixed 
effects, we do not find any difference in relation to the effects of IMF program participation. 
The impact of IMF programs on both civil war measures (Fearon and Laitin 2003 and ACD) 
remains statistically insignificant. Our extended data show that IMF involvement is a poor 
predictor of conflict, results supported by others who have used other data and methods 
examining this crucial question for African countries (Bussmann et al. 2005). However, if 
HHB´s data and models are more representative, then perhaps IMF involvement does alleviate 
the risk of civil war. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Despite the massive importance of IMF lending, few studies have looked at the impact of the 
IMF on the risk of civil war. Recently, Hartzell et al (2010) provided an interesting study on 
                                                             
18 Apart from joint F-statistics, we also use Cragg-Donald statistic test, developed by Cragg and Donald (1993), 
of the null that the model is under identified, i.e. that UNGA voting index does not sufficiently identify IMF 
program participation. However, the Cragg-Donald test allows us to overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis 
that the model is under identified. 
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the effects of IMF lending on the risk of civil war. Indeed, their study, which takes the issue 
of non-randomness between IMF programs and civil war seriously, is a massive improvement 
on previous empirical studies on the subject. Using this study as a benchmark, we investigate 
the issue further by critically examining some fundamental assumptions in their study, namely 
that the IMF actually liberalizes countries and that liberalization is what causes the conditions 
of conflict, rather than crisis itself. Unfortunately, their explanation of the connection is 
neither grounded well in theories explaining who wins and who loses from liberalization, nor 
who is in a position to rebel when IMF programs take effect.  
Given their explanation, the use of an empirical strategy that employs a 
contemporaneous term for signing on to an IMF program is also suspect. With only minor 
adjustments to their own data, particularly the use of a dependent variable measuring the onset 
of a civil war at a much lower threshold for deaths, we find ample evidence suggesting that 
the relationship they report may in fact be the opposite. Our extended data, as well as  a better 
operationalization of a model of civil war and the endogeneity between conditions of crisis 
and IMF involvement, found no connection—either positive or negative—between 
participation in IMF programs and the risk of civil war. Further research is clearly needed on 
the subject, particularly the use of alternative operationalizations of IMF involvement and 
data measuring the degree to which governments liberalize. Indeed, two variables, namely per 
capita income and population size, seem to explain most of the variance in the onset of civil 
wars  (Ward et al. 2010). Thus conclusively, explaining how economic crises, as well as the 
conditions of rent-seeking and other maladies that lead to crises also generate conditions 
conducive to civil war, might be where scholars should look in future studies in order to find 
out how the IMF impacts upon civil war. 
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Table 2.1: Bivariate Probit Estimations Replicating Hartzell et al. (2010) 
 
 Fearon & Laitin Fearon & Laitin Fearon & Laitin Fearon & Laitin 
 >1000  
Model 1 
>1000 
Model 2 
>1000  
Model 3 
>1000  
Model 4 
Civil war equation     
Signed IMF program 1.885***    
 (0.593)    
Signed IMF program (t-1)  0.113   
  (1.089)   
Signed IMF program (t-3)   -1.917***  
   (0.240)  
IMF participation > 5months    0.282 
    (0.711) 
Per capita GDP (log)  -0.069 -0.091 -0.166*** -0.077 
 (0.043) (0.063) (0.023) (0.058) 
Economic growth (log) -0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
Foreign reserves -0.027 -0.033 -0.046** -0.030 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.021) (0.034) 
Democracy 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
Democracy squared -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Population size (log) 0.053 0.048 -0.010 0.052 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.030) (0.048) 
Oil 0.397* 0.495** 0.284 0.482** 
 (0.225) (0.230) (0.228) (0.223) 
Previous civil war -0.090 -0.154 -0.207** -0.147 
 (0.112) (0.123) (0.101) (0.119) 
Years under IMF program 0.006 0.011 0.025*** 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.013) 
Mountainous terrain 0.101** 0.114** 0.039 0.114** 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) 
Constant -2.239*** -2.141*** -0.357 -2.275*** 
 (0.387) (0.562) (0.319) (0.522) 
Signed IMF program equation     
GDP per capita (log)  -0.133*** -0.127*** -0.118*** -0.194*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) 
Economic growth (log) -0.011* -0.014** -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Foreign reserves -0.073*** -0.039** -0.040** -0.063** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025) 
Democracy 0.015* 0.008 0.002 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Democracy squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Population size (log) -0.006 -0.022 -0.028 -0.041 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) 
Oil 0.032 0.106 0.118 0.003 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.095) (0.178) 
Previous civil war 0.028 -0.093 -0.134 -0.120 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.124) (0.170) 
Years under IMF program 0.015** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Number countries under IMF program -0.007** 0.000 0.003 0.015*** 
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 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Constant -0.120 -0.430 -0.515* -0.187 
 (0.307) (0.325) (0.288) (0.451) 
Number of Observations 2404 2404 2158 2404 
Log likelihood -1103.683 -1129.373 -1017.780 -1275.498 
rho -0.889 -0.031 0.997 -0.168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables in civil war equation lagged following 
Hartzell et al. (2010). Independent variables in signed IMF equation lagged according to the lags in the 
IMF variable * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.2: Bivariate Probit Estimation Replicating Hartzell et al. with  
Civil wars above 25 Battle deaths as Dependent Variable 
 
 ACD >25 battle 
deaths 
ACD >25 battle 
deaths19 
ACD >25 battle 
deaths20 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Civil war equation    
Signed IMF program -1.050**   
 (0.454)   
Signed IMF program (t-1)  -0.309  
  (2.695)  
Signed IMF program (t-3)   -1.430*** 
   (0.190) 
Per capita GDP (log)  -0.108*** -0.086 -0.119*** 
 (0.033) (0.063) (0.022) 
Economic growth (log) 0.003 0.008 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.004) 
Reserves -0.027 -0.003 -0.022 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.016) 
Democracy 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Democracy squared -0.004* -0.005* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population (log) 0.140*** 0.160** 0.087* 
 (0.052) (0.064) (0.046) 
Oil 0.321* 0.378** 0.295* 
 (0.174) (0.189) (0.152) 
Previous war -0.207 -0.198 -0.201* 
 (0.149) (0.165) (0.112) 
Years under IMF program 0.008 0.004 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) 
Mountainous terrain 0.008 0.017 0.012 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.032) 
Constant -2.249*** -2.886*** -1.493*** 
 (0.704) (1.092) (0.476) 
Signed IMF program equation    
Per capita GDP (log)  -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.122*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) 
Growth (log) -0.011* -0.014** -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Reserves -0.073*** -0.039** -0.045** 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) 
Democracy 0.014* 0.008 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Democracy squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population size (log) -0.003 -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Oil 0.055 0.101 0.148 
 (0.099) (0.102) (0.113) 
Previous war -0.035 -0.083 -0.152 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.100) 
Years under IMF program 0.016** 0.020*** 0.034*** 
                                                             
19 Dependent variables in civil war equation t-1, in IMF equation t-2 
20 Dependent variables in civil war equation t-1, in IMF equation t-4 
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 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Number countries under IMF program -0.008** 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.111 -0.433 -0.357 
 (0.301) (0.362) (0.334) 
Number of Observations 2404 2391 2145 
Log likelihood -1254.497 -1272.738 -1153.294 
rho 0.650 0.056 0.892 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables in signed IMF equation lagged according 
to the lags in the IMF variable * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.3: IMF Interventions and the Onset of Civil War using Extended Data, 1970-2008 
 
 ACD >25  ACD >25 ACD >25  
 Model 821 Model 922 Model 10 
Civil war equation    
IMF signed (t-1) 0.295   
 (0.725)   
IMF signed (t-3)  -0.158  
  (0.490)  
IMF participation > 5months   0.628 
   (0.391) 
Population (log) 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.190*** -0.217*** -0.119 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.077) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Democracy 0.126 0.073 0.134 
 (0.123) (0.129) (0.123) 
Peace years -0.009* -0.010 -0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Oil 0.388*** 0.378** 0.414*** 
 (0.148) (0.153) (0.142) 
Neighbor at war -0.015 -0.090 -0.005 
 (0.135) (0.142) (0.131) 
Mountainous  -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Years under IMF -0.000 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Constant -8.234 -8.018 -8.689 
  (6.654) (12.025) 
Signed IMF program    
Per capita GDP (log) -0.251*** -0.224*** -0.571*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) 
GDP Growth  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign Reserves -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.035*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) 
Currency crisis 0.349** 0.350** 0.175 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.145) 
Debt crisis 0.388* 0.348 1.211*** 
 (0.212) (0.223) (0.260) 
Banking crisis 0.253 0.263* 0.236 
 (0.157) (0.159) (0.155) 
Ongoing civil war  -0.197** -0.173** -0.370*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.077) 
UNGA voting 1.895*** 1.688*** 3.493*** 
 (0.554) (0.588) (0.453) 
Years under IMF 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -0.221 -0.357 1.256** 
                                                             
21 Independent variables in civil war equation t-1, in IMF equation t-2 
22 Independent variables in civil war equation t-1, in IMF equation t-4 
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 (0.576) (0.570) (0.612) 
Number of Observations 2769 2572 2853 
Log likelihood -1346.603 -1284.185 -1628.340 
Rho -0.214 0.238 -0.434 
Standard errors in parentheses; Time dummies not shown; Independent variables in signed IMF 
program equation lagged according to the IMF variable in the civil war equation. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3.7 Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: List of countries 
 
Afghanistan Colombia Honduras Mauritania Singapore 
Albania Comoros Hungary Mauritius Slovak Republic 
Algeria Congo. Dem. Rep. Iceland Mexico Slovenia 
Angola Congo. Rep. India Moldova Solomon Islands 
Argentina Costa Rica Indonesia Mongolia Somalia 
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Iran. Islamic Rep. Montenegro South Africa 
Australia Croatia Iraq Morocco Spain 
Austria Cuba Ireland Mozambique Sri Lanka 
Azerbaijan Cyprus Israel Myanmar Sudan 
Bahamas. The Czech Republic Italy Namibia Suriname 
Bahrain Denmark Jamaica Nepal Swaziland 
Bangladesh Djibouti Japan Netherlands Sweden 
Barbados 
Dominican 
Republic Jordan New Zealand Switzerland 
Belarus Ecuador Kazakhstan Nicaragua Syrian Arab Republic 
Belgium Egypt. Arab Rep. Kenya Niger Tajikistan 
Belize El Salvador Korea. Dem. Rep. Nigeria Tanzania 
Benin Equatorial Guinea Korea. Rep. Norway Thailand 
Bhutan Eritrea Kuwait Oman Timor-Leste 
Bolivia Estonia Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan Togo 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia Lao PDR Panama Trinidad and Tobago 
Botswana Fiji Latvia Papua New Guinea Tunisia 
Brazil Finland Lebanon Paraguay Turkey 
Brunei Darussalam France Lesotho Peru Turkmenistan 
Bulgaria Gabon Liberia Philippines Uganda 
Burkina Faso Gambia. The Libya Poland Ukraine 
Burundi Georgia Lithuania Portugal United Arab Emirates 
Cambodia Germany Luxembourg Qatar United Kingdom 
Cameroon Ghana Macedonia. FYR Romania United States 
Canada Greece Madagascar Russian Federation Uruguay 
Cape Verde Guatemala Malawi Rwanda Uzbekistan 
Central African Republic Guinea Malaysia Saudi Arabia Venezuela. RB 
Chad Guinea-Bissau Maldives Senegal Vietnam 
Chile Guyana Mali Serbia Zambia 
China Haiti Malta Sierra Leone Zimbabwe 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics 
  
HHB data Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Civil war onset > 1000 battle deaths  0.017 0.130 0.000 1.000 4238 
Signed IMF program 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000 4226 
GDP per capita (log) 4.259 4.730 0.196 41.021 4094 
Economic growth (lagged) 1.634 6.331 -41.900 63.630 3303 
Foreign reserves (months of exports) (lagged) 3.479 2.988 0.000 25.000 2760 
Polity2, Index of democracy -0.329 7.572 -10.000 10.000 4219 
Polity 2 squared 57.435 30.890 0.000 100.000 4219 
Population (log, lagged) 9.079 1.481 5.403 14.030 4238 
Oil 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000 4238 
Previous civil war 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000 4238 
Number of countries under IMF program 6.037 7.297 0.000 35.000 4225 
Mountainous terrain 2.090 1.431 0.000 4.557 4238 
Years under IMF program 44.550 16.016 21.000 72.000 4078 
Index of economic freedom (interpolated) 5.733 1.111 2.300 8.800 2836 
IMF program > 5 months 0.197 0.398 0.000 1.000 5760 
Civil war onset >25 deaths (ACD) 0.036 0.185 0.000 1.000 4622 
Democracy dummy (Cheibub et al.) 0.409 0.492 0.000 1.000 4832 
Extended analysis           
ACD onset >25 battle deaths 0.033 0.179 0.000 1.000 6013 
Signed IMF program 0.127 0.333 0.000 1.000 6013 
IMF program >5 months 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000 6013 
Population (log) 15.763 1.707 11.620 20.999 5874 
GDP per capita (log) 7.389 1.588 4.046 11.686 5521 
Trade (% GDP) 74.557 43.266 0.309 438.091 5372 
Democracy (Cheibub et al) 0.429 0.495 0.000 1.000 5985 
Peace years 11.598 10.978 0.000 38.000 6013 
Oil  0.147 0.354 0.000 1.000 5974 
Neighbor at war 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 6013 
Mountainous terrain 17.347 21.659 0.000 94.300 5470 
Years under IMF 7.768 8.778 0.000 42.000 5869 
Growth  4.016 10.049 -88.086 446.865 4311 
Foreign reserves (months of exports) 3.634 3.293 -0.092 43.694 4384 
Currency crisis 0.035 0.183 0.000 1.000 5767 
Debt crisis 0.011 0.102 0.000 1.000 5767 
Systemic banking crisis 0.021 0.144 0.000 1.000 5767 
Ongoing civil war 0.170 0.375 0.000 1.000 6013 
Voting in line with the US in the UNGA 0.194 0.116 0.000 0.734 5581 
Anocracy  0.206 0.405 0.000 1.000 6013 
Signed SAP program with the IMF 0.006 0.077 0.000 1.000 6013 
Civil war onset (Fearon & Laitin 2003) 0.017 0.131 0.000 1.000 4086 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
81 
 
Table 2.6: Further checks on Robustness 
 
                                                             
23 Independent variables in the civil war equation t-1, in the IMF equation, t-2 
 
Civil war equation 
Fearon Laitin 
>1000 deaths 
ACD 
>1000 deaths 
ACD23 
>1000 deaths 
ACD 
>1000 deaths 
ACD 
>25 deaths 
ACD 
>25 deaths 
Signed IMF agreement 2.098*** 
(.531) 
1.120 
(1.787) 
  -0.255 
(0.509) 
 
Signed IMF agreement (t-1)   -1.443*** 
(.353) 
   
IMF participation >5 months    -1.152** 
(0.420) 
 -0.041 
(0.474) 
Per Capita GDP (lagged) -0.097 
(0.134) 
-0.245* 
(0.130) 
-0.334*** 
(0.065) 
-0.427*** 
(0.074) 
-0.241*** 
(0.065) 
-0.233** 
(0.091) 
Economic growth (lagged) 0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
Foreign reserves (lagged) 0.012 
(0.045) 
-0.069 
(0.051) 
-0.075** 
(0.025) 
-0.057* 
(0.033) 
0.014 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.014 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
Democracy squared 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Population size (lagged) -0.117 
(0.082) 
0.269** 
(0.100) 
0.188** 
(0.093) 
0.250** 
(0.080) 
0.144*** 
(0.035) 
0.149*** 
(0.036) 
Oil  0.929** 
(0.400) 
0.799** 
(0.370) 
0.518** 
(0.245) 
0.668** 
(0.217) 
0.425** 
(0.145) 
0.433** 
(0.148) 
Previous civil war 6.888*** 
(1.506) 
5.318*** 
(0.333) 
-0.066 
(0.162) 
   
Years since previous war    -0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Mountainous terrain  0.001 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Years under SA -0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.016) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
Constant -5.793** 
(2.267) 
-10.293*** 
(2.043) 
-2.488 
(1.904) 
-3.145* 
(1.759) 
-2.709** 
(0.832) 
-2.874** 
(1.080) 
IMF participation equation       
GDP Per Capita (lagged) -0.211*** 
(0.039) 
-0.232*** 
(0.034) 
-0.232*** 
(0.033) 
-0.516*** 
(0.033) 
-0.234*** 
(0.034) 
-0.517*** 
(0.033) 
Economic growth (lagged) -0.016** 
(0.005) 
-0.017** 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.017** 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Foreign reserves (lagged) -0.081*** 
(0.018) 
-0.064*** 
(0.014) 
-0.063*** 
(0.014) 
-0.034** 
(0.010) 
-0.064*** 
(0.014) 
-0.033** 
(0.010) 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.003 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Democracy squared -0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Population size (lagged) -0.009 
(0.029) 
-0.039 
(0.025) 
-0.027 
(0.024) 
-0.085*** 
(0.020) 
-0.043* 
(0.024) 
-0.085*** 
(0.020) 
Oil  0.046 
(0.109) 
0.058 
(0.098) 
0.045 
(0.098) 
0.149 
(0.091) 
0.060 
(0.098) 
0.142 
(0.091) 
Previous civil war -0.222** 
(0.096) 
-0.102 
(0.082) 
-0.146* 
(0.084) 
   
Years since previous war    0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Years under SA 0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
0.041*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.041*** 
(0.003) 
Voting with the US in the UN 1.202** 
(0.515) 
1.820*** 
(0.396) 
1.361*** 
(0.343) 
3.192*** 
(0.364) 
1.846*** 
(0.393) 
3.172*** 
(0.369) 
Constant 0.699 
(0.511) 
0.889** 
(0.453) 
0.779* 
(0.456) 
3.925*** 
(0.399) 
0.935** 
(0.456) 
3.935*** 
(0.400) 
Observations 1957 2867 2733 2867 2867 2867 
Log pseudolikelihood -946.4 -1186.9 -1142.2 -1460.4 -1464.2 -1727.8 
rho -.927 -.603 .969** .736** .206 -.006 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies not shown. * p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01  
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4. Chapter 3 
 
 
 
A Race to the Bottom in Labour Standards?24 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
While many concerns have been expressed over the impact of increasing globalization, many 
of them centre on the possibility of a race to the bottom in which governments seek to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by removing policies that, although potentially socially 
desirable, are viewed as unattractive to firms. This worry has been expressed in the arenas of 
taxation, environmental regulation, and labour standards, among others. While there is a 
growing literature estimating the extent of the race to the bottom in international taxation and 
environmental policies, to our knowledge to date there is no evidence on the potential race to 
the bottom in labour standards. This is the gap the current paper fills. Using panel data on 148 
developing countries from 1985 to 2002, we utilize spatial econometric methods to estimate 
whether the Mosley (2011) and Mosley and Uno (2007) measure of labour rights in one 
country depends on those elsewhere. For the full sample, we find a significant and positive 
spatial lag, which is consistent with strategic complements and a necessary condition for there 
to be a race to the bottom. In particular, this seems to be driven primarily by competition in 
labour practices rather than labour laws, suggesting that competition is driven less by a failure 
                                                             
24 Coauthored with Ronald B. Davies, University College Dublin. 
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to institute regulations than by an unwillingness to enforce them. Since there is a noticeable 
downward trend in both of these measures over the sample period, we take this as evidence of 
a race to the bottom.  
 Although there has been less attention paid to the potential for a race to the bottom in 
labour standards as compared to one in taxes or environmental policies, the essence of the 
argument is the same. Labour standards such as the right of collective bargaining result in 
higher labour costs. All else equal, mobile investment would prefer a location with weaker 
standards and lower costs. Evidence of FDI being deterred by labour standards is provided by 
Görg (2002), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), and Dewit et al. (2009). It should be noted, 
however, that there is disagreement on this issue, with Kucera (2002) and Rodrik (1996) 
providing dissenting opinions.25 The issue of how FDI depends on standards, however, is a 
very different question from the one we ask, which is whether labour standards in one 
location depend on those in another.26 In particular, even if FDI does not flow in as a result of 
a country’s reduction in labour standards, if politicians believe that it does then this alone 
could result in a race to the bottom.  
Although to our knowledge no one has attempted to estimate the extent of the race to 
the bottom in labour standards before, spatial econometrics have been used to look for a race 
to the bottom in taxes and in environmental standards. The first group of work includes 
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), Davies and Voget (2008), Overesche and Rinke 
(2009) and others. Generally, this work has focused on tax competition between developed 
countries where there is some evidence of a positive spatial lag, meaning that as tax rates fall 
                                                             
25 One possible reason they provide is that operating in a high standards location provides consumers a guarantee 
on how a firm treats its workers. As such, they may be willing to pay more for the firm’s product on 
humanitarian grounds. See Greenhill et al. (2009) for a full discussion. In addition, there is evidence that 
increased FDI may improve labour standards (Mosley 2011, Davies and Voy 2009, Neumayer and de Soysa 
2005). 
26 Greenhill et al. (2009) do test to see whether the “practice content of trade” is a predictor for a given nation’s 
labour standards. However, although they do control for the potential endogeneity of trade volumes, they do not 
deal with potential endogeneity in standards that would result from competition. 
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in one nation, this lowers tax rates elsewhere. An exception to this is Klemm and van Parys 
(2009) who focus on Latin America and Africa, finding that they compete in tax holidays. In 
the environmental literature, the focus has been on two issues: the joint adoption of 
environmental agreements (including the work of Beron et al. (2003), Murdoch et al. (2003) 
and Davies and Naughton (2006)) and interaction in environmental policies (which includes 
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Levinson (2003) and Fredriksson et al. (2004)). These 
studies tend to find evidence consistent with the race to the bottom. However, due to data 
limitations, many of them either restrict their attention to developed countries or to 
competition across US states. Davies and Naughton (2006) are an exception to this, who find 
that developed countries affect the treaty participation of both developed and developing 
nations whereas the developing nations only tend to impact themselves. 
For our full sample using GDP weights (which assume that a given nation pays more 
attention to the standards in larger economies), our estimates find that a standard deviation 
decline in labour standard elsewhere leads a given country to lower its own standards by 
3.8%. Although this magnitude varies somewhat when weighting by per-capita GDP or trade 
openness, the qualitative result is the same. When we decompose our measure of labour 
standards into its components – the laws guaranteeing labour rights (laws) and the 
enforcement of those laws (practices) – we find evidence primarily when using labour 
practices. This holds for both significance and magnitude of the estimated impact. This 
suggests that while countries may well attempt to “put on a good face” by instituting labour-
friendly laws for reasons similar to those discussed by Kucera (2002), they may then be 
competing for FDI by simply turning a blind eye towards violations of those laws (or are 
simply unable to adequately enforce them). This finding is also notable because both laws and 
practices have similar trends, indicating our finding for practices is causal rather than the 
result of an uncontrolled for time trend. We also estimate our model for subsamples of the 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
86 
 
data. These estimates reveal that the competition is primarily driven by countries with weak 
standards, occurs both in relatively poor and relatively rich countries, and is strongest for 
Latin America and the Middle East. Again, these differences stand out against a similar 
downward trend in standards for each group and region, suggesting that we are capturing 
evidence of interdependence in standards instead of a mere trend. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes both our data and our 
methodology. Section 4.4 discusses the results and Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data and method 
 In this section, we describe both our data, which is a panel data set across 148 
countries from 1985 to 2002, and our estimation specification.  
4.2.1 Estimation Specification 
Our baseline specification estimates the labour standards in country i in year t as a 
function of a set of exogenous variables ,i tX  (which includes a lagged dependent variable):  
 , , ,i t i i t i tLR X      (1) 
where i  is the country-specific constant and ,i t  is the error term. Our control variables are 
drawn from the existing literature and are described below. To this baseline, we then 
introduce the labour rights in other countries in year t, a variable known in the literature as the 
spatial lag. Specifically, we estimate: 
 , , , , , ,i t i j i t i t i t i t
j i
LR LR X    

     (2) 
where , , ,j i t i t
j i
LR

 is the spatial lag, i.e. the weighted average of labour standards in the other 
countries. As our baseline weights, we utilize 
,
, ,
,
j t
j i t
k t
k i
GDP
GDP




. In words, the share that 
country i gives to country j is equivalent to j’s share of the total GDP across countries not 
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including country i.27 Our rationale for using GDP as the weight is two-fold. First, one might 
anticipate that country i pays more attention to what is taking place in larger countries rather 
than small ones. Second, if the goal of manipulating labour standards is to attract FDI, the 
choice of labour standards will depend on the elasticity of FDI to a given country’s policies. 
With this in mind, if country j is already attractive to FDI relative to country k, then a change 
in j’s labour standards may have a larger impact on the allocation of FDI than a comparable 
change in k. This in turn would make i more responsive to j’s labour standards than to k’s, a 
difference that (2) reflects by giving a greater weight to j.28 Since, as confirmed in many 
studies and reviewed by Blonigen (2005), FDI is attracted to larger countries, this would 
imply a greater sensitivity on the part of country i to the labour standards of a large country. 
GDP has been used as a weight in several papers estimating the race to the bottom in taxation 
(Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008, for example). In addition, we check our results by 
using two additional weights, 
,
, ,
,
per-capita GDP
per-capita GDP
j t
j i t
k t
k i




 and 
,
, ,
,
j t
j i t
k t
k i
Openness
Openness




 where 
Opennessj,t is the sum of exports plus imports relative to GDP (a common proxy for the 
inverse of trade costs in the empirical FDI literature). For both of these, our rationale is 
comparable to the choice of GDP since FDI is often attracted to wealthier and more open 
countries. Nevertheless, since high per-capita GDP can be correlated with wage costs thus 
deterring vertical FDI (in which MNE output is intended for export out of the host) and 
greater openness reduces the need for horizontal FDI (in which FDI is intended to replace 
exports to the host), the net impact of these factors is less clear-cut than GDP. Indeed, as 
discussed by Blonigen (2005), the literature finds mixed results for these variables. We 
                                                             
27 As described by Anselin (1988), it is common to “row standardize” the weights so that the sum of the weights 
adds up to one. 
28 Baldwin and Krugman (2004) provide a model of precisely this issue for tax competition in which a large 
country, by virtue of its attractive domestic market, has a greater impact on FDI flows than a small country does.  
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therefore rely on the GDP weights for our primary results and use these alternatives as 
robustness checks. 
The difficulty with the spatial lag is that if labour standards in i depend on those in j 
and vice versa, the spatial lag is endogenous. We deal with this and the lagged dependent 
variable by using the Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS-GMM estimator accounting for the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction.29 In addition to using lagged values of the endogenous 
variables as instruments, we also follow standard spatial econometric procedure and use 
, , ,j i t j t
j i
X

 ,that is, the weighted average of the other nations’ exogenous variables (but 
excluding their lagged dependent variables).30 The intuition behind doing so is that for a given 
country j, its exogenous variables directly impact its own labour standards but are not directly 
dependent on those in i.  Therefore they are correlated with the endogenous variable but are 
themselves exogenous, making them suitable instruments. Within the literature on the SYS-
GMM estimator, there is concern regarding the potential inclusion of too many instruments 
(Roodman 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, in the reported results, we restrict the lag structure to t-3 
and t-5. The reason for using these years is that, when including t-2 lags, our instruments 
failed to pass the exogeneity tests. Nevertheless, we experimented with a number of 
alternative sets of instruments (such as excluding some or all of the weighted average of the 
other nations’ exogenous variables) and found qualitatively similar results in all cases.31 
                                                             
29 In unreported results, we also utilized IV GMM estimation rather than one which deals with lags. The primary 
difference is that when doing so, we typically found a significantly positive spatial lag when using GDP weights. 
Thus, on the whole, our results are robust to alternative methods of controlling for endogeneity. These alternative 
results are available on request. 
30 In addition to the variants described below, we estimated a set of regressions in which all control variables, 
including the instruments for the spatial lag, were lagged one period. This was done in order to alleviate potential 
concerns that variables such as GDP (both in country i and elsewhere) might be affected by the labour standards 
i uses in year t (such as might be the case if it is able to attract FDI to the benefit of its GDP and the detriment of 
others). These alternative regressions yielded qualitatively identical results to those presented. 
31 These alternate results are available on request. 
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 This baseline specification is modified to explore the robustness of our findings. The 
specifics of these modifications are described below. 
 
4.2.2 Data 
We use annual data for 148 countries from 1985 to 2002. The list of countries is 
reported in table 3.10 in the appendix. For our dependent variable, we use Mosley (2011) and 
Mosley and Uno’s (2007) all-inclusive Labour Rights index constructed annually from 1985 
to 2002 for 148 countries. This composite index, capturing “basic collective labour rights”, 
follows the template of Kucera (2002), which covers 37 types of violations of labour rights 
under six different categories.32 These six categories are (a) freedom of association and 
collective bargaining-related liberties, (b) the right to establish and join worker and union 
organizations, (c) other union activities, (d) the right to bargain collectively, (e) the right to 
strike, and (f) rights in export processing zones.33 It is noteworthy however that the Mosley 
index does not capture aspects of labour standards such as minimum wages or individual 
labour rights like employment benefits and working conditions.  
In each of these above mentioned six categories, violations of labour rights by the 
government or employers (be they local or foreign firms) are identified as an absence of legal 
rights, limitations on legal rights and/or a violation of those legal rights. The index then 
accounts for both the de jure (laws) labour standards and the de facto (practices) standards 
prevailing in a country. The law component of the index, which covers 21 of the 37 categories 
                                                             
32 As such, it is an improvement over other measures of labour rights or standards which capture only a single 
factor, such the number of ILO conventions (Botero et al. 2000), rate of worker injuries (Bonnal 2008) or a 
single subjective index (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). 
33 These categories are line with those laid out by the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work adopted by ILO member states in June 1998. This declaration identified the core or fundamental labour 
rights as including the freedom of association (right to unionize), effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining (right to bargain and protest), elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, effective 
abolition of child labour, elimination of discrimination with respect to employment and occupation and respect 
to minimum wages and hours of work. 
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in the index, captures whether or not the required laws to safeguard the collective rights of 
workers, for example whether an industry is allowed to impose limits on workers’ right to 
strike or bargain collectively, are in place. The practices component, meanwhile, captures the 
actual number of violations observed in the labour rights prescribed in the laws. Thus, the 
practices component captures whether there are any registered acts of violations of the laws 
governing labour standards.  
To construct the index, Mosley and Uno (2007) drew upon information from the US 
State Department's annual country reports on human rights practices, reports from both the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) 
and the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), and the annual surveys on violations of 
trade union rights which published by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU).34 If the information from all three sources displays violation of labour rights over 
the year, Mosley and Uno (2007) assigned a score of 1 for the relevant one of the 37 
indicators for a country. If this is not the case a score of 0 is assigned.35 Then, using the 
recommendation of two experts and following Kucera’s (2002) methodology, weights were 
assigned to each of the indicators and the index was constructed. This resulted in a labour 
rights index which was coded on a scale of 0 – 28.5 and a labour practices rights index 
ranging from 0 – 27.5 wherein higher values represent upholding respect for labour 
laws/practices. The sum of these category scores is then the annual measure of labour rights 
                                                             
34 The US report exclusively covers violations on labour rights in each country related to freedom of association, 
right to bargain collectively and strike, and export processing zones. The CEACR and CFA reports, both of 
which are associated with the ILO, are based on the information provided by the respective governments on 
complaints filed by unions, workers’ organizations and other employee associations. The ILO mandates that 
these are submitted annually and that they include progress reports how grievances are being addressed. These 
reports are then reviewed by two independent experts to deal with potential misrepresentation. The ICFTU, 
rechristened the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in 2006, surveys provide information on legal 
barriers to unions, violations of rights, murders, disappearances and detention of members associated with labour 
unions.  
35 If violation of labour rights in respective indicators is recorded more than once, in either one source or in 
multiple sources, the maximum value according to Mosley and Uno (2007) remains 1.  
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violations, which, in our sample of developing countries has a mean of 25.7 and a maximum 
of 37. Contrasting this with developed countries, where scores reach 76.5, illustrates the 
relatively weak protections developing country workers are provided. Overall, the Mosley and 
Uno (2007) comprehensive measure is a huge improvement on previous indices, such as those 
used by Cingranelli and Richards (2006) and Bohning (2005), because of the multiple sources 
of information, sophisticated weighting methodology and reliability of the information. 
Having both the overall index and its two components provides us with two 
advantages. First, it permits us to examine whether there is any evidence of a race to the 
bottom in one component or the other, that is, whether governments appear to be competing 
by altering legal frameworks or simply by turning a blind eye towards violations. This latter is 
of particular concern since a nation may bow to international pressure and introduce legal 
labour rights but then simply fail to enforce them. Alternatively, strong laws may be 
undermined by weak enforcement, resulting in a low practices score. As shown in table 3.1, 
the correlation between the two measures is 0.20, suggesting that this is indeed a possibility. 
Second, although a positive spatial lag is suggestive of a race to the bottom, it could also 
signify a race to the top. In particular, one might expect that workers in one country might 
observe superior labour standards in other countries and demand similar treatment (and thus 
introducing the possibility of yardstick competition rather than competition for mobile 
firms).36 In this case, one might expect an improvement in laws over time even as violations 
rise as more demanding workers file more registered complaints against their employers. This 
idea of diffusion through ‘public awareness’ and the spread of ‘norms and ideas’ is explored 
by Neumayer and de Soysa (2006), Baghwati (2004) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). As 
                                                             
36 Within the taxation literature, Salmon (1987) was the first to develop a theory of “yardstick competition” in 
which the tax authority in one jurisdiction depends on that elsewhere not because officials use taxes to attract 
mobile factors, but because voters in their jurisdiction judge the performance of the authority by comparing the 
local tax rate to those elsewhere. Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) utilize 
spatial econometrics to find positive spatial lags which they interpret as evidence of yardstick competition. 
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shown in figure 1.1, however, we find that both laws and practices have worsened over time, 
suggesting both an erosion of legal protections and increased violations of those weakened 
standards although it is indeed practices that have fallen fastest. In figure 2.2, where we report 
sample averages weighting by GDP (as is done in the spatial lag), these declines are even 
more pronounced.37  
In choosing our vector of control variables (Xi,t), we follow the work of Caraway 
(2009), Greenhill et al. (2009), Mosley and Uno (2007), Neumayer and de Soysa (2005, 2006, 
2007), Busse (2004), Arestoff and Granger (2004), Brown (2001) and others. Among the 
standard controls in the literature are measures of economic development. With this in mind, 
we include logged per capita GDP (measured in constant 2000 US dollars) and its growth rate 
(ERS, 2010).38 We also include Opennessi,t to control for a country’s exposure to world 
markets. Following Neumayer and de Soysa (2006), we utilize the manufacturing value added 
share in GDP, which is included since labour rights in manufacturing are likely better reported 
than those in agriculture. We also follow their lead and include the total labour force 
participation rate which is intended to capture the idea that higher the participation would 
mean greater demand for protective labour rights. Following Boockman (2006) and others, we 
control for two political variables. The first is Democracyi,t, which is the average score from 
Freedom House’s civil and political liberties ranking and ranges 0 (full liberties) to 7 
(severely limited liberties).39 We also include a variable from Beck et al. (2001) that captures 
the ideology of the incumbent government. We recode this measure so that it ranges between 
                                                             
37 These diffusion of norm effects are found to be much stronger in bilateral trade (see the ‘California effect’ in 
Greenhill et al. (2009)). 
38 We also use constant 2000 US dollars in constructing our weights. 
39 The Polity IV measure could not be considered because our sample includes many small countries such as 
Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, for which the Polity IV index is absent. In order to avoid losing too many 
observations, we opt for the Freedom House score. Alternatively, when using the Polity IV index we could not 
find any significant changes in our main results.  
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-1 and 1, with higher numbers indicating a more leftist (and therefore potentially pro-labour) 
government.  
 Additionally, we account for the ratification of key ILO conventions to measure 
whether these agreements have had any measurable impact. Rodrik (1996), Busse (2002) and 
Neumayer and de Soysa (2006) fail to find any impact of these agreements on labour rights in 
developing countries. We follow Neumayer and de Soysa (2006) to include a dummy variable 
one equal to one when a nation has ratified ILO convention number 87, which deals with 
freedom of association, and if a country has ratified convention number 98 which secures the 
right to collective bargaining. The variable is constructed using the information from ILO’s 
Database of International Labour Standards (www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/). In addition, we also 
include a dummy variable capturing whether a country has signed a Structural Adjustment 
Facility program with the IMF or otherwise, obtained from Dreher (2006) and Boockmann 
and Dreher (2003). For details on summary statistics, the measurement of our data, or their 
sources, see table 3.11 and table 3.12 respectively in the appendix. 
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Baseline Results 
 Table 3.2 presents our baseline results. Column 1 shows results not including the 
spatial lag or the lagged dependent variable to ease the comparison between our results and 
those of others studying the determinants of labour rights. As expected, we find that countries 
with faster growing GDPs, less open economies, better democracies and that have ratified the 
ILO conventions tend to have better labour rights. Of additional note is the significant 
downward trend in labour rights over time. After controlling for country-specific fixed 
effects, however, our other controls are insignificant. Column 2 modifies this by including the 
one year lag of labour rights (and thus moving from fixed effects to SYS-GMM estimation). 
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In addition, as discussed by Beck and Katz (1995), it aids in controlling for potential dynamic 
effects of the exogenous variables on the dependent variable. As can be seen, the coefficient 
on the lag is significantly positive and its confidence interval ends well before one rejecting a 
unit root. Column 2 then forms our preferred specification. 
 Columns 3 through 5 add to Column 2 by including the spatial lag term using GDP, 
per-capita GDP, and Openness weights respectively. With regards to the controls, this results 
in more significance, with smaller, industrialized, left-leaning countries having significantly 
better rights. Turning to the coefficient of interest, in each case, we find a positive and 
significant spatial lag. A rough interpretation of the coefficient on the spatial lag for the GDP 
weights, is that if all other countries lower their labour rights by one point, the country in 
question would lower its labour rights by 0.41 points.40 Alternatively, a standard deviation 
reduction in the spatial lag (a reduction of 2.4) would then reduce those in the country in 
question by 0.984, a 3.8% decline at the sample mean. This lies in between the estimated 
impact when per-capita GDP weights are used (a 6.1% decline) and when Openness weights 
are used (a drop of 2.5%).41 Another way to interpret the coefficient on the spatial lag is to 
calculate the change in country i’s labour rights from a change in another country j’s labour 
rights, which is equal to , ,j i t  . This is then the slope of the i’s best response and is a measure 
of the degree of labour standards competition between countries. Since the spatial lag is 
positive, this can be interpreted as evidence of strategic complementarity. While strategic 
complements can theoretically result in a race to the bottom or the top, since the trend in 
labour rights is downward, we interpret our results as evidence of an economically 
meaningful race to the bottom in labour rights.  
                                                             
40 Note that in this and in the Openness weighting scheme, we find spatial lags that are statistically significantly 
less than 1. This is yet another reason to prefer the GDP weighting scheme over the per-capita GDP one since the 
game theoretic interpretation of a coefficient greater than one would be that of an unstable Nash equilibrium. 
41 Note that these difference result from not only different coefficients but also different standard deviations in 
the spatial lag (1.62 for the per-capita weights and 1.82 for the Openness weights). 
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This, however, is only a part of the total effect, however, since there is also an indirect 
effect arising from how a change in the spatial lag affects labour rights for country i which in 
turn affects those in j, further impacting i. This also applies to changes in the exogenous 
variables. Rewriting (1) in its matrix form, 
 Y A WY X       (3) 
where A is a vector of country specific intercepts and W is the weighting matrix with 
, ,j i t  in the i,jth element and zeros elsewhere (i.e. so that the country rights for country i in 
year t do not predict itself and that values for years other than t are given zero weights in 
predicting the labour rights in t), define M I W  . Then (3) can be rewritten as: 
 1 1Y M A M X      (4) 
implying that the effect of an exogenous variable is   
1
I W 

 .42 This too, however, is 
only a portion of the impact, since it only captures the static effect. In addition, there is a 
dynamic effect since the change in year t has both direct and indirect implications for future 
years through the lagged dependent variable. Since the weights vary by year, the total impact 
would depend on all of these issues as well as the time path of the weights. Since there is no 
obvious choice to make regarding the future path of the weights (since to calculate the long-
run effects would require us to make out of sample forecasts on the weights), we are unable to 
calculate the total effects. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that our estimates suggest that the 
adoption of the ILO conventions does not significantly impact labour rights, something we 
return to below. Finally, with respect to our instruments, we use Hansen’s J-test (Hansen, 
1982) which shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 
conventional level of significance.43 
                                                             
42 Note the importance of having ρ<1 for the calculation of this effect. 
43 As discussed by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), the Blundell-Bond estimator can fall prey to an overabundance of 
instruments, inflating the J-test results. As noted above, in alternate specifications, we explored alternative sets 
of instruments. In these unreported results, we found comparable results for the spatial lags. When including t-2 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
96 
 
 In table 3.3, we repeat the specification for table 3.2 columns 3 through 5 but use the 
two sub-indices of labour rights: labour practices (columns 1-3) and labour laws (columns 4-
6). For the control variables, as with the combined index, smaller, democratic, and left-
leaning states have higher labour practices and labour laws. In addition, wealthier, less open, 
and more industrialized countries have better labour practices although this has no impact on 
labour laws. Finally, unlike the combined index where the ILO treaties had no significant 
effect (a result mirroring that of Rodrik (1996), Busse (2002) and Neumayer and de Soysa 
(2006)), these treaties now raise labour laws but lower labour practices. This latter result 
would be consistent with these agreements leading countries to pass more laws protecting 
workers but turning an increasingly blind eye to violations of those laws. 
 Turning to the spatial lag, for labour practices, we find results that are comparable to 
those for the combined index results with a standard deviation decline in all other nations’ 
labour practices leading to a decline in those of the country in question of 3% (using GDP 
weights), 5.6% (per-capita GDP weights), and 2.6% (Openness weights). For labour laws, 
however, we only find significance for the per-capita GDP and Openness weighting schemes. 
Thus the results are somewhat less robust for labour laws. This would be reasonable if nations 
find it more difficult to compete for FDI in laws (since doing so may draw international 
criticism) than in how they choose to apply the laws they have on the books. This also mirrors 
the differences across the two measures regarding the ILO labour rights conventions. For 
those two schemes resulting in a significant lag for laws, the predicted percentage changes in 
labour laws from a standard deviation decline in the spatial lag are 2.3% (per capita GDP 
weights) and 2.2% (Openness weights), again suggesting that the responsiveness of labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
instruments for the GMM-style variables, we were not always able to reject endogeneity. In addition, when using 
some of the subsamples, we were forced to drastically reduce the number of instruments in order to achieve J-
test values less than 1. However, since we still found results comparable to those reported here, we opted to 
maintain a consistent set of instruments across the regressions in order to simplify the presentation and avoid 
confusion.  
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laws in a given country to those elsewhere is less than the responsiveness in the application of 
those laws. 
 In table 3.4, we restrict our attention to the non-OECD countries out of the concern 
that the results may be driven by the OECD members, i.e. relatively advanced countries with 
strong labour standards. Since, as argued by Mosley and Uno (2007), these countries are 
perhaps less likely to compete for FDI using labour standards as opposed to other means, if 
they are behind our significant spatial lag then this would call into question the interpretation 
of our results. Note that in this (as well as in all subsamples below), when we create a 
subsample we recalculate the spatial lag and the traditional IV-style instruments using only 
those nations in the subsample, i.e. assigning those outside of the subsample zero weight. This 
then assumes that the non-OECD subsample does not respond to OECD member labour 
rights. As can be seen, our results for this non-OECD only subsample are comparable to those 
for the main sample, indicating that our results are not being driven by the relatively advanced 
nations. Also, although from this point forward we only report the results for our preferred 
GDP weights for parsimony, when using the alternative weighting schemes, we found results 
comparable to the GDP weights with the exception that as above we often obtained 
significantly positive spatial lags when using the labour laws index as our dependent 
variable.44 
 
4.3.2 Results for different country categories 
The above results provide evidence consistent with a race to the bottom both in the 
overall labour rights index, labour practices, and, to a lesser extent, in labour laws. In table 
3.5, we explore this further by separating our countries into two categories: those for which 
the mean labour rights index over the sample period was below the median and those for 
                                                             
44 These results are available on request. 
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which their mean was above the median. We do this to investigate whether it is the case that 
the extent of competition differs between developing nations with relatively weak standards 
and those with relatively strong standards. Note that as in the non-OECD sample, we 
recalculate the spatial lags using only within group countries, implying that below the median 
countries do not respond to those above the median and vice versa. As can be seen, we find 
much stronger evidence of competition among countries with relatively low standards where 
the coefficients are somewhat greater than those in the full sample. This, combined with the 
lower average level of standards means that a one standard deviation decline in the spatial lag 
would lower the combined index by 5.1% and practices by 4.3% with no significant effect for 
laws. In contrast, we only find a significant coefficient on labour practices for the high 
standard group with its coefficient being much smaller than its counterpart for the low 
standard group, which when combined with the greater average level of practices, results in 
an estimated 0.8% decline in a given country’s standards when the spatial lag falls by a 
standard deviation. It is also worth noting that if our results were simply capturing an overall 
trend in labour standards, one would expect similar results for the above and below median 
groups because their trends are comparable. The fact that we find distinct results suggests that 
we are capturing something other than a mere trend in the dependent variable. 
 Table 3.6 repeats the estimates of table 3.5 but also includes the other group’s spatial 
lag, i.e. it allows for countries below the median to respond to those above and vice versa.45 
For those below the median, we find a picture similar to that before with respect to within 
group competition, but no evidence for competition across groups. For those with relatively 
high standards, we do find some evidence suggesting that the above median countries respond 
to those below the median. The estimated effect of a one standard deviation decline in the 
                                                             
45 Ideally, we would choose to estimate the above and below median specifications simultaneously. However, to 
our knowledge, such an estimator does not exist. 
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spatial lag for below median countries is -1.7% for both above median labour rights and 
practices. Thus, to the extent that high standard countries do compete with low standard 
countries, the extent of this competition appears to be less severe than that between low 
standard nations. Again, however, there is little evidence of competition among the strong 
standards countries. 
 Tables 3.7 and 3.8 again split our sample into two groups but delineate countries 
according to whether their sample average of per-capita income was above or below the 
median.46 Note that since per-capita GDP is generally insignificantly correlated with labour 
standards (something that holds true even in a univariate regression), that this is a different 
classification of countries from that above. Table 3.7 corresponds to table 3.5 in that it 
assumes no cross-group interactions. For the relatively poor countries, we only find a 
significant spatial lag for labour practices where a one standard deviation decline in the spatial 
lag results in a 2.5% decline in practices. We find more significance in the wealthier group of 
countries, where the estimated impacts of a standard deviation decline in the spatial lag results 
in a 3.9% decline in labour standards and a 3.2% drop in practices. 47 Table 3.8 modifies the 
estimation of 3.7 by introducing cross-group spatial lags. This addition does not affect the 
estimated pattern of within-group competition. Further, with one exception, we find no 
evidence of cross-group competition. 
 The above results suggest that competition is relatively fiercest between nations with 
already low standards (which may be those which have competed heavily along this 
dimension in the past) and those with above average incomes. Further, there is little evidence 
                                                             
46 In unreported results, we classified countries into three categories corresponding to a country’s 2002 World 
Bank classification into the lower income, lower middle income, and upper middle income categories. In these 
results, we found strong evidence for within group competition by the middle income countries, limited evidence 
of such competition for the lower income countries, and no significant competition in the upper middle income 
countries. Further, we found no consistent evidence of cross-category competition.  
47 In unreported results, resource rich countries were removed from the high income country category. 
Nevertheless, a positive coefficient on the within group was found, indicating that the result is not driven by high 
per-capita income, low labour protection resource rich economies. 
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of cross-group competition, suggesting that these nations may be competing for different 
types of investment (for example, unskilled labour intensive FDI may primarily consider low 
income countries whereas skilled labour intensive FDI may only consider high income 
countries when deciding where to locate). Furthermore, the greatest evidence is for 
competition in practices rather than laws. This would be consistent with nations “putting on a 
good face” by instituting labour laws, but allowing firms to bypass those laws in practice. 
 
4.3.3 Results for different regions 
In addition to splitting our sample along the above characteristics, we do so across 
regions. There are two primary reasons for doing so. First, one might expect that countries 
within a region are much more likely to be competing with one another for FDI. This is one 
reason Klemm and van Parys (2009) separate their sample when looking for evidence of tax 
competition in developing nations. Second, as discussed by Mosley and Uno (2007) and 
Neumayer and de Soysa (2006) there may be religious and cultural differences across 
countries which influence the decision of what level of labour standards to enforce.48  With 
this in mind, table 3.9 presents the estimated coefficient for the spatial lag using each of the 
dependent variables across five regions: Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Latin America, 
and the Middle East and Northern Africa. Note that these regressions include the full set of 
controls but that these are not reported for ease of presentation.49 
In comparison to the full sample results, we generally find less significant results. 
Given the large drop in the number of observations, this is perhaps unsurprising. 
Nevertheless, we do find significant differences across regions. Latin America exhibits 
                                                             
48 Also, see Cho (2010) for these arguments with respect to womens’ labour rights. 
49 The full sets of estimates are available on request. Note that we do not estimate cross-group interactions for 
these region subsamples since to do so required us to include five spatial lags which, given the sample sizes, 
resulted in little of interpretive value.  
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coefficients most in line with the full sample results, that is, a significantly positive spatial lag 
for the combined index and practices. The Middle East and African nations also exhibit a 
positive spatial lag, although only for practices. Neither Europe nor Sub-Saharan Africa 
results in significant spatial lags. Perhaps most remarkable are the results for Asia where we 
find a significantly negative spatial lag regardless of the measure of labour standards used. 
However, in unreported results dropping China from the set of Asian countries, we no longer 
found a significant spatial lag for labour rights or labour laws. When India (the second largest 
GDP in this subsample) is also excluded, we did not obtain significant spatial lags for any of 
the measures of labour standards. This suggests that the inclusion of these two large outliers is 
driving the unexpected negative coefficient. 
Finally, it is important to comment on our use of a time trend rather year-specific 
constants.  There are two reasons for doing this, both related to the fact that when including 
year-specific effects, the variation the estimation utilizes is that relative to the within-year 
average. First, from a game theoretic perspective, one would expect that when countries are 
very similar, their Nash labour standards may be similar. In the extreme, if all countries are 
identical, theory can easily obtain the result that equilibrium policies are identical. When 
estimating such a relationship with year dummies, however, this will drive down the 
significance on the spatial lag because it varies little across countries within a year. As a 
result, even if competition is driving the data generation process, the estimation can obscure 
that fact. Second, one must keep in mind the construction of the spatial lag, which is the 
weighted average of other countries’ policies. Consider two countries with equal GDPs, i with 
a high labour rights index and j with a low index. By construction, the spatial lag for i will be 
less than that of j because the only difference in their lags is that i’s includes j’s index in the 
summation whereas j’s includes i’s (with the difference between the two being the difference 
in their index numbers multiplied by the common weight).  As a result, countries with strong 
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policies will tend to have small spatial lags whereas countries with weak policies will tend to 
have large spatial lags simply by construction. When using year dummies where variation in 
the spatial lag is relative to the yearly average drives the coefficient, this creates a downward 
pressure on the estimated coefficient since high index countries will have below average 
spatial lags within a given year. In fact, when we estimate our results in tables 3.2 and 3.3 but 
use year dummies instead of the time trend, we find significantly negative coefficients on the 
spatial lag which were all significantly less than -1 (for the GDP weights these were -5.829, -
8.231, and -4.944 for the combined index, practices, and laws respectively). Thus, because of 
the nature of the spatial lag variable, it is generally unwise to use year dummies (see Klemm 
and van Parys (2009) for more discussion on this issue). 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to present the first set of empirical results exploring the possibility 
of a race to the bottom in labour standards. Using the Mosley (2011) measure of labour rights 
as well as its components of labour practices and labour laws, we utilize a spatial 
econometrics approach to estimate the extent of interdependence of labour standards across 
countries. We find a robustly positive and significant spatial lag which is consistent with 
strategic complements in both practices and the combined labour rights index. Notably, this 
pattern is less evident in labour laws, suggesting that competition is less in the institution of 
standards, but in their enforcement. Since all three measures declined over time, we interpret 
this as competition for FDI as opposed to labour rights diffusion which would result in an 
improvement of laws, possibly even as practices declined as more workers sought to assert 
their rights. This does not imply that such competition is universal, however. We find that it is 
concentrated in the countries with relatively weak standards and that it is focused in particular 
parts of the world, notably the Middle East and Latin America. 
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 These results suggest several potential policy considerations. First, we often find that 
international labour agreements, particularly those championed by the ILO, tend to raise 
labour laws but not practices. This suggests that international coordination on these measures 
may need to follow up and ensure that laws which are adopted are then enforced. Second, the 
ability of a nation to attract FDI via this (or any other measure) is contingent on the other 
factors that attract investment such as domestic market size, institutional quality and the like. 
In particular, the evidence reviewed by Blonigen (2005) indicates that multinationals are often 
attracted by lower trade barriers. As such, if the developed world signs a free trade agreement 
with a low labour standard country, thereby increasing its trade openness, our estimates 
indicate that this would force others to respond by competing more fiercely in labour 
standards to avoid losing investment. This suggests that it may be important to be mindful of 
such implications, particularly in Latin America and the Middle East, when pursuing 
international agreements or other policies that might affect the distribution of FDI. 
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Table 3.1: Bivariate Correlations across Measures of Labour Standards 
 
Labour Rights Index Labour Rights Laws Labour Rights Practices 
Labour Rights Index 1.0000 
Labour Rights Laws 0.8277 1.0000 
Labour Rights Practices 0.7197 0.20600 1.0000 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Weighting Scheme   GDP Per-Capita 
GDP 
Openness 
Spatial Lag   0.410*** 0.972*** 0.359*** 
   (0.103) (0.164) (0.117) 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.723*** 0.748*** 0.754*** 0.749*** 
  (0.023) (0.043) (0.037) (0.042) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.834 -0.205 -0.032 -0.009 -0.036 
 (0.655) (0.927) (0.116) (0.111) (0.113) 
GDP (log) 0.200 -0.079 -0.607*** -0.605*** -0.591*** 
 (0.805) (0.918) (0.096) (0.100) (0.102) 
GDP growth rate 0.007*** 0.005** -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Openness -0.010*** -0.007** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Share in GDP -0.017 0.012 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Labour Force Participation  -0.024 -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Democracy  1.128*** 0.666*** 0.480*** 0.472*** 0.485*** 
 (0.129) (0.115) (0.103) (0.099) (0.102) 
Government Ideology 0.287 0.243 0.473*** 0.511*** 0.504*** 
 (0.186) (0.185) (0.181) (0.171) (0.182) 
IMF SAF participation 0.254 0.323 0.295 0.163 0.186 
 (0.286) (0.267) (0.347) (0.341) (0.352) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties 0.807*** 0.338 0.005 0.033 0.007 
 (0.280) (0.246) (0.143) (0.139) (0.142) 
Trend -0.467*** -0.293*** 0.096** 0.218*** 0.040 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.052) (0.042) 
Constant 971.862*** 209.160*** -186.272** -447.759*** -77.199 
 (57.707) (49.148) (94.200) (108.339) (86.463) 
Observations 2458 2334 2334 2334 2334 
R-squared 0.701     
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value)  0.145 0.574 0.380 0.178 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
110 
 
 
Table 3.3: Practices and Laws 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Practices Laws 
Weighting Scheme GDP Per-Capita 
GDP 
Openness GDP Per-Capita 
GDP 
Openness 
Spatial Lag 0.374*** 1.096*** 0.473*** 0.129 0.928*** 0.688*** 
 (0.069) (0.148) (0.118) (0.106) (0.198) (0.175) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.590*** 0.648*** 0.576*** 0.803*** 0.751*** 0.700*** 
 (0.051) (0.043) (0.047) (0.040) (0.048) (0.051) 
Per capita GDP (log) 0.194** 0.180** 0.194** -0.119 -0.131 -0.135 
 (0.089) (0.078) (0.090) (0.081) (0.100) (0.115) 
GDP (log) -0.510*** -0.463*** -0.511*** -0.196*** -0.246*** -0.301*** 
 (0.074) (0.066) (0.073) (0.053) (0.073) (0.078) 
GDP growth rate -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness -0.003* -0.004** -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Industry Share in GDP 0.020** 0.019** 0.018** 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Labour Force Participation 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Democracy  0.153** 0.143** 0.167** 0.295*** 0.355*** 0.411*** 
 (0.069) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069) (0.084) (0.091) 
Government Ideology 0.316** 0.288** 0.343** 0.263*** 0.315*** 0.345*** 
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.137) (0.093) (0.096) (0.103) 
IMF SAF participation 0.050 -0.018 -0.004 0.216 0.186 0.204 
 (0.247) (0.253) (0.244) (0.227) (0.215) (0.215) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties -0.424*** -0.376*** -0.451*** 0.223** 0.315*** 0.350** 
 (0.118) (0.110) (0.120) (0.103) (0.118) (0.138) 
Trend 0.045* 0.177*** 0.032 -0.015 0.045** 0.038 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) 
Constant -84.490* -365.456*** -61.847 35.264 -102.033** -80.306 
 (48.700) (69.346) (58.450) (31.213) (48.394) (50.984) 
Observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value) 0.184 0.427 0.351 0.269 0.535 0.143 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Non-OECD Countries only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LR Practices Laws 
Spatial Lag 0.364*** 0.348*** 0.105 
 (0.108) (0.073) (0.117) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.761*** 0.617*** 0.823*** 
 (0.043) (0.061) (0.037) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.035 0.167* -0.115 
 (0.115) (0.087) (0.078) 
GDP (log) -0.594*** -0.483*** -0.188*** 
 (0.100) (0.086) (0.055) 
GDP growth rate -0.002 -0.002 0.002* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Openness -0.005** -0.004** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Industry Share in GDP 0.029*** 0.019** 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
Labour Force Participation 0.003 0.005 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Democracy  0.428*** 0.123* 0.270*** 
 (0.103) (0.069) (0.067) 
Government Ideology 0.555*** 0.331** 0.300*** 
 (0.194) (0.150) (0.098) 
IMF SAF participation 0.345 0.075 0.253 
 (0.348) (0.244) (0.241) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties -0.037 -0.462*** 0.190* 
 (0.145) (0.122) (0.103) 
Trend 0.086* 0.050* -0.012 
 (0.048) (0.027) (0.014) 
Constant -167.176* -93.779* 28.060 
 (97.703) (54.125) (30.919) 
Observations 2201 2201 2201 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value)  0.559 0.290 0.401 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Above and Below Median Labour Rights 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Below the Median Countries Above the Median Countries 
 LR Practices Laws LR Practices Laws 
Spatial Lag 0.453*** 0.471*** 0.201 0.064 0.098* -0.014 
 (0.138) (0.105) (0.150) (0.053) (0.057) (0.039) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.652*** 0.543*** 0.700*** 0.519*** 0.368*** 0.532*** 
 (0.057) (0.071) (0.051) (0.074) (0.070) (0.073) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.390** 0.127 -0.431** 0.038 0.068 -0.013 
 (0.163) (0.157) (0.172) (0.145) (0.104) (0.085) 
GDP (log) -0.419*** -0.445*** -0.025 -0.408*** -0.242*** -0.212*** 
 (0.112) (0.102) (0.093) (0.115) (0.079) (0.067) 
GDP growth rate -0.015 -0.023 0.012 -0.000 -0.001 0.001* 
 (0.041) (0.034) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness -0.006*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ind. Share in GDP 0.046*** 0.028** 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) 
Labour Force Participation  -0.020 -0.015 -0.005 -0.013 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) 
Democracy  0.634*** 0.066 0.485*** 0.239** 0.126* 0.151** 
 (0.156) (0.123) (0.108) (0.102) (0.065) (0.071) 
Government Ideology 0.738*** 0.470** 0.344** 0.060 -0.031 0.094 
 (0.270) (0.224) (0.142) (0.185) (0.135) (0.120) 
IMF SAF participation 0.540 0.371 0.089 0.125 -0.206 0.380* 
 (0.545) (0.370) (0.355) (0.308) (0.265) (0.219) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties -0.240 -0.837*** 0.388** -0.087 -0.235** 0.065 
 (0.221) (0.204) (0.185) (0.180) (0.115) (0.116) 
Trend 0.074 0.066* -0.028 -0.117*** -0.092*** -0.061*** 
 (0.062) (0.040) (0.019) (0.036) (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant -138.804 -127.232 62.961 250.587*** 198.557*** 136.395*** 
 (127.972) (81.578) (38.472) (73.416) (40.433) (39.056) 
Observations 1187 1187 1187 1147 1147 1147 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Above and Below the Median with Cross-Group Lags 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Below the Median Countries Above the Median Countries 
 LR Practices Laws LR Practices Laws 
Spatial Lag Below Median 0.419*** 0.370*** 0.118 0.223*** 0.223*** -0.023 
 (0.141) (0.133) (0.159) (0.086) (0.073) (0.066) 
Spatial Lag Above Median 0.057 0.127 -0.089 0.067 0.041 -0.017 
 (0.063) (0.081) (0.086) (0.055) (0.057) (0.040) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.700*** 0.616*** 0.732*** 0.545*** 0.400*** 0.527*** 
 (0.051) (0.058) (0.051) (0.063) (0.068) (0.069) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.392*** 0.078 -0.410** 0.028 0.062 -0.013 
 (0.152) (0.136) (0.161) (0.138) (0.100) (0.084) 
GDP (log) -0.389*** -0.397*** -0.025 -0.398*** -0.230*** -0.218*** 
 (0.102) (0.086) (0.086) (0.105) (0.075) (0.065) 
GDP growth  -0.019 -0.025 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.001* 
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness -0.006*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Industry Share in GDP 0.047*** 0.029** 0.019* 0.011 0.004 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) 
Labour Force Participation -0.018 -0.013 -0.004 -0.013 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Democracy  0.616*** 0.088 0.455*** 0.241** 0.123** 0.156** 
 (0.147) (0.113) (0.103) (0.100) (0.062) (0.070) 
Government Ideology 0.741*** 0.404* 0.351** 0.068 -0.026 0.096 
 (0.259) (0.211) (0.138) (0.185) (0.131) (0.120) 
IMF SAF participation 0.403 0.244 0.048 0.171 -0.207 0.413* 
 (0.550) (0.377) (0.355) (0.307) (0.268) (0.217) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties -0.256 -0.743*** 0.343** -0.106 -0.224** 0.067 
 (0.206) (0.186) (0.173) (0.175) (0.110) (0.114) 
Trend 0.112 0.085** -0.054 -0.015 -0.031 -0.063*** 
 (0.077) (0.041) (0.034) (0.058) (0.026) (0.020) 
Constant -218.474 -167.251** 117.198* 41.414 72.838 141.775*** 
 (158.493) (83.569) (70.348) (118.773) (53.203) (42.640) 
Observations 1187 1187 1187 1147 1147 1147 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Above and Below Median Average Income Countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Below the Median Countries Above the Median Countries 
 LR Practices Laws LR Practices Laws 
Spatial Lag 0.075 0.227*** -0.065 0.393*** 0.431*** 0.106 
 (0.096) (0.087) (0.070) (0.111) (0.085) (0.181) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.751*** 0.682*** 0.751*** 0.667*** 0.491*** 0.780*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.052) (0.054) (0.071) (0.067) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.423 -0.466** -0.007 0.358 0.813*** -0.156 
 (0.298) (0.221) (0.201) (0.234) (0.274) (0.159) 
GDP (log) -0.625*** -0.411*** -0.262*** -0.690*** -0.620*** -0.180** 
 (0.122) (0.065) (0.088) (0.124) (0.113) (0.077) 
GDP growth rate 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.043 -0.049 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.045) (0.035) (0.012) 
Openness -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Industry Share in GDP 0.042*** 0.017* 0.024** 0.034** 0.044*** 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
Labour Force Participation  0.008 -0.003 0.015 -0.023** -0.020* -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) 
Democracy  0.462*** 0.211** 0.260*** 0.611*** 0.161* 0.353*** 
 (0.131) (0.093) (0.096) (0.145) (0.097) (0.102) 
Government Ideology 0.911*** 0.450*** 0.468** 0.366 0.195 0.224** 
 (0.278) (0.169) (0.184) (0.225) (0.178) (0.112) 
IMF SAF participation 0.726* 0.076 0.527** -0.367 -0.206 -0.321 
 (0.380) (0.322) (0.251) (0.537) (0.354) (0.363) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties 0.033 -0.296** 0.272 0.309 -0.194 0.284* 
 (0.227) (0.149) (0.178) (0.237) (0.166) (0.171) 
Trend -0.033 0.042 -0.021 0.051 0.030 -0.027 
 (0.051) (0.040) (0.015) (0.047) (0.028) (0.035) 
Constant 78.983 -73.251 49.647 -96.509 -58.299 60.322 
 (103.128) (80.225) (30.970) (96.120) (56.770) (74.207) 
Observations 1157 1157 1157 1177 1177 1177 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Above and Below Median Average Income Countries with Cross-Group Lags 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low Income Countries High Income Countries 
 LR Practices Laws LR Practices Laws 
Spatial Lag Below Median 0.086 0.220** -0.083 -0.088 0.013 0.020 
 (0.102) (0.094) (0.072) (0.096) (0.083) (0.092) 
Spatial Lag Above Median 0.241** 0.074 0.148 0.378*** 0.428*** 0.081 
 (0.112) (0.073) (0.178) (0.113) (0.087) (0.182) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.758*** 0.666*** 0.750*** 0.687*** 0.504*** 0.788*** 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.056) (0.052) (0.060) (0.060) 
Per capita GDP (log) -0.416 -0.476** -0.023 0.330 0.793*** -0.152 
 (0.298) (0.229) (0.199) (0.224) (0.261) (0.154) 
GDP (log) -0.619*** -0.426*** -0.267*** -0.655*** -0.610*** -0.175** 
 (0.119) (0.066) (0.093) (0.115) (0.103) (0.071) 
GDP growth -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.047 -0.048 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.043) (0.035) (0.012) 
Openness -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Industry Share in GDP 0.042*** 0.017 0.025** 0.034** 0.044*** 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Labour Force Participation 0.007 -0.003 0.014 -0.022* -0.019* -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) 
Democracy  0.456*** 0.211** 0.271*** 0.589*** 0.162* 0.350*** 
 (0.130) (0.094) (0.102) (0.142) (0.094) (0.096) 
Government Ideology 0.912*** 0.466*** 0.487*** 0.360* 0.199 0.230** 
 (0.271) (0.169) (0.184) (0.214) (0.174) (0.109) 
IMF SAF participation 0.728* 0.102 0.507** -0.433 -0.215 -0.315 
 (0.378) (0.321) (0.246) (0.538) (0.360) (0.366) 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties 0.037 -0.306** 0.269 0.282 -0.201 0.269 
 (0.224) (0.152) (0.173) (0.230) (0.164) (0.166) 
Trend 0.084 0.055 0.008 0.013 0.039 -0.030 
 (0.082) (0.045) (0.038) (0.069) (0.042) (0.037) 
Constant -159.714 -101.301 -10.483 -19.712 -74.744 67.295 
 (167.388) (91.337) (78.851) (141.093) (86.142) (77.854) 
Observations 1157 1157 1157 1177 1177 1177 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9: Regional Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ASIA SUBSAHARA EUROPE AMERICAS MIDEAST 
Labour Rights 
Spatial Lag -0.270* 0.006 0.031 0.247*** -0.022 
 (0.160) (0.094) (0.074) (0.069) (0.173) 
Labour Practices 
Spatial Lag -0.220* -0.010 0.070 0.200*** 0.463*** 
 (0.123) (0.080) (0.058) (0.063) (0.141) 
Labour Laws 
Spatial Lag -0.208** 0.128 0.059 0.172 -0.002 
 (0.094) (0.152) (0.050) (0.187) (0.132) 
      
Observations 374 776 253 493 306 
Notes: All specifications include all of the additional controls including country-specific fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1.1: Labour Standards, Practices and Laws over time  
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Figure 1.2: Labour Standards, Practices and Laws over time (weighted by GDP) 
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4.6 Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 3.10: List of countries under Study 
 
Albania Colombia Haiti Mexico Slovenia 
Algeria Comoros Honduras Moldova South Africa 
Angola Congo Dem. Rep. Hungary Mongolia Sri Lanka 
Antigua and Barbuda Congo Republic India Morocco St. Lucia 
Argentina Costa Rica Indonesia Mozambique Sudan 
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Iran Myanmar Suriname 
Azerbaijan Croatia Iraq Namibia Swaziland 
Bahamas Cuba Israel Nepal Syrian Arab Republic 
Bahrain Cyprus Jamaica Nicaragua Taiwan 
Bangladesh Czech Republic Jordan Niger Tajikistan 
Barbados Djibouti Kazakhstan Nigeria Tanzania 
Belarus Dominica Kenya Oman Thailand 
Belize Dominican Republic Korea Republic Pakistan Togo 
Benin Ecuador Kuwait Panama Tonga 
Bhutan Egypt Kyrgyz Republic Papua New Guinea Trinidad and Tobago 
Bolivia El Salvador Lao PDR Paraguay Tunisia 
Botswana Equatorial Guinea Latvia Peru Turkey 
Brazil Eritrea Lebanon Philippines Turkmenistan 
Brunei Estonia Lesotho Poland Uganda 
Bulgaria Ethiopia Liberia Qatar Ukraine 
Burkina Faso Fiji Libya Romania United Arab Emirates 
Burundi Gabon Lithuania Russian Federation Uruguay 
Cambodia Gambia Macedonia, FYR Rwanda Uzbekistan 
Cameroon Georgia Madagascar Saudi Arabia Vanuatu 
Cape Verde Ghana Malawi Senegal Venezuela 
Central African Rep. Guatemala Malaysia Seychelles Vietnam 
Chad Guinea Mali Sierra Leone Yemen Republic 
Chile Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Singapore Zambia 
China Guyana Mauritius Slovak Republic Zimbabwe 
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Table 3.11: Data sources and definitions 
 
Variables Data description Data Sources 
Labour Rights index 
Measures 37 aspects of Labour rights (both Laws and 
Practices) on a scale of 0 – 74.5 (see section 3) 
Mosley and Uno (2007) 
 
Labour Rights Practices and 
Laws 
Measures 16 aspects of Labour rights Practices on a 
scale of 0 – 27.5 and 21 aspects of Labour rights Laws 
on a scale of 0 – 28.5 (see section 3) Mosley and Uno (2007) 
Per capita GDP and growth rate 
Per capita GDP (logged) in US$ 2000 constant prices 
and rate of growth of per capita GDP. 
Economic Research Service (ERS), 
Washington DC 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP UNCTAD 
Industry share in GDP Share of industry value-added in total GDP UNCTAD 
Labour Force Participation Rate Total Labour Force share in Population UNCTAD 
Democracy index 
 
Average of Civil and Political Liberties index coded 
on a scale of 0 to -7 where highest value denotes 
better liberties. 
 
Freedom House 
 
Government’s Ideology 
 
Incumbent government’s ideology coded on a scale 
of -1 to +1 where -1 is right wing, 0 is centrists, and 
+1 is right wing in power. 
DPI (Database of Political Institutions 
dataset developed by Keefer 2001). 
IMF SAP 
 
Dummy capturing whether a country was under 
IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program or not Dreher (2006) 
ILO 87 and 98 conventions 
ratified 
Dummy capturing whether a country ratified ILO 
conventions on labour rights, 87 and 98 or not 
ILO database on conventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.12: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Aggregated Labour Rights  25.873 7.750 0.000 37.000 2458 
Labour Rights Practices 22.231 4.445 0.000 27.500 2610 
Labour Rights Laws 22.642 5.499 0.000 28.500 2610 
Per capita GDP (log) 7.122 1.366 2.856 10.995 2610 
GDP (log) 8.854 1.880 4.813 14.069 2461 
Growth Rate of GDP 1.848 27.811 -44.191 973.608 2610 
Openness 62.86 53.012 4.96 986.64 2334 
Industry Share in GDP 29.609 13.459 0.270 91.607 2468 
Labour Force Participation Rate 66.644 11.766 6.755 93.200 2610 
Democracy (Freedom House) -4.228 1.795 -1.000 -7.000 2505 
Government's Ideology 0.105 0.694 -1.000 1.000 2473 
IMF SAP participation 0.115 0.319 0.000 1.000 2610 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties Ratified 1.287 0.851 0.000 2.000 2610 
Spatial lag: Labour Rights 21.267 2.409 16.684 27.012 2461 
Spatial lag: Labour Rights Practices 19.565 1.808 16.073 22.807 2461 
Spatial lag: Labour Rights Laws 20.702 0.871 19.109 23.785 2461 
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5. Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Fighting Corruption or Elections? The Anti-Corruption 
Policies in India: A Subnational Study 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Are anti-corruption institutions designed to check corruption subject to political 
manipulation? While there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that anti-corruption institutions, at 
least among developing countries, are subject to political manipulation, there is no empirical 
evidence so far to suggest that they are subject to political manipulation and how such 
manipulation works.50 The key difference when it comes to anti-corruption activities between 
the developed and the developing countries is the role that anti-corruption agencies play. In 
developed countries these agencies operate independently and are well equipped with 
investigative powers and prosecuting those involved in corrupt activities. In developing 
countries, however, it has been widely reported that anti-corruption agencies are designed in a 
way that they are vulnerable to political manipulation (Meagher and Voland 2006). Gareth 
Newham, Head of the Crime and Justice Program of South Africa notes that, “…allegations 
(of corruption) point to reasons why the political elite might choose not to strengthen the 
                                                             
50 See USAID detailed report on Anti-Corruption Agencies (2006) authored by Meagher and Voland covering 
issues specifically related to purpose, pitfalls and performance of anti-corruption agencies across countries. 
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independence and ability of the Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigations (DPCI) to 
investigate corruption committed by those at the highest levels of government.”51 Jennett and 
Repucci (2006) highlight how vulnerable anti-corruption agencies in countries like Vietnam, 
South Korea, Nigeria, Guatemala and Montenegro are to political manipulation. Despite 
documented anecdotal evidence, as noted above, there is little empirical analysis on this topic 
mainly due to lack of data on government’s anti-corruption activities and difficulty in 
quantifying political manipulation of agencies. Focusing on states within India, this paper 
presents first such evidence that anti-corruption institutions and bureaus serve political 
interests of politicians as they are under the direct control of their respective state 
governments.52  
Despite rapid economic growth over the last couple of decades, one issue which has 
attracted lot of attention in India is rampant corruption (Global Integrity Report 2009). 
Through examining 11 selected public services in India, Transparency International India 
(TII) and the Centre for Media Study (CMS) find that roughly 22,728 Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) households paid about Rs 9000 million (US$ 212 million) in bribes to get access to 
basic need-based public services (Transparency International Report 2008).53 In addition, 
according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International 
(TI), India was ranked 72nd among 100 listed countries in controlling corruption in 1999, 
                                                             
51 See: http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1475, accessed: October 2011. 
52 The prominent anti-corruption institutions in India are: (i) Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI): national 
investigative agency established in 1964, which has two branches, namely the Anti-Corruption Division and 
Special Crimes Division. The Anti-Corruption Division concentrates purely on investigating cases related to 
bribery and corruption, while the Special Crimes Division is focused more on conventional crime. (ii) Central 
Vigilance Commission (CVC):  set up in 1964 to advise and guide police in the field of vigilance. Following the 
CVC, many states in India have adopted their own State Vigilance Commissions (SVCs), broadly along the lines 
of the CVC. (iii) Lokayukta:  an anti-corruption Ombudsman (at state-level) established in many states for the 
redressal of citizens' grievances. The following states have adopted the Lokayukta Act: Orissa (1970), 
Maharashtra (1971), Bihar (1973), Rajasthan (1973), Uttar Pradesh (1975), Madhya Pradesh (1981), Andhra 
Pradesh (1983), Himachal Pradesh (1983), Karnataka (1985), Assam (1986), Gujarat (1986), Kerala (1988), 
Punjab (1995), Delhi (1996), Haryana (1996), Chhattisgarh (2002), Jharkhand (2002) and Uttarakhand (2006). 
53http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2008/august_2008/anti_corruption_work/india_household
_corruption_study_2007, accessed: September 2011. 
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slipping to 87th  by 2010,  tied alongside Liberia and ranked lower than Malawi and Lesotho 
(Transparency International 2011). Big ticket scams have been a consistent feature in India 
during the last two decades.54 For instance, corruption charges related to the Bofors defense 
deal not only united the opposition parties, but also galvanized the entire country, forcing the 
Indian government to legislate the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1988 (Chawla 1990). 
Likewise, the recent US$ 14 billion Telecommunication 2G spectrum auction corruption 
scam, involving the Telecommunications Ministry in India was ranked 2nd in the list of “all-
time top 10 abuses of power” by the Time magazine55 (Time 2011). The exasperation of the 
public with corruption is reflected in the bloody confrontation which has been taking place 
from 2010 onwards between civil society groups and the Indian government. Civil society 
groups [such as India Against Corruption (IAC), the National Campaign for Peoples' Right to 
Information (NCPRI), and Loksatta] are advocating a strong new anti-corruption Ombudsman 
at both central (known as Lokpal) and state levels (referred to as Lokayukta), which are free 
from political interference, equipped with independent investigative and prosecution powers 
and increased scope of jurisdiction. One of the main arguments of civil society groups is that 
the existing anti-corruption institutions and laws have been used over the years by incumbent 
governments (irrespective of the party in power, both at central and state-level) to serve their 
political interests.56 I test this argument empirically by integrating the theories on political 
                                                             
54 See the list of various multi-million dollar corruption scandals unearthed in the recent past in India:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12769214, accessed: November 2011. 
55 For full list see: http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,2071839,00.html, 
accessed: January 2012. 
56 According to the Global Integrity Report (2009), none of the existing anti-corruption institutions are 
sufficiently protected from undue and excess political interference in practice. Starting with appointments to 
defining powers, these institutions are directly controlled by the government. Appointments are often biased and 
based on bureaucrats’ loyalty to the ruling party. Even the appointments of respective government departmental 
vigilance wings are made by the government and not the CVC. Secondly, most of these investigative agencies 
are merely advisory in nature, except the CBI which is directly controlled by the central government and does 
not have the power to investigate cases in the states without the permission of the respective state government. 
The allegation against the CBI is that the incumbent state government, aligned with the center, often uses the 
CBI to frame their political opponents in cases related to corruption (however, I could not verify this because the 
disaggregated data on cases registered by the CBI in states is not available). Thirdly, the scope and jurisdiction 
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budget cycles and theory associated with political capture of anti-corruption institutions in 
India. By doing this, I examine if existing institutions have indeed served the electoral and 
political interests of politicians.  
Using panel data on 30 Indian states during the 1988–2009 period, I find evidence of 
the political manipulation of anti-corruption institutions during elections, wherein the 
scheduled elections (but not unscheduled elections) are associated with an increase in the 
number of corruption cases registered. Furthermore, I find these effects to be stronger in 
‘swing states’, where the margin of victory of the incumbent in the previous election was 5% 
or less, as well as in those state scheduled election years which coincide with national 
elections. However, I do not find any effect of state scheduled elections on corruption cases 
being investigated by anti-corruption agencies. These findings shed light on the 
acknowledged, though understudied, role of political manipulation of anti-corruption 
institutions in India. It is noteworthy that though it is difficult to empirically test the causal 
link, the mere presence of electoral cycles serves as suggestive evidence of the political 
manipulation which I described above. 
These findings have broad relevance for the study on anti-corruption institutions in the 
developing world, where we are most likely to observe political manipulation. There is a very 
small, but growing literature in this area (for instance see Meagher and Voland 2006 for a 
comprehensive review on anti-corruption institutions across countries). This paper adds to this 
literature in two ways. First, it contributes a new measure for capturing election cycles in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of these institutions is often restricted to government servants and employees in the public sector. Even among 
government servants, not all top level bureaucrats and politicians are covered. Most importantly, prosecuting the 
medium and top-level bureaucrats is highly difficult because before investigating the suspect, the agencies must 
get permission from the same authorities against whom the case has to be investigated. Fourthly, none of the 
anti-corruption institutions have powers to prosecute and hence have to rely on the judiciary system. The 
inefficiencies of the Indian judiciary system are well documented by Chemin (2010, 2009). According to 
Chemin (2010), about 3.1 million cases are pending in all the 21 High Courts, and roughly 20 million cases in 
the lower courts in India. Fifthly, most of these institutions have problems related to coordination and are 
severely under staffed and inadequately funded. It is precisely because of these reasons the anti-corruption 
activities of the government have been politicized over the years. 
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anti-corruption activities undertaken by the incumbent government. Second, a relatively new 
body of empirical literature examines the importance of institutions in controlling corruption. 
Apart from the broad socio-economic factors, Treisman (2007, 2000) and De Haan and 
Seldadyo (2006) Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) point towards a host of institutional factors 
associated with the control of corruption. Aaken, Feld and Voigt (2008) demonstrate that de 
facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of government 
officials. Gerring and Thacker (2004) exploit the role of different political institutional 
arrangements on political corruption and find that unitary and parliamentary forms of 
government help reduce levels of corruption. Two other studies also examine the impact of 
institutions on corruption. Bjørnskov (2011) and Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 
(2007) find that an improvement in institutional quality reduces shadow economy and affects 
the corruption market, The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is 
found to be ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of the institutional quality in 
the shadow and corruption markets. However, these studies remain silent about the potential 
political capture of these institutions that play a pivotal role in controlling corruption. I add a 
new dimension to this strand of literature by providing an empirical test of the theories of 
political manipulation (why and how manipulation of anti-corruption institutions occurs) in 
India.  
This paper also contributes to the strand of literature on political budget cycles, which 
argues that opportunistic pre-electoral manipulation or cyclical manipulation by incumbent 
politicians occurs in order to increase their chances of re-election (starting with Nordhaus’s 
1975 formal model of the political business cycle and followed by the works of Tufte 1975, 
Fair 1978, Rogoff 1988, and 1990). There have been a number of studies in this area, not only 
related to industrialized countries, but also among a cross-section of developing countries 
including India, that have considered the applicability of political determinants to fiscal 
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policy, infrastructure, agricultural credit and law and order decisions. I, however, assume that 
policy manipulation to maximize the chances of an incumbent’s re-election can also be 
associated with key governance related issues such as corruption through controlling anti-
corruption institutions. I thus provide an empirical test of politically motivated cyclical 
manipulation of anti-corruption institutions in India. Compared to previous studies on 
political budget cycles, this study has a significantly larger sample covering all 30 states in 
India during the 22 year post-economic reforms period spanning 1988 to 2009, allowing for 
state-fixed effects.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 5.2, I derive some testable 
hypotheses illustrating why and how political manipulation of anti-corruption institutions 
work in India. Section 5.3 describes the data and methodology adopted, while section 5.4 
discusses the results. Finally, section 5.5 concludes with some policy implications and 
identifies avenues for further research. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses 
Corruption, understood as using public office for private gains, can have severely 
adverse effects on the socioeconomic development of a country (Bardhan 1997, Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1993, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The literature shows that corruption 
has negative effects on economic growth (Mauro 1995), productivity (Dreher and Herzfeld 
2010), investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), entrepreneurship (Dreher and Gassebner 
2011), international and domestic trade (Bjørnskov 2011, Krueger 1974), the informal sector 
(Dreher and Schneider 2010), basic public services delivery (Transparency International 
2007), and can entrap a country in poverty in the long run (Aidt 2009).  
The economic model of corruption is something akin to Ehrlich’s (1973) work on the 
economic analysis of crime and punishment, in which the probability of an individual 
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resorting to corrupt practice i  depends on a host of factors (such as expected payoff and 
opportunity costs: iX ) and, importantly, on the probability of getting caught or arrested ( ia ), 
followed by the probability of getting investigated ( ii ), prosecuted and convicted thereafter 
( ip ).  
  )1()( iiiii piaXf   
As punishing the convict is the prerogative of the judiciary in India, arresting the 
accused and investigating the case is purely under the control of the executive branch of the 
government (Ghosh 2006). In the Indian setting, it is the executive branch of the government 
which is susceptible to political manipulation because of two reasons. First, the incumbent 
often uses coercive control mechanisms to control bureaucrats because the bureaucratic 
output, other things being equal, often influences the longevity of the incumbent remaining in 
power (Iyer and Mani 2011, Mueller 2009). Second, some bureaucrats with long term career 
concerns tend to respond to the incentives provided by the incumbent (see Iyer and Mani 
2011). Such bureaucrats play into the hands of the incumbent in return for financial and 
material gains, such as a posting to higher job assignments which are usually considered 
prestigious, which put them in the position of making influential policy decisions, or increases 
the probability to maximize their rent seeking preferences.57 The incumbent may thus exert 
pressure on an anti-corruption agency or state police, which are directly under the control of 
government, to crack down on corruption during the elections period. Steps taken to control 
corruption during elections are associated with the performance voting theory which argues 
that voters are interested in re-electing competent leaders (Powell and Whitten 1993). Poor 
outcomes in terms of economic conditions and governance issues are evidence of the 
incumbent’s incompetence. Extending the same line of argument to corruption, it can be 
                                                             
57 Of course this does not mean that a meritocratic bureaucrat with high skills, as per the Webarian notion of 
bureaucracy, will always be vulnerable to such political pressures (Alesina and Tabellini 2007). 
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argued that voters reward lower levels of corruption, holding economic conditions constant, 
because they probably reflect the incumbent’s competence. Consider for example the case 
where a citizen is dissatisfied with the rampant corruption which increased during the 
incumbent’s tenure. The performance voting model predicts that the individual will vote 
against the incumbent in the elections under the assumption that replacing the incumbent with 
different leader in office would produce different policies to tackle corruption. Thus, voters 
can motivate the incumbent to focus on corruption by linking their vote to incumbent’s efforts 
to control corruption.   
Numerous studies, starting with Nordhaus’s (1975) formal model of the political 
business cycle, show how opportunistic incumbent politicians engage in pre-electoral 
manipulation of government policies to increase their chances of re-election (Tufte 1975, Fair 
1978, Rogoff 1988, 1990, Alesina and Sachs 1988, Alesina et al. 1993, Besley and Case 1995, 
Khemani 2004, Shi and Svensson 2006, Gosh 2006, Cole 2009). Policy manipulation, 
however, need not be restricted to socioeconomic issues alone and can also be extended to 
key governance related issues such as controlling corruption. However noble the intentions of 
the incumbent to control corruption during the elections period may be, voters often fail to 
observe the effects of any such efforts exerted by the incumbent on the ground. For instance, 
passing legislation to tackle corruption may not have any effect if the capacity to enforce is 
weak. Therefore, the incumbent may choose to signal her competence on controlling 
corruption by ordering the state anti-corruption agencies and bureaus to increase the 
frequency of corruption raids and register cases against those allegedly involved in corrupt 
practices. The incumbent state governments therefore have strong incentives to exert more 
pressure on anti-corruption institutions in the run-up towards elections, thereby generating 
electoral cycles in the controlling of corruption.  
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Note that this line of argument implicitly assumes that the incumbent wants corruption 
to be controlled during elections and more importantly, voters seem to be cognizant and 
concerned about anti-corruption activities.58 The absence of pre-poll surveys covering 
elections in all 30 states in the 1990s makes it difficult to empirically test these claims. The 
issue of corruption has always been one of the key governance issues during the state 
legislative and national election campaigns in India (Sharma and Gupta 2006). The 
subsequent section documents these dynamics with some illustrative cases. That said, even if 
registering more corruption cases during the run up towards elections does not yield any 
political mileage, if incumbent politicians believe that it does, then this alone could result in 
political budget cycles in the registered corruption cases.   
It is also noteworthy that during election time, the issue of governance including 
corruption is often brought to the forefront of electoral debates and discourses. In addition, 
high ‘audience costs’ in the form of intense media pressure and NGO activists’ scrutiny on 
corruption deals and shady scandals involving bureaucrats and political representatives, 
threaten the incumbent’s chances of re-election. The costs associated with ‘naming and 
shaming’ the incumbent government during the election period for its inaction in curbing 
corruption can prove to be very costly. Thus, keeping in view the chances of re-election, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the incumbent tries to project his or her competence to voters by 
exerting pressure on anti-corruption agencies to crack down on corruption in the election 
season.59  
                                                             
58 Lack of pre-poll data, at least in the early and mid-1990s, for all 30 states makes it difficult to control for 
voters’ perception on corruption just before the elections. Likewise, it is also difficult to control for each and 
every corruption case reported by local, national and English media, as well as newspapers in each state and in 
every year due to difficulty in accessing archives of hundreds of newspapers in circulation in each of the 30 
Indian states. However, we do control for total newspaper (local, national and English language) circulation in 
each state, a proxy for media penetration and access to information on anti-corruption activities in the country. 
59 However, it is not very clear as to who becomes the target of anti-corruption agencies during the election 
period. Obviously, it is expected that the agencies might not target corrupt individuals and officials allegedly 
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An important point to note here is that it is unreasonable to expect that such effects 
hold across all elections. Scheduling of elections, especially in India, does not always follow a 
constitutionally established pattern. Most often, the timing of elections is determined by the 
incumbent, when conditions suit them the most, or due to the collapse of a government in 
some cases. Therefore, as highlighted by Khemani (2004) and others, it is important to 
distinguish between scheduled elections and unscheduled elections. While the former follow a 
constitutionally scheduled pattern and occur once every five years, the latter are elections that 
take place in the middle of an incumbent’s constitutionally established five year term, either 
because of imposition of President’s Rule by the central government (which requires 
dissolving state legislative assembly and calling fresh elections) or coalition compulsions, or 
due to the incumbent calling early elections.60 If cyclical manipulation of anti-corruption 
institutions does actually exist, then this would effectively mean that unscheduled elections 
may not be associated with an increase in corruption cases registered by anti-corruption 
agencies because the nature and timing of such elections are often sudden and unanticipated. 
On the other hand, the timing of scheduled elections and the run-up to them is often 
predictable, thus they should be associated with an increase in corruption cases registered by 
anti-corruption agencies. Therefore, anti-corruption activities of the state governments should 
be higher during scheduled elections compared to the unscheduled elections. As scheduled 
elections are predictable, incumbent politicians and bureaucrats working under them have an 
ex ante schedule to guide their anti-corruption activities. When the state elections are 
unscheduled – due to collapse of coalition government or imposition of President’s rule by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
close to the incumbent. Unfortunately, the data used on corruption cases registered and investigated here do not 
provide details of the individuals and officials being convicted and prosecuted.  
60 Although in the post-independence period, the state assembly elections in India were synchronized with 
national Parliamentary elections, due to several unscheduled elections in different states in  later years, the state 
legislative election cycles no longer coincide with the national election cycle. Also, each state legislative election 
cycle does not coincide with other states’ legislative election cycles. 
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centre – it might prove difficult for the incumbent to adjust the anti-corruption activities 
accordingly. Based on this discussion, I derive the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Scheduled elections, and not unscheduled elections, are associated 
with an increase in the number of corruption cases registered.  
Hypothesis 2: The number of corruption cases registered is responsive to the 
proximity to a scheduled election. 
Additionally, it is important to distinguish between the electoral effects on corruption 
cases registered and cases being investigated by anti-corruption agencies for two specific 
reasons. First, incumbent is only interested in using anti-corruption agencies to register cases 
in order to signal her competence in fighting corruption to the voters. Hence, there is no 
political will on the part of the incumbent to actually carry out follow up investigations on 
those cases unless there is intense media pressure on a particular case. The second, more 
practical reason, is that investigation of corruption cases is often time-consuming and not 
really under the control of the government per se. Here, a host of issues come into play such 
as the nature of the investigation, size and magnitude of the case, efficiency and effectiveness 
of investigative agencies, among others, which are not under the control of the government. I 
thus expect that: 
 Hypothesis 3: Corruption cases investigated in a year are not responsive to either 
scheduled elections or the electoral cycle.  
According to the ‘pork barrel politics’ theory, the incumbent faces the dilemma of 
whether to channel the resources to his or her core support group or to the undecided voters. 
Competing theories of tactical redistribution suggest that such politically motivated 
redistribution of resources depend on the political objective of the incumbent, which is to 
maximize his or her votes (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Dixit and 
Londregan 1996). While Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) model suggests that the decision 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
133 
 
whether to target resources towards the core support group or  the undecided voters depends 
on the incumbent’s risk taking attitude, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and 
Londregan’s (1996) models predict that if an incumbent’s objective is to maximize votes, as 
in parliamentary democracies like India, then resources would be channelled to undecided 
voters whose voting decisions are determined by the amount of public goods they receive, 
rather than the affinity towards the incumbent or party ideology.61 In other words, more 
resources are allocated to swing areas/regions, as swing voters are expected to switch their 
vote in favor of the incumbent, where the electoral race is expected to be tight. Similar results 
are discussed by Shariff (2011), Keefer and Khemani (2009), Case (2001), Levitt and Snyder 
(1995) and Snyder (1989). Extending the same logic to corruption in India, intense electoral 
competitiveness, measured by the margin of victory in the previous elections, between the 
incumbent party and opposition parties might actually generate incentives for the incumbent 
to act more swiftly on corruption during the election period. The history of electoral 
competition in India shows that elections are very tight. In fact, electoral competition has 
become very intense during the study period adopted in this paper, where a small swing in 
vote share can result in a change in government (Cole 2009). I therefore expect: 
Hypothesis 4: An increase in the number of corruption cases registered is more 
responsive to scheduled elections in a swing state than scheduled elections in a non-swing 
state.  
Finally, I make the a priori assumption that incumbents in states would want to extract 
more resources and other favors from the central government. To do so, they not only need to 
increase their chances of re-election, but also win more seats in national elections in order to 
increase their bargaining power with the center. As mandates at national level throughout the 
                                                             
61 Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) also propose an alternative model in which if the objective of incumbent is to 
secure majority seats, as in presidential democracies, and if other parties are not as popular as the incumbent, 
then it is likely that more resources are diverted to core support groups. 
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1990s increasingly appeared like a sum total of state level verdicts, the incumbent at the state 
level has clear incentives to engage in influencing both state and national electoral 
outcomes.62 
Hypothesis 5: An increase in the number of corruption cases registered is also 
responsive to state scheduled elections which coincide with national parliament elections.  
 
5.2.1 Illustrative Cases 
Before empirically evaluating the hypotheses, I describe some illustrative cases in a 
few states to document these dynamics in detail. The issue of corruption has always 
dominated national and state elections in India (Sharma and Gupta 2006). For instance, in the 
1984 national elections, Rajiv Gandhi contested and won elections on the back of promising 
to control corruption and fight insurgency in Punjab. However, during his tenure (1984–
1989), the Indian National Congress (INC hereafter) government was accused of accepting 60 
billion Indian Rupees (US$ three billion) in bribes from Bofors, a Swedish arms producer 
(BBC 1999), as well as being involved in other scandals such as the HDW German shipyard 
submarine deal (Sharma and Gupta 2006). These corruption scandals not only united the 
opposition parties, but also illustrated the rampant corruption existent at the state level, 
particularly in those states ruled by the INC party. With several corruption cases being 
unearthed by the media in states like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, all 
ruled by the INC in the late 1980s, it was widely felt that corruption at the top created 
conditions of legitimacy for graft at the lower level (Chawla 1990). With extensive media 
coverage, corruption once again became a key issue in 1989 national and state elections 
(Chawla 1990). As a result, there was a spike in the number of corruption cases registered in 
                                                             
62 This is a reasonable assumption to make, as leading Indian social scientist Yogendra Yadav succinctly puts, 
“ordinary citizens (in India) look at national politics through the prism of their own state” (Yadav and Palshikar 
2011). Therefore, political contestation at the state level post-1990s started to play key role in determining the 
outcomes at the national level. 
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the states (Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Rajasthan) which 
witnessed scheduled elections in 1990.  
Another example comes from the state of Andhra Pradesh. In the run up towards state 
scheduled elections (which also coincided with national parliamentary elections) in 2009, the 
then Chief Minister of the state publicly announced they would lend a free hand to the state 
Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) to crack down on corruption. “The Chief Minister 
complimented the ACB officials for the continuous traps and raids and booking of cases even 
during the elections and asked them to continue the same if needed more vigorously“(quoted 
in the Reachout New Bureau 2009).63Accordingly, the number of corruption cases registered 
during the election year increased from 244 to 330. 
Likewise, in the run up towards elections, Orissa’s State Vigilance Department 
dramatically increased the number of corruption cases registered with the full backing of the 
state Chief Minister. In comparison to 203 cases in 2008, the State Vigilance Department 
registered about 385 cases in the 2009 state scheduled election year.64 Similar such practice 
can be observed under the tenure of Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra Pradesh (1995–2004) and 
Nitish Kumar in Bihar (2005–2011) both proclaimed to be strict against corruption and intent 
on maintaining law and order.65 
 
5.3 Data and method 
In this section, I describe the data, which is a panel dataset across 30 Indian states 
during the 1988–2009 period (22 years), and the estimation specifications. The objective is to 
                                                             
63 “Free hand to ACB to deal with corruption,” Reachout New Bureau 2009, 
http://www.reachouthyderabad.com/newsmaker/hw265.htm, accessed: November 2011. 
64 “Orissa on anti-corruption drive mode,” The Economic Times, November 2009, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-11-08/news/28493922_1_corruption-vigilance-awareness-
week-special-courts, accessed: December 2011. 
65 “The Illusionist of Bihar,” December 2011, Bihar Times, http://expressbuzz.com/magazine/The-illusionist-of-
Bihar/338930.html, accessed: January 2012. 
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identify the impact of the timing of state elections on corruption cases registered and 
investigated in Indian states. The base specifications (2) and (3) are formulated below. 
 
5.3.1 Estimation Specification 
The baseline specification estimates the number of corruption cases registered and 
investigated by the respective state anti-corruption agencies separately ( itCC ), in state i in 
year t as a function of a set of elections itE  and other exogenous variables itZ :  
)2(
titiititit
ZECC    
Where, i  denotes state fixed effects to control for unobserved state specific 
heterogeneity in the panel dataset, t is time specific dummies  and ti is the error term. For 
the dependent variable, I use two variables, namely the total number of corruption cases 
registered and investigated by the respective state anti-corruption agencies in state i in India in 
year t, reported by the National Crimes Records Bureau (NCRB hereafter) for the 30 states 
and five union territories from 1988 to 2009. It is noteworthy that for most of the states, the 
data are only available from 1989 onwards. The NCRB was constituted in 1986, with 
headquarters in New Delhi under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The major task of the NCRB, 
among others, is to function as a clearing house of information on crime and criminals 
operating at national and state levels. They coordinate with the respective States Crime 
Records Bureaus (SCRBs) in collecting and processing crime statistics at the state and 
national level. Along with all other crime data, the data on corruption cases (registered and 
investigated by the respective state anti-corruption agencies) are collected every year by each 
state’s vigilance department and are made available to the NCRB, which then publishes these 
numbers in its annual reports. The most important reason for selecting this dataset is not only 
its reliability, but also the fact that it is the only credible dataset available which provides 
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information on various forms of crimes recorded at the state level and in major metropolitan 
areas. The coding of each section for each state-year combination is evaluated by a set of 
trained coders at the NCRB and is then cross checked by the Crime and Criminal Network 
Tracking System (CCNTS) project of the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
Since 1988, with the inception of the Prevention of Corruption Act, state police have 
been allowed to register cases by arresting suspects and lodging criminal proceedings under 
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Previous to this Act, it was left to the prerogative of 
the respective state police forces to act against officials and others involved in corruption 
according to the respective state laws on corruption. The data on corruption cases registered 
and investigated capture cases related to both public servants, including state and central 
government officials, and people from the private sector. Under the Prevention of Corruption 
Act, state police and state anti-corruption agencies have the mandate to register cases against 
non-public servants who are suspected of corrupt practices. Note that the data on cases 
registered and investigated also include the cases at the state level dealt with by the CBI. The 
NCRB, however, do not provide disaggregated data on the number of cases registered and 
investigated by the CBI and respective state police forces or state anti-corruption agencies. It 
is also worth noting that the data on corruption here do not include other forms of economic 
offenses, such as drug trafficking, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering, 
smuggling, financial fraud and tax evasion, but do include the criminal breach of trust. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show how the number of corruption cases registered (investigated) has 
evolved in the various states during the 1989–2009 period. On average, a larger number of 
cases have been registered and investigated in Maharashtra, Orissa and Rajasthan, followed 
by Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. 
Interestingly, the number of cases registered and investigated is low in West Bengal and 
Assam, where the incumbent has been in power for more than three decades in the former, 
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and three consecutive terms in the latter, respectively. The average number of cases registered 
during the study period is about 104, and roughly 212 cases were investigated.  
The vector itE  includes the main variables of interest, namely state legislative 
assembly elections, which includes both scheduled and unscheduled elections. Accordingly, 
the value 1 is coded if a state i in year t witnesses state legislative elections which are 
scheduled and 0 otherwise. Likewise, another dummy variable is created where the value 1 is 
coded if a state i in year t witnesses state legislative elections which are unscheduled and 0 
otherwise. The elections data are from the Election Commission of India, which provides 
complete details on each state and national election. As per the Indian constitution, scheduled 
elections are those which are scheduled to take place every five years, and unscheduled 
elections are those which have occurred in the middle of a five-year cycle. As pointed out by 
Khemani (2004), unscheduled elections occur for various reasons, such as a shift in political 
alignments (e.g., members of the ruling party quit the ruling alliance), political instability due 
to the compulsion of a coalition (e.g., withdrawal of support by a coalition partner insofar that 
government might not possess the required numbers to maintain its majority in the house), or 
the imposition of President’s Rule by the center, which has the authority to recommend the  
removal of a state government, with the Indian president then taking control. President’s Rule 
is usually recommended when there is a failure in the constitutional machinery of the state 
(e.g., heightened political instability or a loss of law and order). It is noteworthy that any 
election occurring after the imposition of President’s Rule is coded as unscheduled. It is also 
plausible that the incumbent might call for an early election. In fact, in the study period, close 
to 38% of total state legislative elections are unscheduled elections. Some of them owe to the 
calling of early elections by the incumbent, others because of President’s Rule being imposed 
by the central government, as well as political instability. It is precisely for this reason that I 
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distinguish between scheduled elections and unscheduled elections – the timing of 
unscheduled elections is unanticipated due to the three reasons (shift in political alignments, 
political instability, and President’s Rule) and may not be exogenous to government policy on 
tackling corruption if the incumbent calls for early elections. On the other hand, unlike 
unscheduled elections, scheduled elections are fully exogenous simply because the scheduled 
elections and the electoral cycle are fixed by constitutional arrangements, and therefore the 
incumbent can fully predict the exact timing of such elections. Thus, it is reasonable to expect 
that the incumbent will strategically plan policies to influence the outcome of scheduled 
elections. If this is indeed true, then I expect varying effects of scheduled and unscheduled 
elections on corruption variables. The distinction between these two types of elections allows 
me to test the first hypothesis, which is that scheduled elections have a significant positive 
impact on corruption cases, while unscheduled elections do not.  
To the baseline equation (2), I introduce distance from elections in state i in year t, a 
variable known in the literature as the electoral cycle to examine how the temporal distance 
from a specific scheduled election year affects corruption cases. I estimate: 
)3(
4
1
titiitititit
ZSETCC  

  

 
Where, itT
  is the vector of the electoral cycle comprising four dummy variables, 
capturing itT
  for δ = 1 is a dummy coded if state i in year t is one year away from a 
scheduled election year (SEit); δ = 2 is another dummy variable if state i in year t is two years 
away from a scheduled election year; δ = 3 is other dummy variable if state i in year t is three 
years away from a scheduled election year and δ = 4 is the last dummy variable if state i in 
year t is four years away from a scheduled election year. It is noteworthy that if one of the 
years in the electoral cycle coincides with a unscheduled election then it is treated as one, two, 
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three or four years before a scheduled election, and the year after that unscheduled election 
year will be coded as four years away from a scheduled election year and so on.66 This 
method is adopted by Khemani (2004) to nullify the effect of the timing of unscheduled 
elections, particularly if it is viewed as an outcome of an event whose effects do not last 
beyond the event. Meaning, a negative shock in a particular year leading to unscheduled 
election does not affect the probability of such a shock in the future. 
Finally, in order to examine other political considerations listed in the third and fourth 
hypotheses, I examine the following specification:  
 
)4()1_(_ 2 titiitititit ZSWSESWSECC    
 
Where, SE_SWit is a dummy for scheduled elections taking place in a ‘swing state’. 
The swing state is identified based on the margin of victory of the incumbent in the previous 
elections against their rival contesting party was 5% or less in terms of vote share. It is 
important to note that electoral competition in India is very high and a small swing of 5% in 
the vote share can dramatically increase (decrease) the seats. itSWSE )1_(  represents 
scheduled elections dummy in a non-swing state, which helps distinguish the differential 
effects between swing states and non-swing states. Finally, to examine the effects of state 
scheduled elections coinciding with national elections, I utilize: 
 
)5()1_(_ 3 titiitititit ZNESENESECC    
 
Where, SE_NEit is a dummy variable when the scheduled state elections coincides 
with national parliament elections (Lok Sabha) and itNESE )1_(   is also a dummy capturing 
the state scheduled elections which do not coincide with national parliamentary elections. The 
                                                             
66 Note that introducing these dummies into the model does not result in multicollinearty problem.   
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data for the dates of national elections, swing states (i.e., margins of victory) are from the 
Election Commission of India’s statistical reports on each state legislative and parliament 
election.  
The vector of control variables (Zit) includes other potential determinants of corruption 
cases registered and investigated in state i during year t. Since this is the first such study on 
elections and corruption in India, I follow the pioneer cross-country studies on determinants 
of corruption of Treisman (2000, 2007), Aidt (2003), Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 
(2007), Aaken, Feld and Voigt (2008) and other comprehensive evaluations of early studies 
on corruption (Mauro 1995). Accordingly, the models control for the effects of development 
by including respective states’ GDP (logged) in Indian rupees using 1993-94 constant prices, 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of India’s macroeconomic dataset (Mauro 1998, 1995). I also 
control for population (logged) as larger states tend to have more corruption cases registered. 
Following Brunetti and Weder (2003), Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Bjørnskov (2011), I also 
capture the effects of the media by including the log of total newspaper (English, Hindi and 
the respective states’ local languages) circulation per-capita. As argued by De Haan and 
Seldadyo (2006), regulatory capacity is key in tackling corruption. I capture regulatory 
capacity with the effective police infrastructure by including the number of total criminal 
cases (Indian Penal Code – IPC) pending for investigation per policemen in state i in year t. I 
expect a higher ratio is detrimental to the number of corruption cases registered and 
investigated because of intense pressure on police to deal with other criminal cases. The data 
for police infrastructure are obtained from various annual reports on crime published by the 
NCRB. I also include a proxy for anti-corruption legislation in place to control for corruption 
in each state by using a dummy which codes the value 1 if the state has Lokayukta Act (state 
Ombudsman Act), and 0 otherwise. Finally, following Besley and Burgess (2000), I also 
capture the number of years various political parties are in power in state i in year t to control 
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for the longevity of the incumbent in power. I expect the longer the party is in power, the 
lower will be the focus on controlling corruption. These variables include dummies for each 
of the following parties in power, namely the Indian National Congress (INC hereafter), 
centre-left in ideology, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP henceforth),  centre-right, the Left 
Front led by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), leftists, and other regional 
parties often considered soft left in ideology. Details on variable definitions and data sources 
are reported in table 4.5 in the appendix.  
As the count data on corruption cases registered and investigated are strongly skewed 
to the right (with an accumulation of observations at zero) and display significant 
overdispersion, with the variance being greater than the mean (see descriptive statistics 
reported in table 4.6 in appendix), I estimate the regressions employing the Negative Binomial 
estimator to Poisson estimator – which restricts the variance equal to the mean (Lawless 1987, 
Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Note that the ‘goodness-of-fit’ test supports using the Negative 
binomial over the Poisson estimation method. I employ state specific and year specific fixed 
effects and heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). It is 
noteworthy that there exists sufficient variation among elections, with 38% of the all-state 
legislative elections being unscheduled elections (62% therefore being scheduled elections) to 
employ fixed effects without any likely problems occurring.  
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 4.1 presents the baseline results capturing the effect of elections and the 
electoral cycle on corruption cases registered. Table 4.2 focuses exclusively on corruption 
cases being investigated. In table 4.3, I examine how other political considerations (such as 
swing state effect and national elections) affect an incumbent’s efforts to control corruption. 
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As discussed, all the models are estimated using negative binomial regression estimations and 
results in all the tables report coefficients. I compute marginal effects at the mean of the 
explanatory variables.67 Beginning with column 1 in table 4.1, the results show that elections 
in general, though positive, have no statistically significant effect on the number of corruption 
cases registered. However, when disaggregating the elections into scheduled and unscheduled, 
I find a strong positive effect of scheduled elections in column 2, which is significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. The marginal effects suggest that a scheduled election 
year, holding other controls at their mean, is associated with roughly eight additional 
corruption cases being registered than other years. On the other hand, in column 3 I find that 
unscheduled elections actually have a negative effect on corruption cases registered, which is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. These divergent results with respect to 
scheduled and unscheduled elections actually underline the importance of distinguishing the 
effects between the two. These results support hypothesis 1, i.e., unscheduled elections are 
unanticipated while scheduled elections are fully anticipated events, thereby providing 
incentives for politicians to engage in manipulative politics to influence election outcomes.  
In column 4, I include both scheduled elections and unscheduled elections together. As 
can be seen, I still find a positive and significant effect of scheduled elections and a negative 
effect for unscheduled elections. Controlling for unscheduled elections, the marginal effects 
show that a scheduled election year is associated with roughly seven more corruption cases 
being registered. In column 5, I include the electoral cycle. Although two of the four variables 
in electoral cycle are statistically significant, they are found to be jointly significant at 10% 
level. As scheduled elections draw closer, there is an increase in the number of cases being 
registered. A graphical representation (in figure 2.3) show that the number of corruption cases 
registered is responsive to the proximity to a scheduled election year, i.e., the number of cases 
                                                             
67 I use Stata 11.0’s margins command to compute marginal effects.  
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tends to increase steadily as a scheduled election year draws closer. These results are in line 
with the second hypothesis that if there is some evidence of an electoral cycle, with respect to 
corruption cases registered, then the idea of strategic manipulation of policy to affect political 
outcomes is feasible. 
In table 4.2, the dependent variable is the number of corruption cases investigated by 
anti-corruption agencies in the respective states. As one can see here, in column 1, I do not 
find any statistical significance for all state legislative elections grouped together. The effects 
remain statistically insignificant when disaggregating the elections into scheduled and 
unscheduled in separate models, reported in columns 2 and 3 (in table 4.2). Though the effect 
of scheduled elections is positive, it remains statistically insignificant with a p-value of about 
0.14. On the other hand, unscheduled elections also remain statistically insignificant. In 
columns 4 when including scheduled and unscheduled elections together, I do not find any 
significant effect for either of the elections. I introduce electoral cycle in column 5 (of table 
4.2). As can be seen here, there is no clear-cut relationship between the electoral cycle and the 
number of corruption cases being investigated. These results on the investigation of 
corruption cases lend support to hypothesis 3 which reflects two issues: First, unlike 
corruption cases registered, investigations are a time consuming process and a lot depends not 
on the investigative mechanism of the respective state police forces, but also on the 
availability of efficient police infrastructure to finalize the investigation and send the case to a 
judiciary trial. Second, as mentioned earlier, it is also plausible that the incumbent is only 
concerned with signaling his or her competence, i.e., by increasing arrests of people involved 
in corruption during the election period, and may not actually be interested in following up 
with investigation of these cases.68 
                                                             
68 It also noteworthy that the results reported in table 4.1 and 4.2 do not change much, even after introducing 
respective lagged dependent variables. These results are not shown here due to brevity. 
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Before moving further, I discuss the findings on the control variables reported in both 
tables. Interestingly, in both models, the control variables remain largely consistent. There is a 
positive relationship between the level of state GDP and control of corruption (both cases 
registered and investigations). Holding other variables at their mean, a standard deviation 
increase in the (logged) state GDP would result in 19 more cases being registered and 18 
more cases being investigated, which is about 11% and 7% of the standard deviation of cases 
registered and investigated respectively. This could be a reflection of two things. First, in a 
developing country like India, richer states tend to attract a lot of corruption because of the 
sheer size of economic activity. Second, it also plausible that rich states tend to spend more on 
police infrastructure which can effectively reduce corruption. The findings on newspaper 
circulation are interesting. Although newspaper circulation has a strong positive impact on 
corruption cases registered which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level, it 
remains statistically insignificant with respect to investigation of cases. One reason for this 
could be that the media can play a positive role in unearthing the scams and scandals 
associated with corruption, which in turn puts pressure on state administration to act 
(Bjørnskov and Freytag 2011). However, once these cases are reported, there is often no 
follow up by the media on the investigations and trials.69  
The findings related to police efficiency measures, i.e., the total number of criminal 
cases per policemen, are even more interesting.  It seems to have no effect on cases being 
registered, but there is a strong negative effect on cases being investigated which is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Holding other variables at their mean, a 
standard deviation increase in total criminal cases per policemen would mean nine less 
                                                             
69 Of course there are some exceptions, especially if the cases are associated with ministers or businessmen, and 
the nature and size of the corruption is large and attracts public attention. For instance, the corruption cases 
associated with the Commonwealth Games and 2G telecom licenses, in which not just businessmen were 
arrested, but also politicians -  prominent among them  a cabinet minister of telecom -  were put behind bars, are  
prime examples of the media following up with the investigation of cases associated with big ticket corruption. 
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corruption cases being investigated, which is about 3% of the standard deviation of total 
corruption cases investigated. This negative finding highlights another pressing demand by 
civil society activists for police reforms, which is pending in the form of a draft note with 
successive governments. Likewise, I also find that states which have the Lokayukta Act (state 
Ombudsman) in place are associated with roughly 10 additional cases being investigated than 
states without it. However, it has no significant effect on corruption cases registered. Finally, 
with respect to political variables, in line with popular perception, no particular political party 
being in power is associated with either an increase in corruption cases registered or 
investigated. The exception is the Left Front, which is associated with an increase in cases 
being registered. This effect remains statistically insignificant when it comes to investigations, 
however. Prominent among other parties is the Indian National Congress and its allies, which 
has a negative effect on corruption cases registered at the 5% level. 
 
5.4.2 Results on other political considerations 
In table 4.3, I test if the evidence for elections on controlling corruption is robust to 
another political variable that has been identified in the public choice literature as an 
important predictor of manipulative politics — the proportion of votes. Accordingly, I 
introduce two dummy variables in columns 1 and 2, namely scheduled elections in a swing 
state, and scheduled elections in a non-swing state, in order to examine if incumbent 
governments target regions where the electoral race is tight or safe. As can be seen from 
column 1, I find a strong positive effect of scheduled elections in a swing state on the number 
of corruption cases registered, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. When 
estimating marginal effects, I find holding control variables at their mean, that scheduled 
election years in swing states result in roughly 15 additional cases being registered in 
comparison to non-swing states (see column 1). Although positive, I do not find a statistically 
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significant effect in either swing or non-swing states for corruption cases under investigations 
(see column 2). In columns 3 and 4, I replicate these results by replacing scheduled elections 
with unscheduled elections. I do not find any significant effect of unscheduled elections on 
both corruption cases registered and investigated.70 These findings highlight that the effect of 
elections are statistically distinguishable between states which happen to be swing states, and 
those that are not. This also means that incumbent state governments target states where the 
electoral race is tight, instead of the safe states where the incumbent is expected to do better.71 
Table 4.3 also captures the effects of state scheduled elections coinciding with national 
elections (see column 5 and 6). Accordingly, I introduce two variables, namely state 
scheduled elections coinciding with national elections, and state scheduled elections which do 
not coincide with national elections. The results in columns 5 and 6 show that  state scheduled 
elections coinciding with national elections have significant positive effects on both 
corruption cases registered and investigated. Controlling for other variables, the marginal 
effects show that the scheduled state elections coinciding with national elections witness an 
increase in about 10 additional cases registered and 23 additional cases investigated compared 
to other years. Both remain significantly different from zero at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. In columns 7 and 8, I replicate these results, but replace scheduled elections with 
unscheduled elections. As can be seen here, I do not find any effects of unscheduled elections 
that coincide with national elections on either cases registered or investigated.72 An interesting 
finding which emerges from table 4.3 is that unlike in previous models, the marginal effects 
on cases investigated are higher compared to cases registered. Once again, the control 
variables reported in table 4.3 are consistent with the theoretical expectations. 
                                                             
70 These results remain the same even after controlling for swing state dummy in the models. 
71 Note that interacting swing state dummy with scheduled elections dummy yields almost identical results, i.e. 
swing states conditional upon scheduled elections witness more corruption cases being registered. However, the 
statistical significance drops from 5% as reported above to 10% level. The interaction effects however remain 
statistically insignificant for corruption cases investigations. 
72 These results remain identical even after controlling for national elections dummy in the models. 
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5.4.3 Checks on Robustness 
I examine the robustness of the main findings in the following ways. First, I re-
estimate the baseline regressions, varying the set of main independent variables, i.e., the 
scheduled elections dummy. I generate a dummy if the scheduled elections in a year occur 
after March, thus ignoring all the scheduled elections which would have occurred during 
January – March. It is unreasonable to expect that a spike in the number of corruption cases 
registered would have occurred during the first two months in a calendar year after which 
scheduled elections take place.73 Moreover, the elections code of conduct, which prohibits 
incumbent politicians from using policy instruments for electoral gains, comes into play 
weeks after the announcement of the election schedule by the Election Commission of India. I 
find that, in total, there are eight such scheduled election years across all states. Re-estimating 
the baseline results without these scheduled election years yields almost identical results as 
reported in table 4.1 and 4.2. In fact, the statistical significance of the scheduled elections 
dummy increased from 5% (as reported in table 4.1) to 1%.  
Second, it is plausible that unscheduled elections might be endogenous to corruption 
cases registered and investigated, especially if the incumbent chooses to call early elections. 
The issue is not trivial, because those who argue that the timing of unscheduled elections are 
sudden and unanticipated also make causal claims that governance related issues might trigger 
unscheduled elections. Also, controlling corruption in a state might be correlated with other 
omitted variables such as civic associations, which I have not accounted for in the model. In 
order to deal with this problem, I use an instrumental variable approach wherein I instrument 
for the endogenous unscheduled elections. The factors which cause unscheduled elections, as 
                                                             
73 Unfortunately, the NCRB does not provide monthly information on the number of corruption cases being 
registered and investigated by the respective state anti-corruption agencies. 
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argued by Khemani (2004), are numerous. These include imposing President’s rule, political 
instability and an incumbent using the option of calling early elections. Keeping in mind these 
three factors, I use three different instrumental variables which proxy these three political 
factors. First, I use a dummy coding the value 1 for a state if the incumbent party or the 
leading party of a coalition government, from which the Chief Minister of the state i in year t 
comes from, belongs to the same party as that of the central government (or the leading party 
of a coalition government), and 0 otherwise. It has been pointed out that the imposition of 
President’s rule, either due to political volatility or law and order problems in states, is more 
likely in states where the ruling party is not aligned with the center (Arulampalam et al. 2009, 
Khemani 2004). Second, political volatility in a state is also associated with fragile coalition 
governments or splits within the party. Several instances in Indian states viz., Arunachal 
Pradesh, Assam, Goa, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, among others, point 
towards this. I dummy code a value 1 for state i in year t if it is governed by a coalition 
government, and 0 otherwise, to capture political instability. Finally, incumbent governments 
can call early elections based on macroeconomic conditions (Pluemper et al. 2008). Using 
economic variables might violate the instrument exclusion restriction. I therefore use the seat 
share of the single largest party in the ruling government in the state legislative assembly. I 
expect incumbents whose seat share is below the threshold of a simple majority (i.e., 51% of 
seats) have more incentive to call early elections compared to ‘survivors’ lasting a full five-
year term.  
The normal procedure in the next step would be to utilize the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS – IV hereafter) method. However, employing instrumental variables in non-linear 
models such as negative binomial may be problematic. I therefore regress the endogenous 
variable – unscheduled elections – on the selected instruments using the conditional logit 
fixed effects (which is the first stage regression). I then predict the values of the endogenous 
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variable and regress the dependent variables – number of corruption cases registered and 
investigated – using negative binomial estimations (second stage regressions). The 2SLS–IV 
estimations with fixed effects were employed to check the validity of the instruments, which 
depends on two conditions. Firstly, the instruments must be correlated with the explanatory 
variable in question – otherwise they have no power. The variables discussed above are 
expected to be correlated with the endogenous variable. Secondly, the instruments should not 
vary systematically with the disturbance term in the second stage equation, i.e.,   0itit IV . 
In other words, the instruments cannot have independent effects on the dependent variable. 
The validity of the instruments is checked by the Hansen J-test, and the null-hypothesis of 
exogeneity cannot be rejected at a conventional level of significance. 
After controlling for endogeneity associated with the unscheduled elections, using the 
predicted values generated from the first stage regression remains statistically insignificant. It 
is interesting to note that in the baseline models the unscheduled elections was negative and 
significant at 5% level in column 3 of table 4.1. After controlling for possible reverse 
feedback effects, it becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, after controlling for possible 
endogeneity concerns, the impact of unscheduled elections on both cases registered and 
investigated remains statistically insignificant.74 The results with respect to the selected 
instruments in the first-stage analysis find that the coalition state governments dummy, and 
the seat share of the single largest party in the state assembly, explain unscheduled elections 
which are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, respectively. 
Third, I split the sample by years to exclude the first three years after the Prevention of 
Corruption Act came into being in 1988. The idea behind excluding these first three years is 
to allow for state governments across the board to establish the required anti-corruption 
                                                             
74 Note that these results remain the same when estimated using 2SLS-IV method. The joint F-statistics is about 
13.3 (at 1% significance) and the Hansen J-statistic remains statistically insignificant at 5% level. 
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bureaus to tackle corruption in their respective states. The new results do not depict any 
significant change in the baseline results reported in tables 4.1 and 4.2. I further excluded 
another two years from the sample and the results are not drastically different.  
Fourth, following Brandt et al. (2000) and King (1988), I replicate the baseline results 
reported in table 4.1 and 4.2 using an alternative estimate technique, namely a zero-inflated 
negative binomial method. Although it is true that there is over dispersion in the corruption 
cases data, it provides a good test for the robustness of my main findings as an alternative 
estimation technique. The results from the zero-inflated negative binomial estimations do 
support my earlier baseline findings. This apart, the results also support the previous findings 
on electoral cycles associated with corruption cases registered. Fifth, as an additional test for 
robustness, following Dreher and Gassebner (2008), I exclude the few observations with 
extreme values in both corruption cases registered and investigated. Despite this, the baseline 
results are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the results are not driven by extreme 
values.  
Finally, I also estimate the baseline models on corruption cases registered and 
investigated using pooled OLS fixed effects method. Both the dependent variables are 
logged.75 The main results remain robust to using OLS fixed effects models. However, the 
statistical significance of schedule elections comes down from 5% to 10% in OLS models. 
Unscheduled elections remain statistically insignificant. None of the election variables retain 
statistical significance in the corruption cases investigations. Note that estimating OLS fixed 
effects with per-capita cases (logged) also yields identical results. The robustness check 
results are not shown here due to brevity but are available upon request. In summary, taken 
together, the results seem to be robust to sample split, alternative specification, data and 
testing procedure.  
                                                             
75 I add 0.1 for the 0 observations in both corruption cases registered and investigated before logging.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
The idea that incumbent governments may manipulate fiscal and other economic 
policies in their bid to increase re-election chances, have been well documented, not only in 
the context of industrialized countries, but also among a cross-section of developing 
countries. However, almost all of these studies predominantly focus on macroeconomic policy 
outcomes. In this paper, I presume that policy manipulation to maximize the chances of re-
election can also be associated with key governance related issues. Most relevant among these 
is the controlling of corruption, which is widely seen as India’s pressing problem today. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap by identifying the effects of elections on controlling corruption, 
i.e., whether the timing of elections affects the responsiveness of incumbent governments in 
controlling corruption in India. Specifically, I examine the effects of state legislative assembly 
elections on the total number of corruption cases registered in that particular year, as well as 
the total number of corruption cases under investigation by the respective states’ vigilance 
bureaus and anti-corruption agencies. Much of what we know about political influence on 
anti-corruption institutions to control corruption is based on anecdotal evidence. This paper 
represents a contribution to a new literature using innovative data to demonstrate empirically 
the effects of elections on anti-corruption activities of the incumbent government. 
My findings are easily summarized. Using panel data on 30 Indian states during the 
1988–2009 period, consistent with the idea that an incumbent might exert greater effort in an 
election year to control corruption, I find that scheduled elections are associated with an 
increase in the number of corruption cases registered, while unscheduled elections are not 
given that their timing is sudden and unanticipated. In addition, I find that the cases registered 
tend to increase as a scheduled election year draws closer. Furthermore, I find these effects to 
be stronger in ‘swing states’, where the margin of victory of the incumbent in the previous 
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election was 5% or less, as well as in those state scheduled election years which coincide with 
national elections. On the other hand, I do not find any impact of scheduled elections and the 
electoral cycle on corruption cases being investigated by anti-corruption agencies. Even after 
controlling for endogeneity associated with unscheduled elections, using instrumental variable 
estimations, it is scheduled elections, and not unscheduled elections, which seem to predict 
the increase in corruption cases registered.  
In sum, three main policy implications follow from these results. First, the results 
highlight that political budget cycles are not restricted to economic and fiscal policies alone. 
Rather, such cycles are also associated with key governance related issues such as the control 
of corruption. If the effective provision of public goods shapes voters’ perception on 
governments, then considering the control of corruption as a basic public good would provide 
incentives for incumbent politicians to manipulate anti-corruption activities in the hope of 
influencing election outcomes. Thus, greater attention should be paid to the role of political 
manipulation of anti-corruption institutions which is widely believed to be the case in 
developing world. Second, the interesting but contrasting results related to corruption cases 
registered vis-à-vis investigated; suggest that politicians engage in 'cheap talk' on controlling 
corruption, especially during the election period.  It appears that they do not display political 
will thereafter to effectively combat the menace of corruption. This also means that 
politicians, willingly or unwillingly, are unable to ensure a consistent level of effective policy 
framework (such as strengthening anti-corruption institutions and laws) to try prevent 
corruption during their tenure in office. Manipulating anti-corruption agency during elections 
for electoral gains has serious implications for the anti-corruption policy not just in India but 
across the developing world. The potential long term effects could be politicization and 
weakening the very institution meant for tackling corruption. Finally, these findings highlight 
the need for strong anti-corruption institutions, both at national and state levels in India, 
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which do not come under the influence of politicians and are not merely advisory in nature, 
with no independent investigative and prosecution powers, as has been advocated by several 
civil society groups such as India Against Corruption (IAC), the National Campaign for 
People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), and Loksatta. This could help effectively control 
corruption to a large extent.76 Apart from independence, empowering these new institutions so 
that they cover all elected representatives, higher and lower levels bureaucrats, and other 
public servants under its ambit, is also vital. In addition, enacting new and effective laws to 
protect whistleblowers and incorporate a grievance redressal system, coupled with judiciary 
reforms, is also important because the corrupt in India, like in other developing countries, face 
little deterrent due to long delays in prosecuting perpetrators in court (Chemin 2008). 
Future studies might look more carefully at separating top and low-level cases of 
corrupt government bureaucrats, and examine if incumbent politicians have any incentives to 
react differently towards these groups during the election period. In addition, if politicians 
think that the expected payoff from engaging in ‘cheap talk’ on controlling corruption during 
elections is higher, then it would be worthwhile to examine whether this ‘cheap talk’ helps the 
incumbent’s chances of re-election in state legislative assembly elections.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
76 Refer to Government of India’s Lokpal (Ombudsman) Bill version: 
http://www.box.net/shared/k9bz7pfzj6q6s0us9mil. India Against Corruption‘s (IAC) Jan Lokpal Bill version: 
http://www.lokpalbillconsultation.org/docs/lokpalbill2_2.pdf. Refer NCPRI’s version of Bill: 
http://righttoinformation.info/ and refer Loksatta’s Lokpal Bill versions: 
http://www.loksatta.org/cms/documents/lokpal/LokpalBill_LSandFDRposition.pdf 
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Table 4.1: Elections, Electoral cycle and control of corruption (cases registered) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Registered 
  
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
All State Elections 0.0454     
(0.0814)     
State Scheduled Elections  0.222**  0.202*  
 (0.111)  (0.111)  
State Unscheduled Elections   -0.248*** -0.220**  
  (0.0923) (0.0927)  
One-year from State Scheduled Elections     0.0156 
    (0.111) 
Two-years from State Scheduled Elections     -0.117 
    (0.0959) 
Three-year from State Scheduled Elections     -0.187* 
    (0.100) 
Four-year from State Scheduled Elections     -0.185* 
    (0.0961) 
State GDP in Constant Prices (log) 0.341** 0.340** 0.327** 0.329** 0.333** 
(0.135) (0.135) (0.133) (0.133) (0.142) 
Total Population (log) 0.519 0.463 0.512 0.451 0.594 
 (0.693) (0.681) (0.685) (0.671) (0.711) 
Newspapers circulation per head (log) 0.201** 0.198** 0.204** 0.200** 0.199** 
(0.0925) (0.0922) (0.0913) (0.0913) (0.0931) 
IPC Cases per Police -0.0259 -0.0211 -0.0406 -0.0317 -0.0211 
(0.0773) (0.0763) (0.0788) (0.0768) (0.0775) 
Lokayukta Act (dummy) 0.0711 0.0686 0.0653 0.0649 0.101 
(0.108) (0.109) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) 
Indian National Congress ruling years (dummy) -0.313*** -0.352*** -0.277*** -0.328*** -0.324*** 
(0.103) (0.104) (0.0932) (0.103) (0.0980) 
BJP ruling years (dummy) -0.154* -0.183** -0.102 -0.146 -0.153* 
(0.0935) (0.0915) (0.0852) (0.0932) (0.0870) 
Left Front ruling years (dummy) 0.207 0.182 0.260 0.220 0.216 
(0.170) (0.172) (0.162) (0.170) (0.172) 
Regional Parties ruling years (dummy) 0.127 0.0986 0.156* 0.119 0.113 
(0.0901) (0.0899) (0.0878) (0.0896) (0.0874) 
Wald chi2 4597*** 4655*** 4642*** 4659*** 4777*** 
Goodness-of-Fit test 15971*** 16022*** 15993*** 15798*** 15496*** 
Number of States 30 30 30 30 30 
Number of Observations 595 595 595 595 595 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(b) Reports coefficients of all explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.2: Elections, Electoral cycle and control of corruption (cases investigated) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Investigated 
  
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
All State Elections 0.0984     
(0.0709)     
State Scheduled Elections  0.137  0.140  
 (0.0892)  (0.0902)  
State Unscheduled Elections   0.0219 0.0401  
  (0.101) (0.102)  
One-year from State Scheduled Elections     -0.203** 
    (0.0848) 
Two-years from State Scheduled Elections     -0.195** 
    (0.0843) 
Three-year from State Scheduled Elections     -0.175** 
    (0.0803) 
Four-year from State Scheduled Elections     -0.102 
    (0.0896) 
State GDP in Constant Prices (log) 0.210** 0.208** 0.210** 0.209** 0.177* 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.107) 
Total Population (log) -0.667 -0.664 -0.673 -0.663 -0.509 
 (0.805) (0.806) (0.803) (0.805) (0.803) 
Newspapers circulation per head (log) 0.0387 0.0375 0.0399 0.0374 0.0290 
(0.0924) (0.0926) (0.0927) (0.0925) (0.0897) 
IPC Cases per Police -0.126** -0.130** -0.130** -0.128** -0.135** 
(0.0584) (0.0582) (0.0586) (0.0588) (0.0578) 
Lokayukta Act (dummy) 0.185** 0.182** 0.183** 0.181* 0.210** 
(0.0927) (0.0927) (0.0923) (0.0928) (0.0929) 
Indian National Congress ruling years (dummy) -0.135* -0.135* -0.101 -0.140* -0.122 
(0.0794) (0.0796) (0.0745) (0.0804) (0.0759) 
BJP ruling years (dummy) -0.113 -0.105 -0.0777 -0.112 -0.104 
(0.0793) (0.0773) (0.0748) (0.0791) (0.0760) 
Left Front ruling years (dummy) 0.228 0.242 0.266* 0.232 0.218 
(0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.151) 
Regional Parties ruling years (dummy) -0.0913 -0.0924 -0.0699 -0.0958 -0.0861 
 
(0.0739) (0.0736) (0.0712) (0.0743) (0.0712) 
Wald chi2 5853*** 5932*** 5921*** 5856*** 5826*** 
Goodness-of-Fit test 16833*** 16828*** 16837*** 16554*** 16638*** 
Number of States 30 30 30 30 30 
Number of Observations 595 595 595 595 595 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(b) Reports coefficients of all explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.3: Elections and corruption cases in swing-states and national elections 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Investigated 
Cases 
Registered 
Cases 
Investigated 
  
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
State Scheduled Elections in Swing States 0.440** 0.167       
 
(0.204) (0.143)       
State Scheduled Elections in Non-Swing States 0.0906 0.119       
 
(0.112) (0.105)       
State Unscheduled Elections in Swing States   -0.159 0.0803     
 
  (0.132) (0.139)     
State Unscheduled Elections in Non-Swing States   -0.323*** -0.0274     
 
  (0.123) (0.133)     
State Scheduled Elections with National Elections     0.313* 0.416**   
 
    (0.184) (0.200)   
State Scheduled Elections without National Elections     0.190 0.0196   
 
    (0.134) (0.0875)   
State Unscheduled Elections with National Elections       -0.174 -0.0841 
 
      (0.113) (0.134) 
State Unscheduled Elections without National Elections       -0.317** 0.105 
 
      (0.149) (0.139) 
State GDP in Constant Prices (log) 0.360*** 0.210** 0.336** 0.215** 0.340** 0.212** 0.324** 0.215** 
(0.134) (0.103) (0.134) (0.104) (0.135) (0.102) (0.134) (0.104) 
Total Population (log) 0.491 -0.653 0.518 -0.673 0.481 -0.645 0.466 -0.634 
 (0.676) (0.808) (0.684) (0.802) (0.679) (0.798) (0.688) (0.809) 
Newspapers circulation per head (log) 0.194** 0.0365 0.205** 0.0408 0.195** 0.0349 0.201** 0.0400 
(0.0924) (0.0926) (0.0910) (0.0925) (0.0923) (0.0923) (0.0916) (0.0926) 
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IPC Cases per Police -0.0190 -0.130** -0.0378 -0.129** -0.0241 -0.136** -0.0439 -0.127** 
(0.0748) (0.0582) (0.0790) (0.0586) (0.0765) (0.0582) (0.0785) (0.0584) 
Lokayukta Act (dummy) 0.0827 0.184** 0.0642 0.181* 0.0848 0.214** 0.0620 0.186** 
(0.109) (0.0932) (0.107) (0.0924) (0.111) (0.0934) (0.106) (0.0919) 
Indian National Congress ruling years (dummy) -0.358*** -0.137* -0.284*** -0.104 -0.359*** -0.143* -0.280*** -0.0941 
(0.104) (0.0800) (0.0936) (0.0750) (0.106) (0.0803) (0.0936) (0.0740) 
BJP ruling years (dummy) -0.190** -0.106 -0.105 -0.0785 -0.188** -0.102 -0.103 -0.0733 
(0.0919) (0.0778) (0.0853) (0.0749) (0.0933) (0.0776) (0.0853) (0.0745) 
Left Front ruling years (dummy) 0.190 0.241 0.252 0.259 0.179 0.228 0.258 0.263* 
(0.170) (0.155) (0.163) (0.158) (0.171) (0.156) (0.162) (0.156) 
Regional Parties ruling years (dummy) 0.0983 -0.0926 0.152* -0.0726 0.0967 -0.0956 0.153* -0.0673 
 
(0.0897) (0.0735) (0.0871) (0.0714) (0.0899) (0.0735) (0.0881) (0.0714) 
Wald chi2 4623*** 5934*** 4688*** 5919*** 4609*** 5936*** 4631*** 5939*** 
Goodness-of-Fit test 16012*** 16827*** 15890*** 16717*** 16004*** 16817*** 15973*** 16819*** 
Number of States 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Number of Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(b) Reports coefficients of all explanatory variables. 
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Figure 2.1: State-wise corruption cases registered 
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Figure 2.2: State-wise corruption cases investigated 
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Figure 2.3: Electoral cycle on corruption cases registered 
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5.7 Appendix 
 
Table 4.4: List of states under study 
 
Andhra Pradesh Haryana Manipur Sikkim 
Arunachal Pradesh Himachal Pradesh Meghalaya Tamil Nadu 
Assam Jammu & Kashmir Mizoram Tripura 
Bihar Jharkhand Nagaland Uttar Pradesh 
Chhattisgarh Karnataka Orissa Uttaranchal 
Delhi Kerala Pondicherry West Bengal 
Goa Madhya Pradesh Punjab  
Gujarat Maharashtra Rajasthan  
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Data definitions and sources 
 
Variables Definitions and data sources 
Corruption cases 
Registered 
 
Total number of corruption cases registered by state police, CBI corruption branch 
under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in state i in year t. The data was obtained 
from various Annual reports on economic offences from National Crimes Records 
Bureau, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Corruption cases 
Investigated 
 
Total number of corruption cases being investigated by state police and CBI corruption 
branch under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in state i in year t. The data was 
obtained from various Annual reports on economic offences from National Crimes 
Records Bureau, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Scheduled and 
Unscheduled elections 
 
Dummy coding if the state i in year t witnessed a scheduled election or unscheduled 
election and 0 otherwise respectively. The data was obtained from various state 
assembly election reports published by the Election Commission of India. 
Electoral Cycle 
 
 
Separate dummies coding the value of 1 if a state i in year t is one-year, two-years, 
three-years and four-years away from an scheduled election and 0 otherwise. The data 
was own construction based on the information published by Election Commission of 
India on various state legislative assembly elections. 
State GDP (log) State GDP in 1993-94 constant prices (Indian Rupees) from Reserve Bank of India. 
Newspapers’ circulation 
 
Total number of newspapers including English, Hindi and local languages circulation in 
thousands per head in state i in year t obtained from Press Registrar of India. 
Lokayukta Act dummy 
 
Dummy coding whether a state has Lokayukta Act (Ombudsmen) in place and 0 
otherwise. The data was own construction based on the information provided by 
respective state governments. 
Political Parties in power 
 
Dummy coding whether a state is ruled by Indian National Congress, Bharatiya Janata 
Party, Left Front and Regional Party and 0 otherwise respectively. The data was own 
construction based on the information published by Election Commission of India. 
Total cases under 
investigation per police 
 
Total number of criminal cases (as per Indian Peneal Code – IPC) being investigated by 
police as a share of total civil police force in state i in year t. The data was obtained from 
various Annual reports on state-level police infrastructure from National Crimes 
Records Bureau, Government of India, New Delhi. 
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Number of Corruption cases registered 103.983 166.499 0 2598 596 
Number of Corruption cases investigated 211.239 284.143 0 1572 595 
State Scheduled Elections 0.128 0.335 0 1 624 
State Unscheduled Elections 0.085 0.279 0 1 624 
One-year from State Scheduled Elections 0.171 0.377 0 1 624 
Two-years from State Scheduled Elections 0.183 0.387 0 1 624 
Three-year from State Scheduled Elections 0.192 0.394 0 1 624 
Four-year from State Scheduled Elections 0.208 0.406 0 1 624 
State GDP in Constant Prices (log) 10.139 1.667 6.31 13.15 639 
Newspapers circulation per head (log) -1.284 1.395 -4.43 1.26 624 
IPC Cases per Police 1.899 1.053 0.2 4.7 623 
Lokayukta Act (dummy) 0.513 0.500 0 1 624 
Indian National Congress ruling years (dummy) 0.494 0.500 0 1 624 
BJP ruling years (dummy) 0.199 0.399 0 1 624 
Left Front ruling years (dummy) 0.093 0.291 0 1 624 
Regional Parties ruling years (dummy) 0.375 0.485 0 1 624 
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6. Chapter 5 
 
 
 
The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India’s Aid 
Motives77 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
India, widely seen as one of the success stories of globalization, has significantly accelerated its 
economic growth since the inception of economic reforms in 1991 (Basu and Maertens 2007, 
Basu 2008, Panagariya 2010). The country is one of the fastest growing economies in the world 
and host to some of the largest foreign investment inflows in recent years (UNCTAD 2010). Yet, 
for many, India’s progress since its independence 65 years ago is disappointing. Despite rapid 
economic growth over the last decade, some areas in India continue to be severely 
underdeveloped (Banerjee 2010). India has a large domestic constituency of people suffering 
from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance. According to the World Bank’s 
(2011) estimates, 37% of the Indian population is below the poverty line of US$ 1.25 a day. 
Moreover, India ranks below its neighbors Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 
terms of life expectancy, access to sanitation, infant immunization, and underweight children. It 
                                                            
77 Coauthored with Andreas Fuchs, University of Heidelberg. 
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also ranks below Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka in controlling the infant mortality rate 
(Drèze and Sen 2011), below Sri Lanka in terms of the literacy rate and access to education 
(UNESCO 2011), below Nepal in the 2011 Global Hunger Index (IFPRI 2011), and below 
Bangladesh with respect to controlling literacy among female youths (Drèze and Sen 2011). 
Therefore, it is not surprising to note that despite its rapid economic growth in recent 
years, India still receives development aid. In 2009, the total net official development assistance 
received by India from all donor countries was about US$ 2.502 billion, of which US$ 1.578 
billion was in the form of net bilateral aid flows from countries organized in the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) (OECD 2012).78 At US$ 630 million, India is still the single 
largest recipient of development aid from the United Kingdom (OECD 2012). 79 That being said, 
it is puzzling to note that India itself is an aid donor.80 In fact, Indian engagement in delivering 
foreign aid goes back to the 1950s, with its primary target being to provide development 
assistance to neighboring countries. Traditionally, Indian foreign aid has focused on technical 
assistance. Ever since it began in 1964, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), 
India’s flagship external assistance program, has provided training, education and technical 
expertise to about 40,000 NGO personnel, scholars and leaders from developing countries 
(Agrawal 2007). 
Over the last few years, aid from India has diversified and gained prominence. During the 
economic reforms period spanning from 1992 to 2009, official foreign assistance provided under 
                                                            
78 The DAC is a donor organization that consists of the European Union and 23 OECD countries. Specifically, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States are currently DAC members. 
79 Moreover, India also receives a substantial amount of aid from international NGOs. For example, in 2010, the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation committed US$ 100 million to India (OECD 2012). 
80 Note that India avoids the term ‘donor’. It rather perceives itself as a partner in South-South cooperation (see 
Chaturvedi 2008 for a discussion). 
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the umbrella of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) amounted to 18,950 crores Indian rupees 
(US$ 4.47 billion) according to its annual reports (MEA 1993-2010). The Ministry allocated 
2,359 crores Indian rupees (US$ 444 million) to aid-related activities in the 2009 financial year 
alone (MEA 2010). According to Manning (2006: 375), India, together with China, is one of the 
two ‘heavyweights’ among the non-DAC donors. India’s increased commitment to providing 
development aid is reflected in the government’s decision to setup a separate agency by 2012 in 
order to oversee the aid allocation process (Patel 2011). 
In contrast to the extensive empirical literature on the allocation of development aid from 
Western donor countries (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000), studies on development assistance 
provided by non-DAC donors lack rigorous empirical analysis. Notable exceptions are 
Neumayer (2003a, 2004) on Arab aid, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) on China’s foreign assistance, 
and Dreher et al. (2011) on aid from donors outside the DAC in general (excluding India).81 
Concerning India’s foreign aid in particular, to the best of our knowledge, no prior study 
provides an econometric analysis of the determinants of India’s aid allocation decisions. This 
paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. A better understanding of the factors driving India’s 
aid allocation decisions may offer important insights into why poor countries serve as donors of 
foreign aid to other developing countries. 
India claims that its aid is more need-oriented than aid from richer donor countries as its 
economic and political structure is closer to that of other developing countries. If this is the case, 
India should provide more aid to countries that are closer to India in terms of economic 
development. We test this prediction empirically. At the same time, many suspect that India 
might be increasingly using foreign aid as an instrument to gain access to overseas markets for 
                                                            
81 Given that India is poorer in terms of income per capita than any of the donors covered in Dreher et al. (2011), 
India serves as an excellent case to study the behavior of “needy” donors. 
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its goods and services, pave the way for Indian investment abroad, and secure access to natural 
resources (e.g., Agrawal 2007, Kragelund 2008). Another argument put forward is that Indian aid 
is extensively used as a foreign policy tool to expand the country’s geopolitical and diplomatic 
influence (e.g., Agrawal 2007). The consensus in the literature is that political and commercial 
interests are important determinants of aid allocation for the DAC group of “rich” donors (e.g., 
Alesina and Dollar 2000, Neumayer 2005, Kuziemko and Werker 2006), as well as for 
multilateral organizations (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009, Kilby 2011). Not only do we also expect to 
find this for the “needy” donor India, we expect these relationships to be even more pronounced. 
We argue that India has more incentives to provide politically and commercially motivated aid 
since the country lags behind DAC donors in terms of economic development. We will elaborate 
this hypothesis below and test it empirically. 
Our findings show that India’s aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of 
the behavior of a “needy” donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India’s aid 
allocation. We find the importance of political interests, proxied by the voting alignment 
between donor and recipient in the United Nations, to be significantly larger for India than for all 
DAC donors. Moreover, we find that the “needy” donor favors countries which are closer 
geographically and that countries at a similar developmental stage are more likely to enter 
India’s aid program. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 introduces India’s foreign aid program and 
examines its evolution over time. Based on the previous aid literature, Section 6.3 develops our 
hypotheses on the aid allocation behavior of a “needy” donor. In Section 6.4, we empirically 
analyze the determinants of aid allocations by the MEA based on data for the years 2008-2010 
from AidData, a project-level database (Tierney et al. 2011). To analyze whether Indian aid is 
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special, we further compare India’s aid allocation decisions with those of other donors. In 
particular, we test whether Indian aid is motivated to a higher extent by political and commercial 
considerations and to a lesser extent by recipient needs compared to aid from “rich” donors. 
Finally, Section 6.5 summarizes our results, concludes, and provides policy implications. 
 
6.2 An Overview of India’s Aid Program 
The origins of Indian development aid date back to the Colombo Plan of 1950, which a group of 
Commonwealth countries (including India) formulated in Sri Lanka with the objective of 
providing assistance to developing countries in order to raise their respective living standards. 
Along with the Colombo Plan, India started providing aid in the form of grants and loans. India’s 
primary target in its early days after independence was to support neighboring countries, in 
particular Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal.82 However, despite its active role, Indian development 
aid largely remained confined to the field of technical assistance, mainly due to resource scarcity 
and strong demand for developmental funds within the country.83 As a founding member of both 
groups of states, India’s aid program was anchored in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group 
of 77 at the United Nations. 
After the collapse of the USSR and a severe balance-of-payments crisis, India introduced 
pro-market economic reforms in 1991. Eventually, as the economy grew stronger, India 
deepened its engagement with developing countries and extended its aid program. The 2003-04 
budget speech is considered as a sharp break in India’s role as an actor in international 
development cooperation. India wanted to be perceived primarily as an aid donor and not as a 
                                                            
82 For 1958, Chanana (2009) highlights Indian aid commitments of about Rs. 100 million (US$ 21 million) in multi-
year grants to Nepal, Rs. 200 million (US$ 42 million) to Myanmar, and the financing of 60% of Bhutan’s budget. 
83 According to Dutt (1980), a total of 1,442 people received technical training in India under the Colombo Plan up 
until 1960. According to the Colombo Plan Reports (as cited in Dutt 1980), this number increased to 3,550 between 
1961 and 1971. 
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recipient of foreign assistance. Following the speech, India announced several key changes to its 
development cooperation (e.g., Price 2004). First, the country would only accept government-to-
government aid that is untied and provided by five selected countries or the European Union. 
Second, India would repay its debt to most of its bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. 
Third, it would extend its own aid effort to other developing countries through debt cancellations 
for some Highly Indebted Poor Countries, and an increase in its grant and project assistance 
under the so-called India Development Initiative. Although the actual policy changes were softer 
in the beginning than the speech seemed to imply (see Price 2004 for a discussion), it became 
clear that India intended to play an important role in the world of international development 
cooperation. The provision of credit lines via India’s Exim Bank is one of the most prominent 
outcomes of these reforms. 
To provide a better understanding of how India’s aid program evolved over time, we 
compiled data on India’s aid budget since 1966 based on the annual reports of the Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA 1967–2011).84 This information needs to be interpreted with caution 
because of significant changes over time in the way the ministry categorizes its aid amounts.85 
Apart from that, note that the data exclude aid flows from institutions other than the MEA. 
Moreover, we lack detailed information on which fraction of the calculated aggregated aid values 
satisfy the OECD’s definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Nevertheless, the 
figures should provide the reader with an intuition of the overall evolution of the size of India’s 
                                                            
84 Note that the DAC defines ODA as financial flows to developing countries provided by official agencies with the 
objective to promote economic development and welfare, and that contain a grant element of at least 25% (see 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/14/26415658.PDF, accessed August 2011). Although we lack detailed information 
on the concessionality of each individual loan, it seems that aid provided by the MEA by and large qualifies as 
ODA. According to a study by ECOSOC (2008), 80% of India’s total aid disbursed is grants. The remaining fraction 
is loans with an estimated grant element of 53-57%. 
85 Values for grant-in-aid to the Indian Council of Cultural Relations and support to the African National Congress 
are excluded from our analysis. See Agrawal (2007) for a discussion of limitations of the use of data from MEA 
annual reports as a proxy for India’s aid budget. 
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aid program. As can be seen from figure 3.1, there is a spike in India’s aid budget in 1972.86 This 
is largely due to the additional external assistance provided by India to Bangladesh, which 
obtained independence from then West Pakistan (now Pakistan) in 1971 with the help of India. 
According to the MEA annual report in 1973, India allocated about 167.6 crores Indian rupees 
(about US$ 369.7 million in 2000 constant prices) of aid to Bangladesh in 1972 (mostly in the 
form of grants and concessional loans). 
India’s aid disbursements suffered a decline during the early 1990s, a period marred by 
balance-of-payments problems and political crises. However, from the mid-1990s onwards, there 
has been a surge in disbursements of development aid. Though there were ups and downs, which 
could be attributed to the change in government in 2004 and to the Global Financial Crisis 
starting in 2008, India’s aid budget shows an increasing trend since the mid-1990s. Taken 
together, India’s aid budget rose from 13.4 crores Indian rupees (about US$ 40.3 million in 
constant 2000 prices) in 1966, to 2,917.4 crores Indian rupees (US$ 362.8 million in constant 
2000 prices) in 2010, which is roughly 0.04% of India’s GDP. This amount, which only captures 
MEA aid, is comparable to Austria’s total bilateral ODA (US$ 395.2 million in constant 2000 
prices) and amounts to about two thirds of Italy’s total bilateral ODA (US$ 547.0 million in 
constant 2000 prices).87 
In addition to the MEA, India provides concessional finance via its Export-Import (Exim) 
Bank. The sum of all financial flows provided by the Exim Bank between 2005 and 2009 and 
registered on AidData (Tierney et al. 2011) amounts to US$ 2.45 billion (in constant 2000 
prices). In contrast to MEA aid, the largest share of Exim Bank loans (73.2%) was allocated to 
                                                            
86 Using data on India’s GDP deflator and exchanges rates obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(available at http://databank.worldbank.org, accessed May 2012), we converted all aid values from Indian rupees in 
current prices to constant 2000 US$. 
87 A comparison with the figures on non-DAC donors provided in Dreher et al. (2011: 1952) underlines that India is 
one of the most important providers of development assistance outside the DAC. 
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Sub-Saharan African countries. Although Sinha and Hubbard (2011) find that most credits 
satisfy the criteria of a grant element of at least 25%, they conclude that Indian LOCs do not 
qualify as ODA as defined by the OECD. Since the credit lines are extended for the purpose of 
export promotion, these flows meet the criteria of officially supported export credits instead.88 
Therefore, we restrict our empirical analysis below to cover financial flows provided by the 
MEA only. 
 
6.3 Hypotheses 
The extensive literature on the allocation of development aid emphasizes that aid from Western 
donors and multilateral institutions is guided by strategic interests, in addition to economic needs 
in developing countries (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher et al. 
2009, Kilby 2009a). In contrast, research on non-DAC aid is still in its infancy. Manning (2006), 
ECOSOC (2008) and Kragelund (2008, 2010) provide good overviews of the aid activities of 
these so-called new donors. Among the few econometric studies on aid allocation by non-DAC 
donors are Neumayer (2003a, 2004) on Arab aid, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) on China’s foreign 
assistance, and Dreher et al. (2011) on aid from donors outside the DAC in general. The 
literature usually groups the determinants of a donor’s aid allocation into three categories. First, 
aid allocation follows recipient needs. Based on humanitarian motives, altruist countries provide 
more assistance to poorer countries. An important goal is poverty reduction. Second, aid is 
allocated based on good policies. Following the idea of merit, countries with good policies and 
good institutions are supported through increased aid flows. Third, donors’ aid patterns are 
                                                            
88 According to Sinha and Hubbard, the grant element varies between 41.25% for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) and 17.11% to 24.56% for middle income countries with medium to high levels of debt. 
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shaped by political and commercial self-interests. In the following, we discuss whether and how 
these motives are reflected in India’s aid policy. 
Referring to the role that Indian values might play in India’s aid provision, Meier and 
Murphy (2011: 7) point out that, “Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Sikhism all espouse solidarity 
with the suffering and giving without expectations for return.” In line with this, the Indian 
government claims that its aid program indeed responds to the economic needs of developing 
countries. For example, the MEA describes the ITEC program as “an earnest attempt by India to 
share the fruits of its [i.e., India’s] socio-economic development and technological achievement 
with other developing countries” (ITEC 2011). According to Banerjee (1982: 27), India provides 
aid to neighboring countries “with the sole objective of restoring the local citizens to a place of 
primacy.” If this is the case, India’s aid should be targeted to needier countries.89 We test the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: India’s aid allocation responds to the economic needs of developing countries. 
 
In this regard, Banerjee (1982: 55) claims that India’s aid is particularly need-oriented since it 
provides the “appropriate technology and managerial experience” to other developing countries. 
He argues that India’s aid is more need-oriented than aid provided by “rich” donors as its 
economic and political structure is closer to that of other developing countries. Similarly, the 
Indian MEA claims that it “possess[es] skills of manpower and technology more appropriate to 
the geographical and ecological conditions and the stage of technological development of several 
developing countries.”90 If we take this argument at face value, this implies that India should 
                                                            
89 Dreher et al. (2011), in turn, find that non-DAC donors care less for recipient need than traditional DAC donors. 
Note, however, that their study excludes aid from India. 
90 Quoted on several websites of Indian embassies, e.g., the Indian embassy in Azerbaijan: 
http://indianembassybaku.org/en/8/ (accessed: February 8, 2012). 
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allocate more aid to countries that are at a similar stage of development. Consequently, aid from 
India should decrease with a recipient country’s distance to India’s own development level. We 
will test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: The “needy” donor India allocates more aid to countries at a similar stage of 
development. 
 
At the same time, India emphasizes that its aid serves “mutual benefit” (ITEC 2011), i.e., its aid 
allocation is also motivated by Indian interests that are not directly related to the developmental 
concerns of its partner countries in the developing world. In this regard, the MEA (2004: 133) 
openly admits that “[t]he Government has been using development aid, including grants and 
Lines of Credit (LOCs) on concessional terms as tools for promotion of India’s political, 
economic and commercial interests.” With respect to commercial interests, Indian aid is seen as 
an instrument not only to gain access to overseas markets for its goods and services, but also to 
pave the way for Indian investment abroad (Price 2004, Agrawal 2007, Kragelund 2008). The 
fact that India’s aid is mainly ‘tied aid’ suggests that commercial interests play a dominant role. 
Moreover, India’s aid is said to be targeted at developing countries possessing oil and other 
natural resources in order to meet the rising demand for energy resources back home (e.g., 
Chanana 2009). While the MEA (2009: xiii) admits that its aid was “helping Indian companies 
get project contracts and orders for supply of goods,” it is emphasized that “the LOCs have 
helped in infrastructure development in these regions thereby creating considerable goodwill for 
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the country.” With respect to the TEAM-991 program, Kragelund (2008) also identifies an 
overlap with the business activities of Indian oil companies. 
In addition to commercial interests, the Indian foreign aid program is seen as a foreign 
policy tool to expand the country’s geopolitical and diplomatic influence beyond the South Asian 
region, as well as an attempt to build military alliances elsewhere (e.g., Agrawal 2007). In this 
regard, Lafargue (2006) notes that Zambia, an Indian aid recipient, did not criticize India’s 
nuclear tests in 1998 and recognized in 2003 that the Jammu and Kashmir regions are a part of 
India. Aid is considered a part of India’s efforts to obtain support for the country’s bid for a 
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (e.g., Kragelund 2008).92 Moreover, India 
perceives its aid program as a tool to improve its image around the world. In this regard, the 
MEA states that the ITEC program “has generated immense goodwill and substantive 
cooperation among the developing countries,” and that it “constitutes an integral part of India’s 
South-South Cooperation effort which has been a traditional pillar of the country’s foreign policy 
and diplomacy” (ITEC 2011). According to Agrawal (2007: 2), India aims to “develop a viable 
‘pro-India’ constituency among key decision makers in recipient countries.” Contrasting these 
views, Banerjee (1982: 54) argues that “India does not provide aid to its neighbours with the 
hope of extending its influence in the region.” He criticizes allegations that India’s aid was 
motivated by selfish motives.93 Focusing on how India can actually use aid as a foreign policy 
tool, Dutt (1980) lists five elements: first, to improve bilateral relations, second, to improve 
India’s image, third, to gain leverage and influence over recipient countries, fourth, to reward 
                                                            
91 The Techno Economic Approach for Africa India Movement (TEAM-9) program offers LOCs to nine West 
African countries. 
92 Price (2004) hypothesizes that India, as an aid recipient, only accepts aid from three current permanent Council 
members and from three proposed Council members for the very same reason. 
93 Banerjee (1982) claims that India does not make recipient countries dependent on its assistance, instead 
strengthening their self-reliance. Moreover, he argues that India has not installed any military bases in a major 
recipient country. 
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recipients’ policy position, and fifth, to maintain the stability and status quo in recipient 
countries. Taken together, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: India’s aid allocation is guided by India’s political and commercial self-
interests. 
 
With India emerging on the world stage as a significant provider of development assistance, 
critics of its aid program question the diversion of resources away from internal development 
given the chronic socio-economic problems plaguing India. It is this paradox which raises 
suspicion that India’s aid has mainly been allocated in accordance with the country’s own 
interests. We expect a “needy” donor to behave differently than a developed donor country. 
More precisely, the importance of self-interest should be larger in India’s case than for “rich” 
donor countries for several reasons. First, a “needy” donor is more exposed to public criticism of 
its aid allocation because of domestic deficiencies. In order to defend its aid allocation vis-à-vis 
its electorate, the country might be more inclined to follow political and commercial interests to 
a larger extent. In this regard, Price (2004) notes that the Indian government had to emphasize 
the benefits that accrue to India in order to gain domestic support for its foreign aid policy, 
especially the aid reforms after the 2003-04 Finance Minister’s budget speech. Note that this 
need to defend aid expenditure is even larger in democracies like India, where the government 
faces elections, than in autocratic donor countries. A second explanation is evident if one 
assumes a declining marginal utility of wealth, i.e., a “needy” donor like India values an 
additional dollar of wealth more than richer countries. The “needy” donor, lagging behind the 
“rich” donor in terms of wealth, consequently has more incentives to provide strategic aid than 
the “rich” donor does. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2b: While the elasticity to recipient needs is lower for a “needy” donor like India 
compared to “rich” donors, the opposite is true for political and commercial factors in 
regards to their respective aid allocations. 
 
6.4 Empirical Analysis 
6.4.1 Overview 
In this section, we employ data on aid commitments by the MEA in constant 2000 US dollars, 
obtained from the project-level database AidData (Tierney et al. 2011).94  Data are available for 
the 2008-2010 period.95 In what follows, we only analyze aid projects traceable to countries, thus 
excluding aid provided to world regions if we lack information on the country breakdown.96 To 
follow the OECD’s definition of ODA, we further exclude projects related to military assistance, 
as well as aid provided to countries that are not on the DAC list of aid recipients.97 Our aim is to 
estimate the motives behind India’s aid allocation decisions. Beyond that, we compare India’s 
aid allocation to that of other donor countries in order to investigate whether aid from the 
“needy” donor India is allocated based on different grounds. 
The lion’s share (89.7%) of India’s aid administered by the MEA was allocated to South 
Asian countries (see figure 3.2). With the exception of Pakistan, all six South Asian countries 
were beneficiaries of Indian aid in this period of time. Southeast Asian countries received 5.5% 
of MEA aid during this period. This corresponds to a total of 18 countries which have obtained 
                                                            
94 While the first entry in the aid database is “Welfare Activities for the Muktijoddhas (Freedom Fighters)” in 
Bangladesh in 2008, the database ends with an IT center in Osh in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010. 
95 Note that our study period coincides with the Global Financial Crisis. This might have an effect on the aid 
allocation decisions made by India. Nevertheless, the drop in India’s aid budget during this period is not substantial 
compared to previous years as we will see later in figure 3.1. 
96 About 5% of the total aid amount is not traceable to recipient countries. 
97 The DAC List of ODA Recipients is available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/34/37954893.pdf, as of 
January 1, 2006 (accessed February 14, 2011). 
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development assistance in this region. 2.2% of the Ministry’s total aid amount has been received 
by 38 Sub-Saharan African countries, and 1.6% was directed to eight transition economies in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the Middle East and North Africa, only Palestine and Syria 
benefited from Indian aid (1.2% of India’s total aid amount in the 2008-2010 period). Indian 
support in this region was significantly concentrated on providing various types of humanitarian 
assistance to Palestine. Finally, less than 0.1% of total aid allocations by the MEA were made 
available to 10 Latin American countries. Taken together, it is evident that India strongly favors 
countries in its neighborhood, as has been argued previously (e.g., Price 2005, Katti et al. 2009, 
Meier and Murphy 2011). 
Figure 3.3 puts the spotlight on sectoral aid allocations. As can be seen, 23.1% of the aid 
committed was targeted to the energy sector (DAC code: 230), covering both the production and 
distribution of energy in recipient countries. The second most important sector was drinking 
water provision and sanitation facilities (DAC code: 140), making up 15.0% of the Ministry’s 
total aid amount. 12.8% of MEA aid was allocated to transport and storage facilities in recipient 
countries (DAC code: 210), closely followed by 11.8% earmarked for commodity aid and 
general program assistance (DAC code: 500), which includes contributions for general 
development purposes in recipient countries. We also find that about 9.5% of total aid was 
allocated towards the development of activities associated with strengthening the administrative 
apparatus and government planning, activities promoting good governance, strengthening civil 
society, and other social infrastructure projects in the recipient countries, respectively (DAC 
codes: 150 and 160). 8.7% of the Ministry’s aid was allocated to multi-sector activities (DAC 
code: 400), and 7.5% to the development of health-related activities such as building hospitals 
and health centers, and the provision of other health infrastructure (DAC code: 120). The MEA 
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also earmarked 5.6% for industrial development (DAC codes: 321-323). The remaining sectors 
are: education (3.2%, DAC code: 110), communications (1.4%, DAC code: 331-332), 
agriculture, forestry and fishing (0.5%, DAC code: 311-313), humanitarian purposes (0.9%, 
DAC code: 700) and unspecified (0.5%, DAC code: 998). Finally, less than 0.1% is targeted at 
banking and financial services (DAC code: 240). 
These numbers serve as a first indication that India’s foreign aid is motivated to a higher 
extent by commercial interests in comparison to need-based issues plaguing recipient countries. 
This is reflected in the fact that about 45% of the Ministry’s aid has been directed at commercial 
sectors. Nevertheless, the development aid provided by the MEA also covers sectors concerned 
with the overall development of basic public goods (such as health, drinking water, education 
and agriculture), which made up about 24% of total aid allocations. 
With respect to the role of developmental distance between India and recipient countries 
for aid allocation, figure 3.4 provides first descriptive evidence in favor of hypothesis 1b. The 
graph on the left shows the expected strong negative link between the (logged absolute) 
developmental distance and the probability of receiving aid from India. The graph on the right, 
however, shows only a weak negative correlation between developmental distance and (logged) 
aid commitments from India. We now turn to the econometric analysis. 
 
6.4.2 Data and Method 
We follow a common practice in the aid allocation literature and estimate India’s aid allocation 
in two steps (e.g., Neumayer 2002). First, we estimate which countries enter India’s aid program. 
Our dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if India provided aid to a developing 
country on the DAC list of aid recipients. Second, given that a country receives aid from India, 
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we estimate the (logged) amount of aid in constant 2000 US dollars that has been committed to a 
particular recipient country. One way to estimate the first step (the so-called gate-keeping stage) 
is through a Probit (or Logit) model, which takes the binary nature of the data into account. In 
the second step, it may be preferable to include the inverse Mills ratio derived from the first step 
to avoid selection bias. Since we lack a suitable exclusion variable, we run a Heckman model 
without an exclusion variable, i.e., we identify the model based on the non-linearity inherent in 
the selection equation. The resulting Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of independent 
equations (p-value: 0.650).98 Therefore, we opt for an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
of the aid amount allocated to a recipient country. 
For our econometric analysis, we sum bilateral aid allocation over the 2008-2010 period 
since it is difficult to explain aid allocation on a yearly basis due to its volatility (see also Gupta 
et al. 2006, Dreher et al. 2011). Concerning the selection of our explanatory variables, we follow 
the previous literature on aid allocation, in particular that on emerging donors (e.g., Dreher et al. 
2011, Dreher and Fuchs 2011). To control for the effect of geographic proximity, we account for 
the (logged) distance between the recipient and donor country.99 Distance can be seen as a proxy 
for costs associated with the provision of development aid. Aid costs are expected to be a 
particular concern for a “needy” donor with limited resources like India. Apart from this 
explanation, India might favor countries in its neighborhood (with the exception of Pakistan due 
to the bilateral conflict over Kashmir) as it aspires to become a regional power. Dreher et al. 
(2011) find that, in general, so-called new donors are more likely to provide aid to countries that 
are closer to them geographically. Given that India is even poorer in terms of income per capita 
                                                            
98 Results available upon request. 
99 As defined in Mayer and Zignago (2006), bilateral distances are computed as the average of the distance between 
the major cities of the two countries, which are weighted by the share of the city in the overall population. 
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than any of the donors covered in Dreher et al. (2011), we expect to find a pronounced effect of 
distance on aid allocation for the “needy” donor under investigation. 
We use several variables to examine whether India’s aid responds to the needs of other 
developing countries (hypothesis 1a). To reflect humanitarian motives, the need orientation of 
donors is proxied by the recipient country’s (logged) GDP per capita (measured in 2005 
international dollars). A need-oriented donor should provide more aid to poorer countries. Thus, 
we expect a negative sign for this income measure. Next, we control for the (log) population of 
recipient countries. The intuition here is that larger countries need more resources to obtain 
visible effects of aid provision. In addition, we control for the (log) total number of people 
affected by natural disasters as an additional indicator of recipient need since disaster relief is 
part of the aid program of the MEA. Furthermore, we include developmental distance, which is 
measured as the (log) absolute difference between the income per capita of India and that of a 
particular recipient country. Hypothesis 1b implies that India’s aid decreases with the 
developmental distance to a recipient country. 
To proxy donors’ political self-interests, we follow the literature and employ a recipient 
country’s voting alignment with India in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The 
UNGA voting alignment seems to be of large relevance for India since “marshalling support for 
Indian positions in forums such as the UN take up much of India’s diplomatic effort” (Dutt 1980: 
678). Relying on data from Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009), we calculate the number of times a 
country votes in line with India (either both voting yes, both voting no, both voting abstentions, 
or both being absent). We then divide the resulting value by the total number of votes in a 
particular year to derive a measure of voting coincidence between zero and one. We follow 
Dreher et al. (2011) and compute the voting alignment based on key votes as defined by the U.S. 
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State Department (Kilby 2009b).100 Various empirical studies find that developing countries are 
favored in donors’ aid allocation decisions when they have closer political ties (Thacker 1999, 
Alesina and Dollar 2000, Barro and Lee 2005, Dreher et al. 2009, Kilby 2009a). We also include 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a recipient country is a non-suspended member of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. It can be argued that India uses the Commonwealth as a forum to 
develop political and commercial ties. For example, over the years India has developed strong 
ties with Commonwealth countries in South and Southeast Asia, as well as Africa (Johnson and 
Kumar 2011). Beyond that, referring to colonization, Banerjee (1982: 54) views India’s aid “as a 
part of the process to undo the injustice of ages.” 
To account for commercial interests, we include India’s (log) total exports to a particular 
recipient country in constant US$. In addition, we follow Dreher et al. (2011) and use the 
recipient country’s (log) depletion of mineral and energy resources as a proxy for a recipient’s 
endowment of natural resources. 
Finally, to account for merit as a motive for aid supply, institutional quality in the 
recipient countries is proxied by both the political rights measure from Freedom House (2009) 
and the corruption index from Kaufmann et al. (2009). The political rights variable is coded on a 
scale of 1-7, with higher values representing worse liberties, and lower values reflecting full 
liberties. As the world’s largest democracy, India might reward democratic countries and provide 
less aid to autocratic countries in comparison. Note that India is the second largest donor in the 
UN Democracy Fund (US$ 25 million as of 5 January 2012), which underlines the importance 
that India attributes to the support of democratization.101 Alternatively, India might follow the 
‘spirit of Bandung’ (Lafargue 2006) and follow the principle of non-interference in internal 
                                                            
100 Note that we also report the results with all votes as a robustness check. 
101 See UNDEF webpage: http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Donors/donors_index.html (accessed 11 February 
2012). 
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affairs, i.e., its aid allocation might be independent of the institutional characteristics of the 
recipient country. If this is the case, we would expect India to be unresponsive to corruption in 
the recipient countries. The control-of-corruption index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values corresponding to better governance. 
For our time-varying explanatory variables, we take lagged values, i.e., the corresponding 
value in 2007, to mitigate endogeneity issues. The only exception is the disaster variable since it 
is reasonable to assume that the occurrence of natural catastrophes is exogenous. Since our 
export variable and UNGA voting alignment both show relatively high volatility over time, we 
follow Dreher et al. (2011) and take the average of the respective values in the three years 
preceding our period of investigation (2005-2007). All definitions and sources of variables are 
provided in the table 5.3 in appendix. 
 
6.4.3 Main Results 
Table 5.1 displays our results. While columns 1-3 show the results for the gate-keeping stage, 
columns 4-6 present the results of the allocation decision. Analyzing the coefficient on GDP per 
capita in column 1, Indian aid shows some need orientation. The probability that a developing 
country receives aid from India decreases with a country’s stage of development. The coefficient 
is statistically significant, at the ten-percent level. In turn, both the number of people affected by 
natural disasters and country size have no significant impact on the probability that a developing 
country enters India’s aid program, at conventional levels of significance.102 To test whether 
India favors countries at a similar developmental stage (hypothesis 1b), we add the 
developmental distance to India to our regression in column 2. The corresponding coefficient 
                                                            
102 Note that the coefficient on disasters becomes statistically significant in column 2, at the ten-percent level. The 
significant negative sign is strong evidence against the hypothesis that disaster-stricken countries are more likely to 
enter India’s aid program. 
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shows the expected negative sign and is statistically significant, at the ten-percent level. Note 
that the coefficient on per-capita GDP loses its statistical significance. Considering that the 
developmental distance between India and developing countries is correlated with the recipient’s 
income per capita, we drop this latter variable as a next step. As shown in column 3, 
developmental distance then reaches statistical significance at the five-percent level. This 
suggests that countries closer to India in terms of economic development are favored by the 
MEA, in line with hypothesis 1b. The corresponding marginal effect of a ten-percent decrease in 
developmental distances increases to 0.01 percentage points. 
According to all three specifications (columns 1-3), countries which are closer to India 
geographically are favored. The probability that a country receives aid from India decreases with 
distance, at the one-percent level of significance. Holding all other explanatory variables 
constant at their mean and computing the marginal effects, a ten-percent decrease in bilateral 
distance leads to an increase in the probability to receive Indian aid by roughly 0.03 percentage 
points. The political and commercial variables do not have a significant effect on Indian aid in 
the gate-keeping stage. The coefficient on the UNGA voting alignment on key votes, the 
Commonwealth dummy, and the variable capturing the extraction of natural resources are all not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Note that the Indian exports variable gains 
statistical significance in column 3, at the five-percent level, but the suggested negative effect is 
not robust (see columns 1 and 2). The indicators of recipient merit, political rights and control of 
corruption are not statistically significant at conventional levels in all three specifications. This 
finding would support the idea that India’s aid of today still follows the ‘spirit of Bandung’, with 
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. 
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Focusing on the sample to India’s recipient countries, we analyze the subsequent 
allocation decision. As can be seen from column 4, we do not find a significant link between a 
recipient country’s stage of development and the amount of aid received. This also holds true if 
we use the developmental distance between India and the recipient instead of the recipient 
country’s  GDP per capita (column 6), or if we include both variables at the same time (column 
5). While this finding questions India’s commitment towards recipient need at the allocation 
stage, we obtain a nuanced picture if we consider the effect of the number of people affected by 
disasters. While we did not find that disaster-affected countries are more likely to enter India’s 
aid program, countries suffering from more severe natural disasters receive larger aid amounts if 
they are already among India’s aid recipients. If the number of people affected increases by one 
percent, India’s aid commitments increase by about 0.1 percent. Our results also show that larger 
countries are disfavored as the coefficient on population is negative and statistically significant, 
at the one-percent level. While this result seems surprising at first, it is in line with empirical 
evidence for China (Dreher and Fuchs 2011) and six other so-called new donors (Dreher et al. 
2011). As was the case in the gate-keeping stage, geographic proximity is also an important 
determinant of aid amounts. A one-percent increase in the distance from India to a particular 
recipient country decreases India’s aid commitments by about 1.6 percent, on average. 
Political and commercial motives are also important for India’s aid allocation decisions. 
Recipients with both a closer voting alignment with India in the UNGA and stronger commercial 
ties (proxied by Indian exports to recipient countries) do in fact receive larger aid flows from the 
“needy” donor, with both coefficients being significant at the one-percent level. If the voting 
alignment on key votes increases by ten percentage points, India increases its aid commitments 
by roughly 0.7%, on average. Accordingly, if Indian exports grow by one percent, aid increases 
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by 0.4%. These results support hypothesis 2a. In contrast to our expectations, however, India 
disfavors countries that are members of the Commonwealth. The coefficient on the 
Commonwealth dummy shows a surprising negative sign and is statistically significant, at the 
one-percent level. Our results indicate that India donates strategically in order to strengthen ties 
with developing countries with which it does not already share common ties with through being 
members of the Commonwealth. In these cases, the marginal benefit of aid giving may be higher 
compared to aid allocated to Commonwealth members. Moreover, recipient countries’ extraction 
of natural resources does not have the expected positive impact on the size of India’s aid flows. 
While we do not find a statistically significant effect of political rights on aid amounts provided 
by India, aid flows are significantly larger to countries with a relatively low level of corruption, 
at the one-percent level of significance, and in contrast to our findings at the gate-keeping stage. 
 Overall, the empirical results lend some support in favor of our “needy” donor 
hypotheses. In line with hypothesis 1b, countries at a similar developmental stage are more likely 
to enter India’s aid program (but do not receive larger aid amounts). Moreover, political and 
commercial interests have an impact on the size of India’s aid flows, which is empirical evidence 
in favor of hypothesis 2a. As a next step, we will compare the role that political and commercial 
motives play in India’s aid allocation decisions with aid flows from richer donors. By doing this, 
we test whether aid allocation from the “needy” donor India is driven to a higher extent by 
political and commercial motives than is the case for richer donor countries (hypothesis 2b). 
 
6.4.4 Comparison with DAC and Other Non-DAC Donors 
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Finally, we compare India’s aid allocation with other donors to evaluate whether aid from the 
“needy” donor under investigation is special.103 Dutt (1980, p. 676) expects India’s aid allocation 
to be closer to that of the big powers than to Scandinavian aid since “Indian elites perceive India 
as having a role on the world stage,” an assessment that became even more evident after the 2003 
budget speech. The pattern of India’s aid allocation is compared to the largest donors of the 
DAC, i.e., the United States, Japan and the three largest EU countries (Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom). We use the so-called ‘like-minded donors’ or ‘good donors’ (Canada, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) as a further benchmark. This latter group is said to 
provide development aid predominantly based on humanitarian motives.104 Beyond that, we 
compare India’s aid allocation with two emerging donors for which data are easily accessible. 
The first donor is South Korea, another large emerging Asian donor, which became a DAC 
member in 2010. The second one is the United Arab Emirates, which has provided sizable aid 
amounts since the oil crises of the 1970s. Data on ODA from these donors again cover the 2008-
2010 period, and are obtained from the OECD (2012). Unfortunately, we cannot compare India 
with China, the largest non-DAC donor, since we lack sufficient data on China’s foreign aid after 
2005 (see Dreher and Fuchs 2011 for a discussion). We use a similar set of explanatory variables 
as in our baseline model in column 1 of table 5.1. Note that we replace the Commonwealth 
dummy, which is an India-specific variable, with a general dummy variable for common colonial 
history between donor and recipient. More precisely, the variable takes a value of one if donor 
and recipient had a common colonizer (e.g., the British Crown in the case of India) or if the 
recipient was a colony of the donor country after 1945 as defined in Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
                                                            
103 We obtained data on aid allocation from the countries under comparison from the OECD (2012). 
104 Note that doubts have been raised as to whether the positive image of these donor countries is warranted (see, for 
example, Neumayer (2003b) with respect to human rights, or Strømmen et al. (2011) with respect to peace and 
human security). Similarly, in their ranking of aid agency practices, Easterly and Williamson (2011) find that 
Scandinavian donors perform surprisingly badly. 
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Moreover, we now employ the recipient’s UNGA voting alignment on key votes with the 
respective donor (not necessarily India) and, analogously, we take the exports of the respective 
donor to a recipient economy. 
In order to be able to compare the effects between donors, we run nested regressions 
rather than individual regressions for each donor (see also Berthélemy 2006, Dreher et al. 2011, 
Dreher and Fuchs 2011). This is done by interacting dummies for each donor country or donor 
group with each of our explanatory variables. In addition to the coefficients and the 
corresponding p-value of all explanatory variables for all donors (in parentheses), we compute 
the p-values of a Wald test for differences in the effect of a variable for a particular country and 
India (in italics). 
Table 5.2 displays our results. Analyzing the role of recipient needs as measured by GDP 
per capita, we find that Indian aid shows the smallest need orientation than of all donors under 
investigation. The coefficient on GDP per capita for India is the smallest in absolute terms and 
significantly different from the EU-3 and the “good” donors, at least at the five-percent level of 
significance (see p-values of the Wald test in italics). Moreover, India is the only donor for 
which population size has a negative effect on aid commitments that is statistically significant at 
conventional levels, which questions India’s actual concern for recipient needs. Only with 
respect to disaster response does India show some need orientation. Apart from Japan, India is 
the only donor with a statistically significant and positive coefficient on the number of people 
affected by disasters. 
The effect of geographic distance between the donor and recipient is the largest for India 
compared to all other donors included in the analysis. This can be interpreted as evidence that aid 
costs matter more for a “needy” donor than for “rich” donors. The p-values of the Wald test in 
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italics show that the distance coefficient for India is significantly different, at least at the five-
percent level, from the US, the EU-3 and the “good” donors. Analyzing the impact of the UNGA 
voting alignment on aid allocation, the coefficient for India is found to be the largest among the 
donors under investigation. While Indian aid is significantly more motivated by politics than aid 
from all traditional DAC donors, the difference between the coefficients is not statistically 
significant with respect to South Korea and the United Arab Emirates. While countries that share 
a common colonial legacy do not receive higher aid amounts from India and are even receiving 
less aid on average, the EU-3 and the “good” donors provide significantly more aid to countries 
which have had a colonial relationship with the respective donor country. 
The effect of bilateral exports on aid amounts is larger for India than for any of the other 
donors under investigation. According to the p-values of the Wald test in italics, Indian aid has a 
significantly closer link to commercial relationships than aid from the “good” donors and Japan. 
With regard to its relationship with natural resource endowments, we find that neither of the 
donors rewards countries extracting natural resources through increased aid flows. Likewise, we 
do not find evidence that any of the donors under investigation reward countries with greater 
political rights. Finally, we find that, alongside India, Japan is the only other donor that provides 
significantly larger amounts of aid to recipients that score better on the control-of-corruption 
index, at conventional levels of significance. 
 
6.4.5 Robustness checks 
Next, we examine the robustness of our findings. To begin with, we analyze nine additional 
variables that might influence India’s aid commitments in addition to those included in tables 5.1 
and 5.2, respectively. First, Indian aid allocation decisions are said to be related to the prevalence 
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of Indian diaspora communities (e.g., Dutt 1980, Banerjee 1982, Lafargue 2006).105 The (log) 
Indian migrant stock in recipient countries is obtained from two sources, namely the Global 
Migrant Origin Database (Parsons et al. 2007) and the MEA (2001). Second, in order to examine 
whether India targets traditional recipients of aid from China, we include a variable capturing the 
number of completed Chinese aid projects in recipient countries as a share of China’s total aid 
over the 1996-2005 period (see definition in Dreher and Fuchs 2011). A positive sign could 
suggest aid competition between the two emerging Asian powers, as suggested by some scholars 
(see Cheru and Obi 2011, for instance). Third, we add a recipient country’s (logged) infant 
mortality rate (children under the age of 5) as an alternative measure of India’s need orientation. 
Fourth, we add a dummy for countries which share a border with India to test whether India 
favors its direct neighbors in addition to the role played by geographic distance. Fifth, we replace 
the UNGA voting alignment index covering key votes with an index that covers all votes. Sixth, 
to allow for an alternative definition of what constitutes a key vote from the Indian perspective, 
we consider only those votes which show opposite voting behavior to the United States on the 
one hand, and to the four BRIC countries on the other. More precisely, we construct a voting 
alignment index based on those votes where Brazil, Russia, India and China vote ‘yes’ and the 
United States votes ‘no’ (or vice versa).106 This measure should reflect the one-dimensional 
voting pattern that continues to exist in the General Assembly after the end of the Cold War, with 
the United States and its Western allies on one pole and a “counterhegemonic voting bloc,” most 
notably the rising powers, on the other (see Voeten 2000). Seventh, we replace the 
Commonwealth dummy with a dummy that takes a value of 1 if India and a recipient country 
                                                            
105 Lafargue (2006) identifies Indian diaspora as intermediaries for Indian investments in their respective host 
country. 
106 We also considered the construction of a voting alignment index based on the instances in which India and 
Pakistan voted differently. There are, however, only very few instances in which India and Pakistan showed 
opposite voting behavior during our period of analysis. 
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share a common language (i.e., English). Eighth, the Commonwealth dummy is substituted by a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the recipient country and India had a common 
colonizer after 1945 (i.e., the British Crown). Ninth, we replace the political rights measure with 
a dummy capturing whether a recipient country qualifies as a democracy as defined in Cheibub 
et al. (2010). 
 Detailed tables containing the regression results are reported in tables 5.6 and 5.7 in 
appendix. In the gate-keeping stage (see table 5.6 in appendix), we do not find any statistical 
significance for the variables listed above, at conventional levels of significance. For example, 
neither Indian diaspora communities nor aid projects lead to a significant increase (or decrease) 
in the probability that a developing country enters India’s aid program. The outlined changes in 
the definition of the various explanatory variables do not change our main conclusions. In the 
allocation stage, we confirm the large positive significant effect of a country’s UNGA voting 
alignment when we use the two alternative definitions instead. Note that the common colony 
dummy takes a negative sign, at the one-percent level, in line with our results for the 
Commonwealth dummy. Apart from these variables, all other variables introduced do not reach 
statistical significance at conventional levels. 
Finally, we run a sub-sample analysis by restricting our sample to those countries that 
receive aid from India. Aware that this approach has its limitations, we intend to control for 
differences between the sample of India’s aid recipients and that of other donors.107 As before, 
we run nested regressions by interacting dummies for each donor country with each of our 
explanatory variables. By construction, the results for India are exactly the same as those 
reported in table 5.2. These results are reported in table 5.7 in appendix. With respect to per-
                                                            
107 Our sample includes 51 countries that receive aid from India in the 2008-2010 period.  
Essays in Political Economy 
 
196 
 
capita GDP, the respective coefficients for the United States, Japan and South Korea lose their 
statistical significance. When restricting the sample to Indian aid recipients only, Indian aid does 
not appear to be inferior with respect to need orientation compared to all other donors under 
investigation (see p-values of the Wald test in italics). Concerning the UNGA voting alignment, 
however, our results confirm the high importance of political interests in India’s aid allocation. 
The respective coefficient for India is still larger than for any traditional DAC donor, the 
difference being statistically significant, at least at the five-percent level (except for the United 
States). Note that the coefficient on UNGA voting alignment is now larger for South Korea than 
for India, but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (as indicated by 
the p-value in italics). Although the EU-3, South Korea and UAE retain the expected sign and 
level of significance on bilateral exports, “good” donors and Japan are now positive and 
significantly different from zero, at the one-percent level. Finally, we also find some changes 
with respect to the corruption variable. We now find that the coefficients for the EU-3 and the 
“good” donors (along with India and Japan) become positive and statistically significant, at least 
at the five-percent level of significance. With respect to population size, mineral and energy 
depletion, and political rights, our results largely mimic those in table 5.2. Taken together, while 
commercial interests do not seem to play a significantly larger role for India than for most “rich” 
donors, according to this robustness check, the sub-sample analysis largely confirms the 
outstanding importance of political interests compared to most traditional DAC donors. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Despite having a large amount of its population suffering from underdevelopment, chronic 
poverty and mal-governance, India has jumped on the bandwagon in the ‘business’ of 
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development aid. This is puzzling. According to a recent World Bank report on India, about 37% 
of the Indian population lives on less than US$ 1.25 a day (World Bank 2011). Although India 
has a large number of anti-poverty schemes and programs to tackle these problems, the progress 
made in poverty reduction is rather small. Against this background, it is ironic that India 
provides development aid to other developing countries. Many of India’s aid recipients even 
have a larger income per capita than India.108 
With the intension of understanding why poor countries such as India provide foreign aid, 
this paper has empirically analyzed India’s aid allocation decisions. We utilized data on aid 
commitments by the Ministry of External Affairs to 127 developing countries in US dollars, 
obtained from the AidData database for the 2008-2010 period. To examine whether India is 
different, we also compared India’s aid allocation decisions with those of other donors. Our 
empirical results show that India’s aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of the 
behavior of a “needy” donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India’s aid 
allocation. We find the importance of political interests, proxied by UNGA voting alignment, to 
be significantly larger for India than for all traditional DAC donors under investigation. 
Moreover, India favors countries which are geographically closer, and countries at a similar 
developmental stage are more likely to enter India’s aid program. 
From our results, it appears that the “needy” donor India predominantly cares about its 
own needs rather than the needs of others. Given India’s domestic problems, this is 
understandable. Although India’s own interests dominate its aid allocation, it may nevertheless 
be the case that India’s assistance is effective in terms of poverty reduction and other 
                                                            
108 23 recipients of Indian aid had a larger income per capita than India (based on 2007 values of GDP per capita in 
international dollars and purchasing power parity): Armenia, Belarus, Bhutan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cuba, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Indonesia, Jamaica, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Samoa, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Turkmenistan. 
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developmental goals with respect to recipient countries.109 This merits further investigation. 
Concerning political self-interest, Agrawal (2007) raises doubts over the long-term political 
gains resulting from India’s engagement. Future research may also evaluate whether Indian aid, 
officially aimed at the promotion of India’s welfare in addition to that of aid recipients, actually 
supports India’s own development. 
While we find that India’s allocation is partially in line with our expectations of a 
“needy” donor, India itself does not want to be perceived as such. This is made clear by the 
comments of India’s Minister of Finance, Pranab Mukherjee, who characterized British aid to 
India as a “peanut” compared to India’s own development expenditures.110 Moreover, India 
made its ambitions clear by announcing to setup a foreign aid agency, which is said to manage 
the distribution of aid flows amounting to 11 billion US dollars over the next five to seven 
years.111 If India aspires to be recognized as one of the big aid donors, it would be beneficial 
from India’s point of view to, first, establish clearly outlined aid legislation, and second, increase 
its aid transparency. Clearly identified goals and the provision of detailed and transparent aid 
records will not only alleviate India’s credibility as an emerging aid donor, but will also enhance 
the scope for coordination with other aid donors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
109 If this is the case, India’s aid would differ from DAC aid. Analyzing the effect of aid on growth, empirical 
evidence in Kilby and Dreher (2010) suggests that donor motives matter for aid effectiveness. 
110 “India tells Britain: We don't want your aid,” The Telegraph, 4 February 2012, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9061844/India-tells-Britain-We-dont-want-your-aid.html 
(last accessed: May 28, 2012). 
111 “Aid 2.0,” The Economist, 13 August 2011, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21525899 (last 
accessed: May 28, 2012). 
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Table 5.1: Allocation of India’s aid commitments (2008-2010) 
 
  SELECTION ALLOCATION 
                     Probit OLS 
                     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(log) GDP per capita       -0.315*         -0.244                          -0.241          -0.243                    
                          (0.060)         (0.182)                         (0.226)         (0.209)                    
(log) Developmental distance                       -0.228*         -0.268**                         0.012          -0.015    
                                          (0.097)         (0.039)                         (0.936)         (0.924)    
(log) Affected from disasters       -0.060          -0.079*         -0.063           0.111**         0.112*          0.126**  
                          (0.137)         (0.059)         (0.126)         (0.037)         (0.055)         (0.015)    
(log) Population            0.028           0.060           0.113          -0.526***       -0.530***       -0.451**  
                          (0.852)         (0.697)         (0.438)         (0.002)         (0.004)         (0.012)    
(log) Distance             -0.847***       -0.798***       -0.802***       -1.668***       -1.670***       -1.695*** 
                          (0.001)         (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
UN voting (key votes)        0.364           0.526           0.689           6.918***        6.911***        6.631*** 
                          (0.747)         (0.647)         (0.542)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
Commonwealth                0.434           0.464           0.503          -1.203***       -1.209***       -1.182*** 
                          (0.146)         (0.132)         (0.101)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)    
(log) Indian exports       -0.152          -0.157          -0.197**         0.398***        0.400***        0.359*** 
                          (0.123)         (0.117)         (0.036)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.003)    
(log) Resource depletion        0.002          -0.002          -0.011          -0.019          -0.019          -0.024    
                          (0.924)         (0.895)         (0.488)         (0.339)         (0.355)         (0.217)    
Political rights           -0.140          -0.144          -0.145           0.037           0.038           0.039    
                          (0.173)         (0.165)         (0.157)         (0.798)         (0.800)         (0.801)    
Control of corruption       -0.228          -0.177          -0.289           1.474***        1.469***        1.459*** 
                          (0.421)         (0.557)         (0.307)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
Constant       12.592***       13.075***       11.043***       26.284***       26.253***       24.308*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
Number of observations          125             125             125              51              51              51    
Prob>Chi2 / Prob>F          0.002           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000    
(Pseudo) R-Squared           0.17            0.19            0.18            0.83            0.82            0.82    
Notes: * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level 
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Table 5.2: Comparison of India’s aid allocation with other donors (2008-2010) 
  India USA EU-3 Good donors Japan Korea UAE 
(log) GDP per capita       -0.249          -0.646**        -0.798***       -1.007***       -0.586***       -0.562*         -0.926*** 
                          (0.165)         (0.021)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.067)         (0.007)    
           0.211           0.016           0.002           0.163           0.344           0.092    
(log) Affected from disasters        0.097**         0.039          -0.044           0.054           0.103***        0.045          -0.076    
                          (0.039)         (0.500)         (0.358)         (0.231)         (0.007)         (0.524)         (0.392)    
           0.384           0.013           0.441           0.925           0.475           0.101    
(log) Population           -0.483***        0.699***        0.679***        0.462***        0.371***        0.524***       -0.012    
                          (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.004)         (0.960)    
           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.108    
(log) Distance             -1.634***        0.171          -0.386*         -0.722**        -1.483***       -0.779          -0.934    
                          (0.000)         (0.740)         (0.081)         (0.021)         (0.000)         (0.115)         (0.168)    
           0.002           0.000           0.033           0.681           0.123           0.321    
UN voting (key votes)        6.826***        2.009*          1.873*          0.165           0.926           1.923           2.453    
                          (0.000)         (0.077)         (0.085)         (0.906)         (0.506)         (0.627)         (0.424)    
           0.006           0.005           0.001           0.002           0.236           0.229    
Common colonial history       -1.219***        1.221           1.622***        4.803***            0.860    
                          (0.000)         (0.465)         (0.000)         (0.000)             (0.191)    
           0.153           0.000           0.000               0.008    
(log) Bilateral exports        0.401***        0.088           0.367***        0.121           0.068           0.285**         0.187**  
                          (0.000)         (0.620)         (0.004)         (0.173)         (0.220)         (0.025)         (0.019)    
           0.118           0.835           0.025           0.007           0.444           0.102    
(log) Resource depletion       -0.027           0.012           0.020          -0.011          -0.013          -0.020          -0.012    
                          (0.115)         (0.563)         (0.199)         (0.591)         (0.296)         (0.473)         (0.723)    
           0.133           0.017           0.514           0.498           0.816           0.691    
Political rights            0.056          -0.126           0.068           0.004          -0.012           0.058           0.058    
       (0.676)         (0.306)         (0.340)         (0.967)         (0.888)         (0.744)         (0.752)    
           0.333           0.939           0.780           0.677           0.992           0.993    
Control of corruption        1.481***       -0.572           0.202           0.433           0.467**        -0.273          -0.032    
       (0.000)         (0.188)         (0.438)         (0.227)         (0.045)         (0.552)         (0.964)    
           0.000           0.001           0.004           0.003           0.000           0.051    
Donor country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1371 
Number of recipients 125 
     - per donor group 51 124 125 124 125 118 87 
R-Squared   0.58 
Notes:               
- Estimation technique: Nested OLS model with standard errors clustered by recipient country     
- Dependent variable: (log) Aid commitments to recipient country, sum 2008-2010       
- We report coefficients of the explanatory variables (corresponding p-values in parentheses)     
- In italics: p-values of a Wald test of equal marginal effects of the respective donor (group) compared to India 
- * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level         
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Figure 3.1: Aid provided by the MEA in millions of constant 2000 US$ (1966-2010) 
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Notes: BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party; UPA: United Progressive Alliance led by Indian National Congress. 
 
Figure 3.2: India’s aid allocation by region (MEA, 2008-2010) 
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Figure 3.3: India’s aid allocation by sector (MEA, 2008-2010) 
0 5 10 15 20 25
% share of total aid
Banking & Financial services
Unspecified sectors
Agriculture & allied sectors
Humanitarian
Commmunications
Education
Industry
Health
Multisector
Govt & Civil Society
Commodity & General
Transport & Storage
Water Supply & Sanitation
Energy
 
Figure 3.4: Aid allocation and developmental distance 
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6.7 Appendix  
 
Table 5.3: Definitions and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Explained variables     
1 if aid commitment  1 if aid committed to recipient country, 2008-2010 AidData (Tierney et al. 2011) 
(log) Aid commitment (log) Aid commitments to recipient country (constant 2000 US$), sum, 2008-2010 AidData (Tierney et al. 2011) 
Explanatory variables: Main results   
(log) GDP per capita (log) GDP per capita (constant 2005 I$), lag Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009) 
(log) Developmental distance (log) Absolute difference between the per-capita GDP of donor and recipient, lag 
Own construction based on Penn World 
Tables 
(log) Affected from disasters (log) Number of people affected by disasters, average EM-DAT (2010) 
(log) Population     (log) Total population, lag Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009) 
(log) Distance       (log) Bilateral distance (weighted by populations of major cities) CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006) 
UN voting alignment (key votes) UNGA voting alignment between donor and recipient (key votes), lag 
Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009), Kilby 
(2009b) 
Commonwealth 1 if recipient is a non-suspended member of the Commonwealth, lag 
www.thecommonwealth.org, internet 
research 
Common colonial history 
1 if donor and recipient have had a colonial relationship or a common colonizer 
after 1945 CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006) 
(log) Indian/Bilateral exports (log) Total exports from donor to recipient country, lag 
UN Comtrade via WITS 
(http://wits.worldbank.org) 
(log) Resource depletion 
(log) Product of unit resource rents and physical quantities of energy and minerals 
extracted, lag 
World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
Political rights Index of political rights rated on a seven-point scale (1: most free), lag Freedom House (2009) 
Control of corruption 
Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better 
governance, lag Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Explanatory variables: Robustness checks   
(log) Indian migrants (def. 1) (log) Indian migrant stock in recipient country, 2000 round of population censuses 
Global Migrant Origin Database (Parsons 
et al. 2007) 
(log) Indian migrants (def. 2) (log) Estimated size of Indian community in recipient country, 2001 MEA (2001b) 
Chinese aid projects 
Number of Chinese aid projects completed in recipient country (% of total), 1996-
2005 Dreher and Fuchs (2011) 
(log) Under-5 mortality Rate (log) Mortality rate, under 5 years (per 1000), lag World Bank 
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(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
Neighbor             1 if donor and recipient share a border CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006) 
UN voting UNGA voting alignment between donor and recipient, lag 
Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009), Kilby 
(2009b) 
UN voting (BRIC vs USA) 
UNGA voting alignment between donor and recipient (disagreement between 
BRIC and USA), lag 
Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009), Kilby 
(2009b) 
Common language 
1 if e if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in donor and recipient 
country CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006) 
Democracy            1 if the regime qualifies as democratic, lag Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Notes:     
- Values in current US$ have been transformed to constant 2000 US$ using US Consumer Price Indices from the World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
- The value of 1 has been added to exports and natural resource variables as well as to the number of people affected by disasters before taking logarithms 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Observations Mean Stdandard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
1 if aid commitment  125 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
(log) Aid commitment 51 13.28 2.45 9.02 20.07 
(log) GDP per capita 125 8.37 0.97 5.95 10.16 
Control of corruption 125 7.86 1.09 3.83 10.00 
(log) Affected from disasters 125 9.21 4.34 0.00 18.71 
(log) Population     125 15.62 2.02 10.59 21.00 
(log) Distance       125 8.83 0.64 7.04 9.74 
UN voting (key votes) 125 0.74 0.14 0.25 0.93 
Commonwealth 125 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Common colonial history 125 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
(log) Resource depletion 125 13.16 10.22 0.00 25.82 
Political rights     125 3.94 1.95 1.00 7.00 
Control of corruption 125 -0.47 0.59 -1.38 1.34 
(log) Indian migrants (def. 1) 125 6.17 2.99 0.00 13.86 
(log) Indian migrants (def. 2) 125 4.73 4.24 0.00 14.33 
Chinese project aid  124 0.75 0.94 0.00 4.62 
(log) Under-5 mortality Rate 125 3.84 0.90 1.76 5.57 
Neighbor             125 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
UN Voting alignment 125 0.79 0.10 0.38 0.89 
UN Voting alignment (BRIC vs USA) 125 0.92 0.12 0.37 1.00 
Common language 125 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Democracy            125 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for sample as in table 5.1, column 1 
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Table 5.5: Further checks on Robustness – Probit estimations of Allocation of India’s aid commitments (2008-2010) 
                     Baseline (1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(log) GDP per capita       -0.315*         -0.308*         -0.313*         -0.247          -0.469**        -0.315*         -0.316*         -0.321*         -0.331*         -0.320*         -0.319*   
                          (0.060)         (0.067)         (0.061)         (0.165)         (0.037)         (0.059)         (0.057)         (0.053)         (0.052)         (0.059)         (0.054)    
(log) Affected from disasters       -0.060          -0.057          -0.060          -0.066          -0.058          -0.060          -0.062          -0.060          -0.058          -0.058          -0.053    
                          (0.137)         (0.170)         (0.139)         (0.102)         (0.145)         (0.134)         (0.128)         (0.139)         (0.151)         (0.152)         (0.177)    
(log) Population            0.028           0.015           0.031           0.062           0.007           0.028           0.022           0.028          -0.027          -0.009           0.016    
                          (0.852)         (0.924)         (0.837)         (0.681)         (0.963)         (0.852)         (0.883)         (0.850)         (0.854)         (0.950)         (0.914)    
(log) Distance             -0.847***       -0.806***       -0.847***       -0.783***       -0.825***       -0.841***       -0.873***       -0.850***       -0.852***       -0.852***       -0.797*** 
                          (0.001)         (0.004)         (0.001)         (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)    
UN voting (key votes)        0.364           0.375           0.337           0.157           0.610           0.365                                           0.602           0.530           0.380    
                          (0.747)         (0.738)         (0.767)         (0.889)         (0.590)         (0.746)                                         (0.590)         (0.641)         (0.727)    
Commonwealth                0.434           0.408           0.424           0.432           0.494           0.432           0.436           0.448                                           0.549*   
                          (0.146)         (0.169)         (0.162)         (0.150)         (0.100)         (0.146)         (0.140)         (0.128)                                         (0.061)    
(log) Indian exports       -0.152          -0.166          -0.157          -0.165*         -0.148          -0.152          -0.162          -0.144          -0.126          -0.136          -0.152    
                          (0.123)         (0.102)         (0.128)         (0.092)         (0.135)         (0.124)         (0.101)         (0.137)         (0.197)         (0.166)         (0.121)    
(log) Resource depletion        0.002           0.002           0.001           0.001           0.003           0.002           0.002           0.002           0.003           0.003           0.003    
                          (0.924)         (0.908)         (0.948)         (0.940)         (0.885)         (0.923)         (0.896)         (0.920)         (0.877)         (0.864)         (0.852)    
Political rights           -0.140          -0.136          -0.139          -0.133          -0.135          -0.140          -0.142          -0.131          -0.163          -0.162                    
                          (0.173)         (0.184)         (0.175)         (0.201)         (0.190)         (0.173)         (0.153)         (0.171)         (0.124)         (0.116)                    
Control of corruption       -0.228          -0.237          -0.231          -0.211          -0.315          -0.230          -0.250          -0.212          -0.205          -0.219          -0.114    
                          (0.421)         (0.404)         (0.415)         (0.452)         (0.291)         (0.423)         (0.378)         (0.450)         (0.467)         (0.440)         (0.670)    
(log) Indian migrants (def. 1)                        0.026                                                                                                                                                    
                       (0.662)                                                                                                                                                    
(log) Indian migrants (def. 2)                                        0.005                                                                                                                                    
                                                          (0.883)                                                                                                                                    
Chinese project aid                                                         0.190                                                                                                                    
                                                                          (0.174)                                                                                                                    
(log) Under-5 mortality Rate                                                                       -0.246                                                                                                    
                                                                                          (0.291)                                                                                                    
Neighbor                                                                                                    0.035                                                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.961)                                                                                    
UN voting                                                                                                                   0.978                                                                    
                                                                                                                          (0.492)                                                                    
UN voting (BRIC vs USA)                                                                                                                        0.073                                                    
                                                                                                                                          (0.950)                                                    
Common language                                                                                                                                             0.039                                    
                                                                                                                                                          (0.894)                                    
Colonial relationship                                                                                                                                                        0.148                    
                                                                                                                                                                          (0.624)                    
Democracy                                                                                                                                                                                   0.442    
                                                                                                                                                                                          (0.133)    
Constant      12.592***      12.416***      12.632***      11.210***      14.607***      12.546***      12.617***      12.704***      13.218***      13.031***      11.524*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.002)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
Number of observations          125             125             125             124             125             125             125             125             125             125             125    
Prob>Chi2                   0.002           0.003           0.003           0.003           0.001           0.003           0.002           0.002           0.002           0.002           0.002    
Pseudo R-Squared             0.17            0.17            0.17            0.18            0.18            0.17            0.17            0.17            0.16            0.16            0.17    
Notes: Dependent variable: Dummy that takes a value of one if aid was committed to a recipient country during the 2008-2010 period / * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent 
level 
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Appendix 5.6: Further checks on Robustness – OLS estimations of Allocation of India’s aid commitments (2008-2010) 
                     baseline (1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(log) GDP per capita       -0.241          -0.235          -0.240          -0.214          -0.047          -0.230          -0.317          -0.286          -0.233          -0.249          -0.251    
                          (0.226)         (0.251)         (0.233)         (0.292)         (0.880)         (0.246)         (0.126)         (0.175)         (0.340)         (0.208)         (0.201)    
(log) Affected from disasters        0.111**         0.112**         0.111**         0.109**         0.106**         0.108**         0.077           0.075           0.101*          0.097*          0.110**  
                          (0.037)         (0.041)         (0.040)         (0.042)         (0.034)         (0.043)         (0.162)         (0.173)         (0.060)         (0.063)         (0.036)    
(log) Population           -0.526***       -0.533***       -0.526***       -0.531***       -0.532***       -0.522***       -0.502***       -0.465***       -0.363**        -0.483***       -0.542*** 
                          (0.002)         (0.004)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.008)         (0.037)         (0.004)         (0.003)    
(log) Distance             -1.668***       -1.646***       -1.669***       -1.630***       -1.660***       -1.529***       -1.997***       -2.053***       -1.857***       -1.634***       -1.635*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
UN voting (key votes)        6.918***        6.968***        6.907***        6.933***        6.858***        7.215***                                        5.926***        6.826***        6.941*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)                                         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
Commonwealth               -1.203***       -1.214***       -1.210***       -1.210***       -1.236***       -1.199***       -1.050***       -1.000***                                       -1.292*** 
                          (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.003)         (0.006)                                         (0.000)    
(log) Indian exports        0.398***        0.394***        0.395***        0.398***        0.413***        0.383***        0.365***        0.378***        0.292**         0.401***        0.412*** 
                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.015)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
(log) Resource depletion       -0.019          -0.019          -0.019          -0.019          -0.019          -0.019          -0.010          -0.011          -0.014          -0.027          -0.020    
                          (0.339)         (0.325)         (0.316)         (0.350)         (0.349)         (0.347)         (0.625)         (0.622)         (0.534)         (0.153)         (0.303)    
Political rights            0.037           0.038           0.037           0.039           0.030           0.035           0.072           0.096           0.052           0.056                    
                          (0.798)         (0.797)         (0.802)         (0.788)         (0.849)         (0.812)         (0.568)         (0.447)         (0.750)         (0.703)                    
Control of corruption        1.474***        1.473***        1.470***        1.465***        1.426***        1.403***        1.508***        1.587***        1.505***        1.481***        1.461*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
(log) Indian migrants (def. 1)                        0.011                                                                                                                                                    
                       (0.892)                                                                                                                                                    
(log) Indian migrants (def. 2)                                        0.004                                                                                                                                    
                                                          (0.920)                                                                                                                                    
Chinese project aid                                                         0.080                                                                                                                    
                                                                          (0.551)                                                                                                                    
(log) Under-5 mortality Rate                                                                        0.341                                                                                                    
                                                                                          (0.267)                                                                                                    
Neighbor                                                                                                    0.682                                                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.268)                                                                                    
UN voting                                                                                                                   8.478***                                                                 
                                                                                                                          (0.000)                                                                    
UN voting (BRIC vs USA)                                                                                                                        5.854***                                                 
                                                                                                                                          (0.000)                                                    
Common language                                                                                                                                            -0.239                                    
                                                                                                                                                          (0.486)                                    
Common colonial history                                                                                                                                                       -1.219***                 
                                                                                                                                                                          (0.001)                    
Democracy                                                                                                                                                                                  -0.259    
                                                                                                                                                                                          (0.498)    
Constant      26.284***      26.111***      26.321***      25.727***      23.238***      24.922***      28.461***      29.206***      27.486***      25.511***      26.396*** 
       (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)    
Number of observations           51              51              51              51              51              51              51              51              51              51              51    
Prob>F                      0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000    
R-Squared                    0.83            0.82            0.82            0.82            0.83            0.83            0.84            0.84            0.77            0.83            0.83    
Notes: Dependent variable: (log) Aid commitments to recipient country, sum 2008-2010 / * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level       
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Table 5.7: Further checks on Robustness: Comparison of India’s aid allocation with other donors 
(Indian aid recipients only, 2008-2010) 
  India USA EU-3 Good donors Japan Korea UAE 
(log) GDP per capita       -0.249           0.003          -0.628**        -0.647**        -0.314          -0.237          -1.174**  
                          (0.191)         (0.994)         (0.035)         (0.011)         (0.108)         (0.429)         (0.027)    
           0.552           0.203           0.154           0.823           0.970           0.119    
(log) Affected from disasters        0.097*          0.131*          0.025           0.062           0.083*          0.099          -0.213    
                          (0.053)         (0.083)         (0.705)         (0.342)         (0.056)         (0.278)         (0.188)    
           0.696           0.244           0.595           0.844           0.979           0.073    
(log) Population           -0.483***        0.868***        0.543**         0.567***        0.312**         0.841***       -0.256    
                          (0.002)         (0.005)         (0.013)         (0.001)         (0.020)         (0.000)         (0.507)    
           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.601    
(log) Distance             -1.634***        0.184          -0.535          -1.139**        -1.467***       -1.336***       -2.001*   
                          (0.000)         (0.798)         (0.317)         (0.022)         (0.000)         (0.002)         (0.072)    
           0.025           0.041           0.394           0.618           0.544           0.739    
UN voting (key votes)        6.826***        4.023          -0.383           0.717          -0.076          10.602**        -1.883    
                          (0.000)         (0.165)         (0.880)         (0.766)         (0.964)         (0.016)         (0.678)    
           0.389           0.021           0.030           0.001           0.388           0.097    
Common colonial history       -1.219***        4.189***        1.039**         2.681***            0.606    
                          (0.000)         (0.007)         (0.050)         (0.000)             (0.519)    
           0.001           0.000           0.000               0.092    
(log) Bilateral exports        0.401***        0.043           0.506***        0.311***        0.220***        0.217*          0.231**  
                          (0.001)         (0.858)         (0.009)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.074)         (0.014)    
           0.136           0.616           0.468           0.179           0.184           0.226    
(log) Resource depletion       -0.027           0.037           0.012          -0.030          -0.019          -0.031           0.020    
                          (0.137)         (0.253)         (0.630)         (0.291)         (0.164)         (0.222)         (0.618)    
           0.066           0.084           0.926           0.716           0.914           0.301    
Political rights            0.056          -0.026           0.083           0.141          -0.052           0.186          -0.499    
       (0.692)         (0.897)         (0.410)         (0.251)         (0.474)         (0.177)         (0.190)    
           0.756           0.881           0.697           0.491           0.468           0.200    
Control of corruption        1.481***        0.175           0.972**         1.321***        0.573**        -0.267          -1.157    
       (0.000)         (0.805)         (0.021)         (0.005)         (0.048)         (0.607)         (0.398)    
           0.094           0.314           0.707           0.025           0.001           0.064    
Donor country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 574 
Number of recipients 51 
     - per donor group 51 51 51 50 51 49 33 
R-Squared   0.65 
Notes:               
- Estimation technique: Nested OLS with standard errors clustered by recipient country       
- Dependent variable: (log) Aid commitments to recipient country, sum 2008-2010       
- We report coefficients of the explanatory variables (corresponding p-values in parentheses)     
- In italics: p-values of a Wald test of equal marginal effects of the respective donor (group) compared to India 
- * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level         
 
 
 
 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays in Political Economy 
 
215 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
This final section briefly summarizes the findings of this work. The thesis consists of three 
essays in the field of international political economy, and two essays in political economy of 
development in India. The international political economy essays focus on a wide array of topics. 
We examine the social effects of globalization and market economic policy reforms. In doing so, 
we have expanded the knowledge-base surrounding the political economy literature through 
several dimensions. 
The question of whether free-market reforms cause decline in human rights is an issue 
that is extensively debated in the literature, particularly in debates surrounding globalization and 
the effects of IMF interventions. In the absence of a meaningful consensus, the question of 
whether economic reforms  towards freer markets cause social dissent and disarray, measured by 
the level and degree of state violations of human rights, is one which needs to be dealt with 
empirically. We address this by examining the association between the level and rate of change 
towards more free-market policies, and the respect for the human rights of individual citizens in 
their own states. The results support those who argue that freer markets generate better economic 
conditions and higher levels of social harmony.  
Advancing the debate on the intervention effects of global financial institutions on 
political stability, we critically examine the theoretical and empirical evidence of Hartzell, 
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Hoddie and Bauer (2010) find that signing on to an IMF structural adjustment program (SAP) 
increases the risk of civil war. We question their crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF 
programs on the economic environment, and more specifically, who actually wins and losses 
from liberalization, as well as who might be in a position to rebel. Clearly, separating the effects 
of a crisis itself from IMF interventions is crucial, since crises also generate losers in their own 
right. With minor adjustments to their dataset, we find the opposite of what they conclude. These 
findings highlight the need for a careful analysis; if one is to believe that IMF intervention leads 
to civil war, then it is important to find out the exact channels through which the IMF has this 
impact. 
In the third chapter, we utilize spatial econometric methods to estimate whether labour 
rights in one country depend on those elsewhere. We find positive support for this argument, 
which is consistent with strategic complements and a necessary condition for there to be a race to 
the bottom. In particular, this seems to be driven primarily by competition in labour practices 
rather than labour laws, suggesting that competition is influenced more by a failure to enforce 
regulations than unwillingness to enforce them. Since there is a noticeable downward trend in 
both of these measures over the sample period, we interpret this as competition for FDI, as 
opposed to a diffusion of labour rights, which would result in an improvement in laws, possibly 
even as practices declined as more workers sought to assert their rights. We thus take this as an 
evidence of a race to the bottom. 
In chapters four and five we examine two critical issues related to India. In chapter four, 
we investigate whether the timing of elections affects the responsiveness of the incumbent state 
governments to control corruption activities. The findings show that scheduled elections, but not 
unscheduled elections, are associated with an increase in the number of corruption cases 
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registered by anti-corruption agencies in Indian states. These effects are found to be stronger in 
swing states and in those states where state scheduled elections coincide with national elections. 
However, we do not find any effect of scheduled elections on corruption cases being investigated 
by anti-corruption agencies. The policy conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is the 
need for independent anti-corruption institutions, which are free from political interference and 
are equipped with independent investigative and prosecution powers. 
The final chapter examines the determinants of India’s development aid program. With 
the intension of understanding why poor countries such as India provide foreign aid, this paper 
has empirically analyzed India’s aid allocation decisions. We utilized data on aid commitments 
by the Ministry of External Affairs to 127 developing countries in US dollars, obtained from the 
AidData database for the 2008-2010 period. To examine whether India is different, we also 
compared India’s aid allocation decisions with those of other donors. Our empirical results show 
that India’s aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of the behavior of a “needy” 
donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India’s aid allocation. We find the 
importance of political interests, proxied by UNGA voting alignment, to be significantly larger 
for India than for all traditional DAC donors under investigation. Moreover, India favors 
countries which are geographically closer, and countries at a similar developmental stage are 
more likely to enter India’s aid program. 
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